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**Brazil and the Americas:**

**Convergences and Perspectives**

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Introduction

The book that the reader has in hand, the fruit of an interdisciplinary seminar held in Berlin in December 2004 which brought together scholars from Germany and different regions of the Americas, is guided by a dual perspective and objective, a fact reflected by the authors and themes that it brings together. It is on one hand, a view from outside Brazil that seeks to understand how Brazilian society is responding to the processes of global integration. At the same time, there is also an internal perspective of observation that documents the plurality of ways that social actors and analysts interpret the transformations underway. The common thread of the various perspectives of analysis involved, which, therefore, unifies the different articles joined here, is not their focus on Brazil, but more properly the interest in the relations between Brazil and the world, based on the context of the Americas. It can be said that it is not a book about Brazil, but of a set of reflections, oriented by the case of a specific country, about the way that local, regional and global processes and contexts have been interweaving in various fields.

In the political realm, the deep crises generated by the corruption scandal in the government of the Workers Party in 2005 triggered ambivalent reactions and sentiments among the analysts. Whatever the lesson that one can learn from it, the Brazilian crises has important consequences, to the degree to which it marks the expectations placed in the Latin American left, at a time in which governments have been elected in various countries on the sub-continent, which, like the Workers Party in Brazil, earned their principal electoral conquests from the defense of social justice and a solid base among the poorest sectors.

The new forms of insertion of Latin America and Brazil, in particular in the “post-national” world, are treated in historical perspective in the article by Jorge Larrain, revealing the connections between the history of (subordinated) integration of the countries of the region to modernity, the neoliberal cycle of the 1990’s and the alternatives presented to these policies.
From a more programmatic perspective, Gustavo Lins Ribeiro continues the analysis begun by Larrain. His immediate interlocutors are post-colonial studies. Thus, in place of a maximum “provincialization of Europe”, proposed by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Ribeiro defends a post-imperialist agenda that could provincialize the United States. In the realm of institutional policy, Jean Daudelin studies recent movements of Brazilian diplomacy, showing that if the country’s foreign policy does not – and this is not its objective – provincialize the Empire, it at least leads to expressive growth of the importance of Brazil in the international arena.

In the economic realm, apparently ambiguous developments are noted, marked by the complete insertion of the Brazilian economy in the context of global accumulation simultaneously with a certain disintegration of the national economy. While, since 1990, Brazil has followed, with certain success, an aggressive strategy of opening to the world market of goods and capital, internally an apparent disorganization of the economy is found, with exponential growth of informal relations and even of illegal and criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and the predatory exploitation of natural resources. This does not indicate, by any means, the emergence of a dual economy: the informal and illegal sectors are completely intertwined with the more modern and dynamic economic sectors and are also trans-nationally connected. The article by Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra presents an overview of developments in Brazilian economy during the accelerated phase of internationalization. It considers both the changes noted in the economic policies adopted in recent years, as well as their repercussions on the “real economy”, thus indicating the difficulties imposed on economic growth in the present context.

The paradoxes of economic integration are reflected in an amplified manner on the social plane. On one hand, the non-governmental social movements and organizations that have multiplied since the final years of the military dictatorship have been able to establish increasingly effective alliances on the American continent and worldwide. This has increased their effectiveness and power in political negotiations. Nevertheless, simultaneously to the strengthening of these forms of mobilization, there has been a growing vulnerability of politically unorganized sectors. Thus, the many years of policies to limit social spending, associated to the deep social inequality that ap-
pears chronic in Brazilian society, make the poor sectors even more vulnerable to the offers of populist politicians and leaders who seek to instrumentalize less organized groups. New religious leaders who promise immediate benefits in the living conditions of their followers have thus had growing influence among the groups that live at the limit of anomie. Equally concerning is the explosion of violence and criminality, mostly associated to drug dealing and the control of dealers over favelas and neighborhoods of the periphery of Brazilian metropolitan regions. Therefore, pari passu with the civil society that is pluralized, transnationalized and which seeks to broaden the effectiveness of democracy and the rule of law, an incivil society has been growing, which takes advantage of the absence of the State and of law to impose its power.

The tensions between civil and incivil society are reflected in different contributions found in this book. The article by Alberto Olvera is concerned with placing these discussions in context, by showing how Latin American civil societies, even those squeezed by the authoritarian history and by the draining of the space of politics that accompany the processes of structural readjustment, effectively contribute to the deepening of democracy in the region.

The many dimensions and contradictions in the processes of internationalization of civil society are addressed in the contributions of Bila Sorj and Aparecida Fonseca Moraes about the women’s movement and by Patricia Pinho’s article about the connections between African Americans and Afro-Brazilians. In distinct manners, both articles show that transnational relationships between social actors are marked by expectations that are not always realistic, and principally, by the asymmetries of political power present in the relations between the respective nation states.

In the article by Marjo de Theije, the paradoxes of transnationalization are treated from a frequently forgotten focus: the relationship between migration and religion. Based on a careful ethnographic study, the author discusses the daily life of the actors, showing how social relations, values and beliefs are being recodified by migratory movements.

In the field of cultural and symbolic production, we have witnessed in recent years a reordering of that which is defined as national culture. Historically, the construction of the national identity took
place through the ideological eulogy of the racial mixing that celebrates Brazil as a melting pot capable of combining the cultural differences and preferences of the various groups that compose the country. In the context of globalization, a plurality of a different nature is celebrated. This involves a broad and creative reception of various and contradictory cultural influences which, at times, as in the case of Funk and Hip Hop, seek to denounce the assimilationist policy that presided over the formation of the national culture. In cities such as Recife, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, these cultural manifestations are already mass movements, leaving forms of expression such as samba, frevo or maracatu adapted, refunctionalized and challenged in their role as the principal carriers of national culture. Nevertheless, what is found in the cultural field is not a national/global dichotomy, but varied processes of recreation, fusion and reinvention, from which constantly arise new configurations and mixtures.

The articles by Heloísa Buarque de Hollanda and Olívia Maria Gomes da Cunha conduct an analytical inventory of the new cultural creations. Buarque de Hollanda focuses on the dynamics of cultural production, also studying it from the perspective of aesthetic analysis and classification, while Cunha is interested in one of the contexts in which the new creations emerge – the space of the favela.

Esther Hamburger uses a film that documents the tragic assault on a passenger bus in Rio de Janeiro as the theme of a study of relations between violence and culture in new Brazilian audio-visual production.

In the contribution from Robert Stam which concludes the book, culture and violence are also present. Stam begins with a look at the Tropicália cultural movement; but the analysis is not limited to history. Through interpretation of song lyrics, films and videoclips, Stam shows how the celebration of mixture and the persistence of symbolic mechanisms of racial violence combine in equal proportions in the formation of Brazilian multiculturalism.

Because of the breadth and currentness of their themes, the articles joined in this book are an invitation to reflect upon phenomenons that go beyond national borders. They involve a search for categories suitable to the analysis of new configurations and constellations marked by a redefinition of relations and articulations between the regional and the global, the local and the national. They are cultural, social and
political processes with a dynamic and open character. For this reason, what the book offers the reader are not definitive analyses, but various places to examine and interpellate a reality in full movement. In any case, the book has completed its rule if from its reading arise new questions and new modes to observe studied realities.

The editors would like to thank all of the institutions and people who made this book possible and, in particular, the Ibero-Amerikani-sches Institut and the Lateinamerika-Institut for their institutional support as well as the Thyssen Foundation for financial support to this initiative.
The present situation of Latin America has to be explained in terms of the interaction between two main sets of factors. On the one hand there are the long-term cultural, political and economic processes which underlie its development since the early 16th century. On the other hand, there are the more conjunctional processes and results of events happening in the shorter term: namely, globalization, the prevalence of neoliberal policies since 1980 and the recent economic downturn which started in 2000 and which is just beginning to recede. In this paper I would like to consider both aspects. I shall start by briefly considering some characteristics of Latin America’s long-term road to modernity.

1. Some features of the Latin American path to modernity

For a start, four main cultural features, formed during three centuries of colonial rule, can be said to condition the character of the Latin American path to modernity. First, a catholic religious monopoly which was never seriously challenged by the main protestant denominations or by religious dissidence of popular origin. Second, political centralism which never had to compete with local (feudal) powers and third, a tendency to authoritarianism in politics which has survived even within formal democracy. Finally, an economic preference for exporting raw materials and primary products which fails to result in strong and independent industrial bourgeoisies and proletariats. All these elements point to a strong Latin American centralist cultural tradition (Véliz 1984: 15-16).

The centralist and authoritarian features and the absence of a strong bourgeoisie give a special character both to the first experiments with democracy and to the economic orientation in Latin America. The construction of democracy had initially an imitative character: most constitutional projects very closely copied European or North American models. The majority of these projects were not suc-
cessful and had an ephemeral character: they did not survive for a long time. In addition, they managed to achieve very reduced popular participation. In so far as the economy is concerned, contrary to the European road to modernity, industrialization was postponed and replaced by a raw material exporting system which retained the backwardness of the productive sectors, especially under the hacienda system.

It was only during the first half of the 20th century, when due to the export crisis the oligarchic governments came to an end, that the state played a central role in two substantial advances of modernity. First, the expansion of democracy by the widening of the franchise which allowed the middle and working classes to participate in the political system from which they had been excluded so far. Second, the beginning of import-substituting industrialization, which promoted a new kind of inward-oriented economic development.

However, the widening of democracy with the incorporation of the middle classes in political power and the implementation of social legislation, was not exempted from contradictions of an authoritarian character. During the three years that followed the Great Depression of 1929, seventeen governments were overthrown by force in twelve Latin American countries (Véliz 1984: 273). In several cases, it was military interventions that gave rise to populist and nationalist regimes which widened political participation and established forms of welfare state and social legislation from above and against the conservative forces entrenched in parliaments. These regimes sought the support of the masses by organizing them. Peron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil helped create trade unions from within the state.

Thus between 1930 and 1970 a process of modernization was consolidated in Latin America which widened democracy and the process of industrialization began to make progress. The latter was realized with heavy state protection and investment, which continued practically until the end of the 1970s. At the same time, the populist coalitions that carried out these reforms also established incipient forms of social legislation and welfare state. Therefore, it could be argued that the general orientation of the modernizing process in Latin America at this time had more affinity with the European road to modernity than with the North American one.
In spite of this clear-cut influence of European modernity, there are important differences that remain between the European path and the Latin American one. Conditioned by cultural traits formed during three centuries of colonial rule, Latin American modernity tends to have a centralized character while European modernity is inclined to have more decentralized features. This affects both democracy and the economy. The European parliamentary system generally distributes power more evenly, while the Latin American presidential system tends to concentrate power. In Latin America “presidentialism” is an important source of serious conflicts between the executive and legislative powers; such conflicts are not necessarily as acute in the European parliamentary regimes. This factor has contributed in an important manner to the political instability of Latin America because the executive as much as the legislative branches of the state claim popular legitimacy and tend to blame each other for their problems (Hartlyn/Valenzuela 1997: 23). An example of this is the recent parliamentary attempt to impeach President Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador.

On the economic front, the British industrial bourgeoisie was born far away from the state centres of power in small provincial workshops, whereas the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie was created by state action and has always been much more dependent on state aid in order to exist and prosper. The key role of the state in the birth of entrepreneurial classes has led them to interfere much more actively in politics in order to achieve favourable conditions in their own interests, which is also destabilizing and potentially increases the possibilities of corruption.

A second important difference between the European trajectory and the Latin American one has to do with the practical efficacy of citizens’ rights. While in Europe there is a greater correspondence between citizens’ rights and their respect in practice, in Latin America declared rights enacted in constitutions and laws often lack guarantees and accessible procedures that protect them in practice. According to Whitehead “the majority of subjects experience the insecure and unpredictable character of their rights” (Whitehead 1997: 69) and often are defenceless in the face of the enormous power of the state and enterprises. This is related to what O’Donnell has called “a democracy of low intensity citizenship” which occurs when the state is unable to enforce its legality, not so much in the area of political rights, as in the
area of civil rights: “peasants, slum-dwellers, Indians, women, et al., are often unable to get fair treatment in the courts, or to obtain from state agencies services to which they are entitled, or to be safe from police violence … etc.” (O’Donnell 1993: 16).

The difference between Europe and Latin America can be understood further by means of a distinction between the polycentric structure of European modernity and the concentric structure of the Latin American modernity (Mascareño 2000; Leiva 2003). A polycentric society would be that in which its diverse component systems such as politics, law, economy, religion, science and art are highly autonomous and able to organize themselves without interference from others, thus excluding the possibility that one of them controls the others and becomes the centre of society. On the contrary, in Latin American concentric society, although there is functional differentiation, the political system instrumentalizes the other systems by imposing upon them its own logic and interests (Mascareño 2004: 68-69 and footnote 15). The autonomy of politics is realized at the cost of the other spheres’ own autonomy.

This is the reason why Brunner has argued that in contrast to the modernity of central countries, Latin American modernity suffers from a

voracity of politics which swallows everything and behind which everyone seeks protection or justification: equally entrepreneurs, intellectuals, universities, trade unions, social organisations, clerics, the armed forces (Brunner 1988: 33).

The enormous gravitation of politics and the state also reaches art, culture and education. The consequence of this tendency, widely recognized by many authors, is that, in general, civil society in Latin America (the sphere of individuals, classes and non-governmental organizations) is weak, insufficiently developed and very dependent upon the state.

By 1973 a new phase set in which end the stage of protected and centralized modernization. At this time in Latin America the processes of industrialisation and development entirely lost their dynamism, economic growth came to a standstill and even became negative during the 80s, and as a consequence social and labour agitation became widespread. The international recession resulted in unemployment, inflation and increased political instability everywhere. Under the
threat of increasingly radicalized left-wing urban movements, a new wave of military coups set in all over Latin America. This time round right-wing dictatorships are established, not only more durable than those of the 1930s in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, etc., but also with longer-term social and economic impacts associated with the application of new economic policies of liberal character.

2. The Impact of the new Neoliberal Stage

The novelty of the situation, which came to confirm old cultural trends, is that the renewed liberal character of economic policies can coexist with authoritarianism in politics. This has three important effects on the modernizing processes: on the one side the reaffirmation of the authoritarian centralist tendency in conflict with the rule of law. Second, the relative depoliticization of society and, third, the beginning of a change from the relative influence of the European social democratic model of welfare state to the preeminence of the North American model of individual liberty.

In the first place, the authoritarian centralist tendency was confirmed by the new wave of dictatorships. This is just the last instalment in a long history in which the breakdowns of democracy and the recurrent presence of dictatorships figure prominently. True, from the first years of widespread anarchy (1810-1850) to the 20th century, there has been much improvement. Yet one would be mistaken in believing that the 20th century represents a dramatic shift from the old pattern. During this time there were 3 periods in which many Latin American governments were overthrown by force: 1930-1933, 1948-1954 and 1964-1980.

Some authors have contrasted European stability, where there is a closer correspondence and articulation between the political system and the legal system (Mascareño 2004: 65), with the Latin American instability, where power and legality are frequently decoupled. In the first case there is a form of articulation between the two systems which mutually respect the autonomy of each other in their own sphere. This means that “the function of politics – to take binding collective decisions – is not … directly realized through power, but processed by means of legality and only then transformed into law”
It also means that political power provides external support so that legality could be enforced within other systems, beyond the legal system itself (Mascareño 2004: 65).

That this does not always happen in Latin America can be explained by the concentric structure of its modernity, whereby politics has acquired primacy over other spheres and often does without legality, or, more frequently, accommodates legality to its own interests and prevents it from fulfilling its role in other spheres. Given the character of Latin American culture, the de facto surpassing of legality is almost always accompanied by a strong nominal legalism which seeks juridical justifications. But all the same, the coupling of power and legality has been always weaker in Latin America, given the cultural centrality of power and authority. The European polycentric structure, on the contrary, seems to guarantee that politics, even though also playing a central role, respects the autonomy of legality and avoids flouting it.

The second effect of the changes occurring since 1970 in Latin America is the relative depoliticization of society (at least in the traditional sense of institutionalized democratic politics). There has been a change from a positive evaluation of politicians, parties and ideologies as essential elements for leading a nation in the years prior to the 1970s, to the present extremely negative evaluation and generalized disillusion with them. The depoliticization of Chileans, for example, can be detected throughout the 1990s by most surveys, which consistently show a decrease in the identification of people with political parties, a growing lack of interest in political affairs and a negative evaluation of politicians. The loss of prestige of politicians and the disaffection with politics in general has also become acute in Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Argentina.

The origins of this are clearly related to two factors. First, the failure of politics to deliver the kind of economic development which could redistribute wealth and thus bringing down widespread poverty. Second, the political repression taking place during military dictatorships. Military dictatorships sought to depoliticize society by eliminating elections, abolishing political parties and closing down parliaments. However, after a few years of forced depoliticization by terror, the very policies of exclusion and violation of human rights, led to the opposite result in the long-term: society became more intensely politi-
cized against military governments. This led to a search for crucial agreements and strong coalitions among the opposition forces in order to negotiate the end of military rule, thus allowing the return to democracy. Paradoxically, it was the negotiated conditions for the transition to democracy that had to do with depoliticization (Silva 2004: 159-160). This in three different ways.

First, democratic coalition forces exercised a strong restraining influence on popular mobilization so as not to give the military a motive to return. In almost every country of the region trade unions were partially dismantled and those which survived experienced a severe loss of influence and power. Politicians of the centre-left frequently resorted to self-censorship and did not want to support any movement which could cause political upheaval among the armed forces or entrepreneurial sectors.

Second, part of the negotiated deals to return to democracy included, even if sometimes only implicitly, total respect for the self-regulating nature of the economic sphere in order to protect it from the ups and downs of everyday political discussion. The price of democratization was the increased autonomy of and the loss of state control over the economy. Politics became more self-referential and people lost interest in it.

A part of this process was the new attitude of social scientists, many of them persecuted and exiled. The years of bloody dictatorships in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, not to speak of the more or less permanent situation of repression in Central America, changed their perception of politics. Their focus of analysis radically shifted, from strategies for social change and development to problems of the political system, democracy and human rights. Important as these problems are, the exclusive re-focussing on them by default left the management of the economy to the new neoliberal forces (Lechner 1991). This abdication of responsibility also had depoliticising effects.

Third, when democracy returned, the newly elected governments did not satisfy people’s expectations that those responsible for the human rights abuses would be brought to justice. Which again produced deep disillusionment and political demobilization. Human rights groups experienced great difficulties in getting support from politicians. Democratic governments accepted or even enacted am-
nesty laws which exempted the military from any responsibility. In Chile, for instance, many deputies from the governing coalition (Concertacion) voted against the political condemnation of Pinochet when he took his seat in Senate. The Concertacion’s strategy to cause a minimum of problems with the armed forces prompted a marked policy to lower the profile of complaints by the surviving victims and families of the disappeared victims. It was only from the moment Pinochet was detained in London, ten years after the return to democracy, that Chilean tribunals started processing some criminal lawsuits which involved members of the armed forces and changed the interpretation of the amnesty law which exempted them from responsibility.

The newly acquired autonomy of the economic system in Latin America since the arrival of neoliberalism and its market-oriented economic policies, has nevertheless not meant that the economic system has replaced politics in the concentric pattern referred to above. The economic system continues to be frequently threatened not only by globalization, but also by political interventions, sometimes of a very arbitrary nature. It is true that the State is now weaker in terms of its capacity to implement progressive and redistributive social policies, but the executive power is stronger in terms of being able to take more or less arbitrary decisions (Boschi 2004: 290). Politics, through its privileged means, power, continues to be the central element which has been unable to fully subject itself to legality in Latin America, or rather it accommodates legality to its own interests. Thus President Meza of Bolivia or President Kirchner of Argentina or President Chavez of Venezuela frequently take decisions which interfere with the market and sometimes with international agreements. It cannot be maintained that the new autonomy of the economic system has displaced the preponderance of the presidential political system.

The third effect of changes occurring since 1970 in Latin America is the transition, very marked in some countries like Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Chile, from a more interventionist social democratic European model of capitalism to a North American model of individual autonomy and diminished state intervention. It cannot be said that the welfare state existed everywhere in Latin America or that it was remotely as complete as the European model. Yet it had a relatively important influence. At any rate, the little welfare state that
could be found tended to be dismantled with the arrival of neoliberalism and the new model of individual citizenship drawn from the North American model. This has resulted in the privatization (and sometimes deterioration) of public education, health and social security and the sale of state public services and facilities. It has also meant the end of a series of interventionist economic policies, such as subsidies, price fixing, import and export controls, financial regulations of capital movements, differentiated and high custom tariffs, high state expenditure, etc. Within the new North American model trade unions and social organizations are weakened and, generally, a new kind of citizenship is brought about whereby citizens are basically conceived of as individual consumers of goods and services in the market.

Although up to a point the European social democratic regimes have also suffered the impact of the new neoliberal ideas and, under the pressure of having to curb excessive state expenditure, have been forced to cut their funding of the welfare state, public health and education, it is also true that even during the most radical right-wing governments of Mrs. Thatcher in Britain or Mr. Kohl in Germany the welfare state was not really dismantled to the extent it has been (the little that there was) in Latin America. Besides, economic policies in Europe have been coordinated, made uniform and regulated by the European Union for all the member states, which up to a point means a bigger degree of intervention in the economy. In Latin America, on the contrary, the tendency has been to deregulate, sell state assets, open frontiers and markets and enter into free trade agreements.

3. The Articulation between Politics and Economic Neoliberalism

From the mid-1980s onwards, a massive return to democracy has taken place in Latin America. What is important and different from other occasions is the renewed resilience of democracy which has allowed it to survive until now in most countries. Yet despite this newly acquired strength of democracy in the region, the picture of political instability has been growing worse since 2000 in Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, etc. The failed coup attempt against Chavez in Venezuela, the quick change of resigning presidents in Argentina (5 presidents in 2 weeks), the resignation of Fujimori in Peru and Sanchez de Losada in Bolivia, the very precari-
ous situation of Toledo in Peru, Gutiérrez in Ecuador and Meza in Bolivia, are symptoms of political systems in which legality continues to be frequently overstepped. In spite of this continuing political instability, dictatorships have not come back and this may have to do with the almost total disappearance of the revolutionary left and the discouragement of the United States (Silva 2004: 168).

The return to democracy was on the whole very rapid, Chile being the last country to come back to it in 1989. But it did not mean a change from the neoliberal economic policies started by the dictatorships. As Yocelevzky has put it, a factor shared by Latin American processes of democratization has been “the discrepancy between the democratic character of political change and the non-egalitarian, concentrating and excluding character of the development model upon whose base those changes occurred” (Yocelevzky 2002: 44).

In many ways, therefore, it can be seen that one of the main differences of Latin American modernity compared with European modernity is the type of articulation between politics and the economy. Whereas in Europe there seems to be a greater consistency between a socially oriented democracy and an economy quite regulated by the state or the European Union, in Latin America there is a co-existence between centralist and authoritarian features in politics with liberalism in economics. Sometimes this is seen as a contradiction or inconsistency on the part of the Latin American ruling classes. What this criticism overlooks is that neoliberalism in itself, at least in Hayek’s version of it, which seems to be prevalent in Latin America, inherently entails this duality of authoritarian conservatism in cultural and political matters and liberalism in economic matters.

What Hayek proposes is a conservative kind of liberalism which highlights three elements: first, an inherent respect for tradition which fits into an evolutionist conception of culture. Second, a distrust of all attempts at constructing a social order by means of planning which is a consequence of the inherent limitations of reason. Third, a separation of liberalism from democracy. According to Hayek, democratization demands an absolute power of the majority and in that way it could become a sort of anti-liberalism. This opposition between democracy and liberalism is at the heart of neoliberalism and has frequently allowed the ideological justification of dictatorships in Latin America. According to Hayek it is possible to have totalitarian democ-
ratic governments and authoritarian liberal governments and the latter are certainly preferable to the former. Why is it that this kind of thought could become so widespread in Latin America?

My hypothesis is that this is related to the prevalence of Catholicism in Latin America. In contrast to the European and North American paths to modernity, which were influenced by a protestant ethic that values democracy and legality and that, on the other hand, promotes the scientific and rational control of nature, the Latin American path to modernity has been influenced by Catholicism and by authoritarian and centralist forms of government and has had a less marked orientation to the rational control of nature and to technology. The enormous cultural weight of Catholicism in Latin America has been no doubt related to the great success and acceptance of Hayek’s brand of neoliberalism in the region.

In spite of the democratizing influence of Enlightenment thought after Latin American independence, which no doubt resulted in a partial moderation of authoritarianism, the latter’s cultural strength has not been entirely extinguished in Latin America’s socio-political life, as we have just seen. Weber’s classical thesis linked Calvinism and protestant Puritanism with the rationalistic spirit of capitalism. Traditional Catholicism appears to have a greater affinity with Hayek’s type of neoliberalism. In his conception religion, authoritarianism and a free market system become fused. This could help explain the greater ease with which an overwhelmingly catholic Latin America has adopted a more radical sort of neoliberalism, while in protestant countries a stronger bond survives between protestantism, democracy and rational constructivism.

It is also important to see the connection between a prevalent neoliberal outlook and the new weakness of the industrialization process in Latin America. State-protected and state-promoted industrialization had been the Latin American approach during the first half of the 20th century. The present neoliberal policies of openness to the international market and avoidance of subsidies and state protection have

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1 The affinity between Catholicism and Hayekian neoliberalism should not make one forget that the same Catholicism is able to engender quite enlightened forms of opposition to neoliberalism and capitalism as those to be found in Liberation Theology. Yet it is also true to say that they do not prevail within the catholic church and have tended to be repressed by the hierarchy.
meant in practice not only the abandonment of industrialization but also an actual process of deindustrialization in many Latin American countries. Even more, many orthodox economists in the region propound the idea that industrialization is not in itself the only road to development and that by following the theory of comparative advantages some countries can hope to fully develop with almost no industrialization. With the exception of Brazil and Mexico this could be the case of the majority of Latin American countries which basically continue to export primary products.

In effect, free trade and economic policies open to the world market have brought about a considerable diminution of industrial production and employment in Latin America. Some big countries like Mexico and Brazil managed to expand their industrial exports after a while. The rest, on the contrary, followed a more radical model of laissez-faire which diversified the export of primary products, but also made more permanent the low level of industrial production and employment. In this, the Latin American path to modernity has been very different from the Asiatic one, where the state took an important role in the acquisition and adaptation of state-of-the-art technologies and in the promotion of industrial exports (Gwynne 1996: 228-229; 220).

4. Results of the Globalized Neoliberal Stage: an Appraisal

In assessing the results of the neoliberal stage and globalization in Latin America, it is clear that in spite of some macro-economic gains like the control of inflation, the influx of foreign capital and fiscal stability, the social impact of radical neoliberal policies plus the results of the economic crisis taking place since 2000, have been on the whole very negative: there has been a steady rise of unemployment and a loss of stability of many jobs. In countries like Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Ecuador, the so-called “informal sector” – with its low-wage no-benefits jobs – is greater than the “formal” one, and in the rest of Latin America, with the exception of Chile, the informal sector employs more than the 40% of the workforce (Gwynne 2004: 55). There has also been downward pressures on real wages, reduction in the minimum wage, increased inequalities in the distribution of wealth and a substantial increase in poverty.
Countries like Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, the so-called Andean countries, have today a lower per capita income than in 1990. In the majority of Latin American countries, more than 25% of the population live under the poverty level. In at least seven countries of the region more than half of the population live in that condition, even if poverty has somewhat receded in many of them. On the whole, in Latin America 225 million people (43.9%) have incomes below the poverty level (PNUD 2004: 36).

It is no surprise then that the divergence between the Latin American region and the developed world should continue to grow. In 1978, the per capita income of the six core economies was five times that of the six richer Latin American countries and twelve times that of the six poorer ones. By 2001, the ratio had increased to seven and 29 respectively. But asymmetries have also become internal to Latin America. The gap between the six richer countries and the six poorer ones has almost doubled between 1978 and 2001 (Gwynne 2004: 8-9). Most of the direct foreign investment, virtually 75%, has gone to Mexico, Brazil and some Caribbean offshore financial centres. Brazil and Mexico are practically the only countries in Latin America that have acquired some industrial technological capacity and which can therefore export manufactured products, while the rest of Latin American countries export mainly primary products.

The negative results have brought about strong resistance to the model practically everywhere and as a result serious problems of governance have arisen in the region. In Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela and Ecuador there has been growing opposition to neoliberal policies. The governance problems are also related to a crisis of the party system. Traditional parties are no longer able to represent the needs and hopes of the voters, and hence they have all but lost support. In the recent municipal elections in Bolivia (5th December 2004) traditional parties like the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the Movement of the National Revolution (MNR), New Republican Force (NFR) and National Democratic Action (ADN) were almost completely wiped out and the new Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), originating amongst the “cocaleros” (coca cultivators), became the biggest party. In Uruguay, the elections at the end of 2004 brought about the collapse of the traditional parties (Colorado party and Blanco party) which had alternated in ruling the coun-
try for more than 170 years. A coalition of moderate left-wing forces achieved an absolute majority in parliament and also elected the president of the country (Tabaré Vásquez).

There has also been a tendency to endless fragmentation of political parties and lack of loyalty to them. In many countries social movements have become far more important than parties. In the last Colombian election there were around 70 political parties. In Ecuador the practice of winning an election while representing a party, only to change it once elected, is widespread (Arriagada 2004: 4). Over all of Latin America the support of people for parliaments and political parties has fallen below 25% (PNUD 2004: 12). Exceptionally, Chile maintains a solid and representative party structure, but almost 3 million young people refuse to register to be able to vote. Inevitably, all this has affected the functioning of democracy.

Economic issues related to the daily lives of the people have become paramount in Latin America, so much so that for most people their economic well-being has become more important than democracy itself. The politicians and parties’ loss of prestige has necessarily affected adhesion to democracy, particularly among the young. The survey conducted by the PNUD shows that a majority of Latin Americans are prepared to drop democracy if it does not solve their economic problems. In fact, 54.7% of all Latin Americans reply that they would be prepared to accept an authoritarian government if it was capable of solving the economic situation (PNUD 2004: 27, 31). Even if since 1989 Latin American countries have not fallen again into dictatorships, the widespread poverty and inequality has made democracy less appealing.

Widespread poverty and disaffection with democracy and politics seem to be the two common elements which affect most Latin American countries in the 2000s. Together they contribute to an increasing problem of governance or, at least, to an increasing gap between people’s expectations and the ability of democratic institutions to deliver. This is why the credibility and the very stability of democratic institutions is at risk. And yet, it is difficult to generalize about the likely consequences. For a start, on the economic front there is hardly a new model emerging which could present itself as an alternative to the prevalent neoliberal policies. So the opposition to them is disintegrated and not strong enough to threaten their viability. On the politi-
cal front, in spite of the increasing problems of governance and depo-
licitization, democracy has survived but also with different levels of
risk.

Three different situations seem to be emerging. A first group of
countries including Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay since
the election of Tabaré Vásquez, have been hit so hard by an economic
and political crisis that their political stability has been threatened and
both their governments and peoples are increasingly disaffected with
globalization and the leadership of the United States. A second group
including Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, also in deep crisis, suffer from
an important split between the people, which are mostly disaffected
and disillusioned, and the governments, which still want to pursue
American-led globalization as a way out. Finally there is Chile and
Mexico, which in spite of having some problems, have still managed
to grow and have fully embraced American-sponsored globalization.
Popular resistance to globalization in them is far less marked.

Where can Brazil be placed? Well it is difficult to say. Brazil is
clearly more stable politically and follows more orthodox economic
policies than the countries in the first group. Brazilian people are not
as disaffected with the government as Peruvians or Ecuadoreans in the
second group, nor is the government fully neoliberal when the coun-
try’s industrial interests are at stake. On the other hand it is far less
keen on United States-led globalization than Chile and Mexico. More-
over its sheer size and huge population make it qualitatively different.
Maybe then, Brazil is in a league of its own, or in a bigger league, as
many of its politicians increasingly believe. Notwithstanding that,
there is little doubt that it shares many common cultural features and
most important problems with the rest of Latin America – even if in a
distinct way – and because of that, its future is tied up with the future
of Latin America.

The variety of situations in Latin America poses a challenge to the
role which the region can play in the world. If, as the title given by me
to this paper suggests, the world is entering a post-national phase, then
there is little future for Latin America as a balkanized conjunction of
nations. The example of the European Union is in this sense crucial to
Latin America. And perhaps Brazil’s unique position in the region is
strategic to playing a leading role in trying to achieve the elusive goal
of a Latin American Union.
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In the last fifteen years, two major historical events have radically impacted upon the dynamics of the world system and have led to different discourses and policies in international relations. First, with the end of the Cold War (1989-1991) a triumphant capitalist global integration started to unfold in a so-called unipolar world, the euphemism that designates North American imperial hegemony. Second, in 2001, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre’s Twin Towers in Lower Manhattan reinforced classic imperialist perspectives of conservative U.S. political and military elites.

Up to the end of the Cold War it was customary to explain the configuration of the world system by means of discourses often based on ideologies and utopias that referred to humankind’s destiny. These discourses, postmodernists would say, were deeply rooted in meta-narratives of the Enlightenment, promises of salvation through progress, accumulation, power, science, technology and, to a lesser or greater degree, social justice. With the end of the Soviet Union though triumphant capitalism had no major ideologies and utopias to confront. In the ten years between 1991 and 9/11, political ideologies and utopias gave way to culture, disguised as civilization and religion, as the new substance for a dual vision of the world. The clash of the socialist and capitalist worlds was substituted by the clash of civilizations. 9/11 confirmed that evil had to be understood through a culturalist note. Culturalism, a perspective often associated with symbolic analysis, ethnic, racial and identity issues, has clearly transcended materialism, a perspective highly associated with class relations and political economy. Now it is time for the West and the rest, all kinds of orientalisms and occidentalisms, modernity, identity politics and multiculturalism. Interest in culture and power has almost brought

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1 This is a revised version of the chapter that provided the title of my last book, Postimperialismo, published in 2003 by Gedisa, Barcelona.
about the fading away of interest in class and power (Fonseca 2005). It may be the case that social classes have been buried in the rubble of the Soviet Empire.

My arguments must be placed against a backdrop of crisis in ideologies and utopias that has characterized the past two decades. This crisis is reflected in the academic world in different ways. Neoliberal recipes, for instance, have started to restructure university life. There has also been a relative decline in the visibility of Marxist theories during this period. The world system theory may be the only exception, perhaps because it has given a sense of a world totality, something useful in an era of heightened globalization. It does not follow though that critical stances have been totally outmoded. We have undoubtedly entered the era of the 'post' prefix with strong moments of post-modernist and post-structuralist critiques, also heavily inclined to dwell more on discourses and culture than on class or labour relations.

Globalization has increased the number of contacts and exchanges among people located in different countries. In the academic world, this has meant a growth in the international flow of knowledge and the possibility of increasing cooperation. Nevertheless, in many ways, such trends have mirrored unequal relations existing within larger structural globalization processes. Theory has flown from metropolitan centres to non-metropolitan centres while the flow of “raw data” has moved in the opposite direction. The circulation of critical discursive matrices has occurred within a Western university system that has become globalized in the past five decades. Such matrices could be called ideascapes, the category Arjun Appadurai (1990) coined to interpret the dissemination of ideas and discourses within “global culture”. I’d rather call them cosmopolitics (see below). This global university system operates as a world system of intellectual production (Kuwayama 2004; Gerholm 1995) whereby hegemonic centres define canons and professional standards as well as accumulate global symbolic capital. In exploring the existence of a world system of anthropology, Japanese anthropologist Takami Kuwayama states that:

Simply put, the world system of anthropology defines the politics involved in the production, dissemination, and consumption of knowledge.

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2 Arturo Escobar and I have edited a volume to explore the existing unequal relations among world anthropologies (Ribeiro/Escobar 2006).
about other peoples and cultures. Influential scholars in the core countries are in a position to decide what kinds of knowledge should be given authority and merit attention. The peer-review system at prestigious journals reinforces this structure. Thus, knowledge produced in the periphery, however significant and valuable, is destined to be buried locally unless it meets the standards and expectations of the core (2004: 9-10).

Kuwayama is aware of the problems arising from dualistic readings, he recognizes the complexity of centre/periphery intra and inter-relations and the existence of elites in the periphery closely connected to those of the centre (pp. 49-46).

The world system’s approach has been recently enriched by two other important perspectives: the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ and the ‘provincializing Europe’ projects. Geopolitics of knowledge is a notion developed by Walter Mignolo (2000; 2001; 2002) who relates economic geopolitics to the geopolitics of knowledge in order to stress the idea that the locus of enunciation in academic subjects is geopolitically marked. Mignolo argues in favor of diversality or the possibility of epistemic diversity as a universal project. Chakrabarty’s attempt at “provincializing Europe” is also central to the development of more complex forms of global cross-fertilization as well as more democratic modes of academic exchange worldwide. While transcending Eurocentric modernity is one of his goals, Chakrabarty asserts that

[The project of provincializing Europe] does not call for a simplistic, out-of-hand rejection of modernity, liberal values, universals, science, reason, grand narratives, totalizing explanations, and so on. […] It cannot originate from the stance that the reason/science/universals that help define Europe as the modern are simply ‘culture specific’ and therefore only belong to the European cultures. For the point is not that Enlightenment rationalism is always unreasonable in itself, but rather a matter of documenting how […] its ‘reason’, which was not always self-evident to everyone, has been made to look obvious far beyond the ground where it originated (2000: 42, 43).

In his dialogical stance, Chakrabarty avoids a romantic dualistic position since he recognizes that without Enlightenment universals ‘there would be no social science that addresses issues of modern social justice’ (idem: 5). However, he also underscores the fact that in a world of globalized scholarship, translation of multiple forms of understanding life into universalist European categories is clearly a problematic process (idem: 17).
1. Cosmopolitics

These debates immediately place us within global power fields, i.e. in social and political arenas shaped by unequal exchanges between hegemonic and non-hegemonic centres. They also make mandatory consideration of the many tensions between universalism and particularism, tensions that, as Ernesto Laclau (2000) argues, cannot be considered as beyond the reach of power relations. Indeed, for Laclau the aspiration to universalism is the result of power effects. Relations between universalist and particularist claims are thus always traversed by specific hegemonies. In reality, there is a permanent struggle among different particularist positions to occupy the place and perform the role of a universal proposition. In the academic globalized world, under the hegemony of Anglo-American discourses, the issue is to foster different particular subject positions and enunciations and keep them in an articulated tension.

I find the notion of cosmopolitics useful in this regard. It seeks to provide a critical and plural perspective on the possibilities of supra- and transnational articulations. It is based, on the one hand, on positive evocations historically associated with the notion of cosmopolitanism and, on the other hand, on analysis in which power asymmetries are of fundamental importance (on cosmopolitics see Cheah/Robbins 1998; Ribeiro 2003). Cosmopolitics comprises discourses and modes of doing politics that are concerned with their global reach and impact. As an anthropologist, I am particularly interested in those cosmopolitics that are embedded in conflicts regarding the role of difference and diversity in the construction of policies and supranational alliances.

Several cosmopolitics are counter-hegemonic discourses anchored in particular situations. This is the case with post-colonial critique, Zapatismo, subaltern studies and interculturalidad, a perspective that is being more clearly elaborated in the Andes, especially in Ecuador (Walsh/Schiwy 2002; Castro-Gómez 2002; García Canclini 2004). Since there are several progressive cosmopolitics, articulation becomes a key-word. Indeed, the effectiveness of cosmopolitical initiatives on the transnational level relies on networking. There is not a singular cosmopolitics capable of dealing with the entire complexity of the global counter-hegemonic struggle and with the existence and proliferation of critical subjects in fragmented global-spaces. Support-
ers of counter-hegemonic cosmopolitics need to identify their mutual equivalences to be able to articulate themselves in networks and political actions. Effective non-imperialist cosmopolitics that inform transnational political activists and progressive forms of global awareness also require a complex articulation of multi-located and plural struggles and subjects.

2. Towards a Latin American Cosmopolitics

The height of international visibility of Latin American theoretical contributions occurred in the 1970’s with the consumption of dependency theory in Northern hegemonic centres and elsewhere. Since then, in spite of important works by Latin American scholars (see, for instance, Néstor García Canclini’s work on hybridity; Aníbal Quijano’s on the coloniality of power and Enrique Dussel’s on multiple modernities), the region has not produced theoretical discourses that have impacted upon global audiences like dependency has.

At the same time, the current hegemony of the Anglo-American academic system has generated distortions in the production and dissemination of academic cosmopolitics and theories. I think, for instance, of the worldwide diffusion of multiculturalism. Postmodernism also perfectly illustrates the centrality of the North American university system in the reception and diffusion of theories. Originally formulated in France, post-modernism acquired great global visibility when, in the 1980’s, it was increasingly absorbed and debated by North American academic centres. More recently, post-colonial and subaltern studies, highly related to the work of Indian scholars, have undergone a similar process. It is the dissemination of post-colonialism that interests me. My arguments are a call for a critical dialogue between post-colonialism and another cosmopolitics which I call post-imperialism.

3. A critical dialogue with postcolonialism

In a session at the 1999 meeting of the American Anthropological Association, a young American anthropologist called contemporary Brazil a “postcolonial country”. It was the first time I heard a researcher classifying Brazil that way. I wanted to understand her reason for using that category. For me, it sounded like an anachronism. I was
surprised at the young professor’s answer to my question as to why she labeled Brazil a postcolonial country: “You are right, Brazil is not a postcolonial country, this category does not apply there.”

This small, for many people irrelevant incident, made me think how the dissemination of theories and concepts may follow paths that are similar to the diffusion (in its old sense) of other cultural constructions: swift and subtle mechanisms that are often imperceptible and random modes of generating familiarity and the mandatory use of a tool, a merchandise, words or ideas which, in many ways, are “misplaced ideas” (to borrow the title of the essay by Roberto Schwarz 1992). Such mechanisms hide power relations, commonly embedded in the diffusion of anything. In the end, that was a session at a metropolitan academic meeting. We know that science and art are also means to fixate colonial images and discourses (Said 1994: 12-13).

In relation to exchanges between Latin America and the “North”, Nelly Richard considers that

the transit of cultural signs between the peripheral practice (Latin America) and metropolitan theory (Latinamericanism), as well as the system of scholarly exchanges that administer these signs are responsible not only for the circulation of analytic tools but also for the criteria that regulate their value and reception according to the predominant trends established by certain discursive hegemonies (quoted by de la Campa 1999: vii).

The production of labels that designate cultural dominants is not an innocuous fact, most noticeably when it is intertwined with the act of interpreting. The relations between global and local actors within academic power fields replicate other kinds of power relations, especially when the dissemination of cosmopolitics is at stake. In the domestication of the local by the global the direction of the vector of power accumulation favours global actors. When global actors name trends or paradigms they guarantee their prominence and the affiliation of local actors to discursive universes that they, the global actors, have constructed. Spurr (1999: 4), in her work on the “rhetoric of empire”, considers that: “the process through which a culture subordinates another starts with the act of giving or not names”. The acritical acceptance of labels such as post-colonialism is problematic because it often implies categorizations that essentialize and homogenize the other from above.
If we need to consider the conditions of production, dissemination and reception of cosmopolitics in order to understand them, post-colonialism needs to be placed within such frameworks of analysis. It is a diversified theoretical and political stance marked by the presence of writers of the English language who are mostly from former British colony countries. This is my starting point. The post-colonial situation it refers to is intimately related to the decolonization of the British empire after Second World War, notably in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. This was a very particular juncture of the world system for historical, cultural, economic and political reasons, especially if compared to nineteenth century post-colonial Latin America.

Post-colonialism started with “ethnic intellectuals” (to use Ahmad’s [1994: 167] expression in his critique of “Orientalism”, Said’s archaeological landmark in post-colonial studies) who opened political and professional space to substitute the literature of the Commonwealth for a “new object” that came into focus. According to Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge

As the British Empire broke up and attempted to sustain an illusion of unity under the euphemistic title of ‘Commonwealth’ a new object appeared on the margins of departments of English Literature; ‘Commonwealth literature’. The ambiguous politics of the term was inscribed in the field that it called into being. ‘Commonwealth literature’ did not include the literature of the centre, which acted as the impossible absent standard by which it should be judged. The term also occluded the crucial differences between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Commonwealth, between White settler colonies and Black nations that typically had a very different and more difficult route into a different kind of independence. The struggling enterprise of ‘Commonwealth literature’ was jeopardized from the start by the heavily ideological overtones of its name. […] Post-colonial(ism) has many advantages over the former term. It foregrounds a politics of opposition and struggle, and problematizes the key relationship between centre and periphery. It has helped to destabilize the barriers around ‘English literature’ that protected the primacy of the canon and the self-evidence of its standards (Mishra/Hodge 1994: 276).

The fact that the archaeology of post-colonialism is marked by its roots in literary fields brings up other issues. It draws my attention to the acritical use of literature and fiction (most often based on the hermeneutical power of metaphors) as substitutes for social reality and for dense social science methodological and theoretical research. This raises the possibility of the existence of social sciences without social scientists, a complicated problematic that involves historical and epis-
temological factors and power disputes within academia. There is no doubt that we are facing here one of the most difficult issues in social theory, especially in a time when inter- and transdisciplinarity assume ever more sophisticated dialogues. After the impact of the post-modernist wave new interpretations are needed to recast the relations between literature and the social sciences.

I am neither advocating a chauvinist position nor a defense of any canonic disciplinary perspective; both would be untenable by themselves. It is evident that science, knowledge and academic life are international practices in which cross-fertilization is welcome. But it is never misplaced to recall that this realm too is traversed by power inequalities. The high global visibility of post-colonialism became possible only after its reception in the Anglo-American academic world. If colonial discourse analysis and post-colonial theory are “critiques of the process of production of knowledge about the Other” (Williams/Chrisman 1994: 8), it would be at least ironic that post-colonialism – with its trajectory marked by its growth and proliferation in English-speaking academia – colonizes – if you will excuse the wordplay – the empty space left by the absence of Latin American cosmopolitics and becomes a discourse about producing knowledge about the Latin American Other. In Latin America post-colonialism would amount to what it condemns, a foreign discourse on the Other that arrives through the hands of a metropolitan power. Post-colonialists would be, unwittingly, doing what they criticized.

Obviously, post-colonialism’s dissemination cannot be reduced to the force of the Anglo-American hegemony behind it. Similar to other critical cosmopolitics, post-colonialism has contributions to make in the analysis of social, cultural and political realities anywhere, especially when power asymmetries are at stake. The issue is not to deny post-colonialism but to assert the production of critical narratives in tune with Latin American subject positions, in a heteroglossic dialogue with cosmopolitics from other glocalities.

4. Post-imperialism

The nineteenth century was the post-colonial century properly speaking in Latin America. It coincided with a period of nation-building both in Europe and in the Americas. But the nineteenth century was
also the century of classic modern imperialism that transformed many Asian and African countries into colonies that covered almost the whole world.\(^3\) Two apparently paradoxical movements existed side by side and flourished under the force of monopolist capitalism (Lenin 1984): the consolidation of Nation-States within their own territories and the expansion of the most powerful states out of their territories incorporating other nations into their domains. In this period, post-colonialist ideologies in Latin America were highly marked by nation-building processes. Direct rule was almost absent on the continent, with the exception, in South America, of the French, Dutch and British Guianas.\(^4\) At the same time, in Asia and Africa colonialism would last until the second half of the 20\(^{th}\) century. In these areas, anti-colonial struggles would reach their goals after World War Two when the United States would substitute the British Empire and others and a new global hegemony, mostly independent of direct-rule, would be established.

The political and ideological post-colonialist struggles in African and Asian countries had to face the task, as did Latin Americans in the 19\(^{th}\) century, of creating/consolidating independent nation-states. The wave of decolonization in the 1970’s meant at the same time the closure of the nation-state system within the world system and the last cry of modern imperialism. But the closure of a system triggers the opening of another. In this new juncture of a world basically organized under the model of the European, republican nation-state, nationalism started to feel the presence of ever stronger transnational trends. Especially in the period 1980-2000, transnational corporations, flexible capitalism and neoliberal recipes generated new forms that surpassed national control. This is a kind of transnationalism marked by an intense time-space compression (Harvey 1989), i.e. by a technological command of space and time that distances itself more and more from the political and administrative forms of exerting power

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\(^3\) Based on the geographer A. Supan, Lenin (1984) shows the following variation of territories that were under American or European colonial rule between 1876 and 1900: Africa, from 10.8 to 90.4%; Polynesia from 56.8 to 98.9%; Asia, from 51.5 to 56.6%; Australia 100% in both years and the Americas from 27.5 to 27.2%.

\(^4\) We should not forget Cuba, the U.S. expansion over Mexican territory and the interventions that, at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century, led to the construction of the Panama canal.
associated with modern imperialism and from the colony in its strict sense of occupation of a foreign land. The relative climax of the nation-state goes hand-in-hand with the relative decadence of its controlling power set in motion by transnational capitalism.

In order to exert their power, transnational corporations do not require direct territorial control by a metropolitan State. Post-imperialism is what I call this juncture in which nation-states have to deal with transnationalism, a superior level of integration. Already in the 1970’s, Samir Amin (1976: 191) called post-imperialism the most advanced phase of capitalism, characterized by the concentration of power in transnational corporations and by their control of the “technological revolution” (p. 189).

But post-imperialism does not exhaust all possible forms of organizing economic and political life and constructing cosmopolitics. It exists together with other forms. Those new nation-states that since World War Two have had to cope with the post-colonial situation may find in post-colonialism a useful cosmopolitics to situate their struggles in the present moment of the world system. Furthermore, after 9/11, imperialism has resurged in Afghanistan and Iraq, a fact that shows, once again, that history does not move in a straight line and that the conservative military-industrial complex has known very well how to maintain its power and take advantage of certain political opportunities in the United States. However, in Latin American nation-states, post-imperialism predominates over other dynamics. It informs the contents of political, economic and cultural contemporaneity as well as imposes certain interpretative and research needs.

The prefix “post” is surely emblematic of the anxieties of our time. There is, as Anne McClintock (1994: 292) suggests in her texts on the traps of the term post-colonialism, an “almost ritualistic ubiquity” of post words. Indeed “post” has many slippery qualities not the least of them being the confusion between continuity and discontinuity, change and permanence. Yet, it may be exactly because of its tricky qualities that – in a time full of uncertainties and ambiguities – “post” is such a popular prefix. Its use avoids the risk of making peremptory statements, a stance that has characterized triumphalist trends in the social sciences (including Marxism).

If the prefix “post” may be problematic, why use an expression such as post-imperialism? For the following reasons: a) currently the
world system is characterized by unipolarity, the euphemism for the climax of American supremacy; b) military interventions are made by a globalized war machine with unprecedented power; c) I want to make use of the political reverberations of the term “imperialism” in a time when anodyne terms such as “globalization” are diffuse; d) characteristics of imperialism, such as the control of the world system by powerful economic conglomerates are still with us; e) I also want to make use of the critical reverberations already associated with the expression “post-colonialism”; f) finally, the ambiguity of the prefix “post” is not entirely negative and it is possible to make it work in the direction of other subject positions.

I want to advance the idea that post-imperialism is the Latin American side of the coin on which post-colonialism is found. It should be clear that I use the term ironically. Furthermore, as a cosmopolitics, post-imperialism mixes utopian horizons (a moment beyond imperialism in which, nonetheless, imperialism remains an issue) and descriptions of specific characteristics of our times. It thus combines programmatic and sociological visions.

Like the term colonialism, imperialism has many meanings and definitions. It is well-known that colonialism and imperialism are different sides of the same coin. Williams and Chrisman start their anthology on post-colonialism by pointing out the equivalence of both terms. For them, colonialism is

a particular phase in the history of imperialism, which is now best understood as the globalization of the capitalist mode of production (1994: 2).

Said relates imperialism to colonialism: imperialism is

the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; “colonialism”, which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory (1994: 9).

This definition shows that “classic imperialism” is not common anymore in today’s world since, with a few exceptions, it is no longer necessary to rule distant territories but to retain the means to exert hegemony at a distance – often flexible and mobile means (such as
transnational political and economic networks; military vigilance and rapid military capacity of intervention).\footnote{“Few exceptions” here refer to Afghanistan and Iraq which were invaded by multinational forces. Interestingly enough, these are allegedly temporary invasions to restore “order” and implant “democracy”.}

Post-imperialism supposes the hegemony of transnational, post-Fordist, flexible capitalism, with its impact on the redefinition of relations of dependency and the establishment of new interdependencies within the world capitalist system made possible by the existence of “global fragmented productive spaces” and satellite integration of financial capital. After the end of the Cold War, it also supposes the military, economic and politic hegemony of the United States as well as the control and concentration of scientific production and technological knowledge, especially in cutting-edge sectors such as information technology, electronics and biotechnology. We should not overlook the control of space and of the production of “mediascapes”. Hollywood, Silicon Valley, Wall Street, NASA and the Pentagon are icons of a political economy based on production, dissemination and reproduction of images, high technology, financial capital and military power. This triumphant capitalism, in a one-system world, does not need to divide the planet in “spheres of influence” the way the classic modern European imperialist powers did (Lenin 1984: 9) in a programmed division of the globe.

Modern imperialism was organically linked to Fordist capitalism. It relied on major socio-political-economic actors; economic verticalization; the creation of a periphery through the unequal exchange of raw materials and manufactured or industrial goods; metallurgy’s hegemony, especially by means of the expansion of railroads which gave access to natural resources, important for the central economies. For Lenin (1984: 10), “coal, iron and steel” were the “basic capitalist industries”. Rosa Luxemburg (1976: 366) also underscores the importance of railroads for imperialist expansion. Time-space compression caused by trains and telegraphs implied a much less intense shrinking of the world than what we witness today in the era of jets, the Internet, on-line time, and CNN.

It is not a coincidence that when Said (1994: xii) addresses the issue of “cultural forms”, “immensely important in the formation of
imperial attitudes, references and experiences” to the “modern Western empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”, he chooses the novel as his object. It is no surprise either that the study of the “rhetoric of empire” (Spurr 1999) follows the same path. Both are studies marked by the post-colonialist debate that focus on the kind of media that existed in the time of modern empires. For the post-imperial critique the main object would be the cosmopolitics embedded in “mediascapes” (Appadurai 1990), especially those “cultural forms” shown on television or in movies that fixate exoticizing and essentializing narratives about hegemonic and non-hegemonic practices. The contemporary “structures of feelings” (as Raymond Williams called them) are currently much more based on the mass media, which prepare and reinforce the “practice of the empire”, more than through any other media. Observe, for instance, what happens with the diffusion of English in Latin America and elsewhere. International pop culture (Ortiz 1994), hegemonized by U.S. production, plays a key role in the transformation of English into the créole of the world system and into a status symbol.

Under the conditions of transnational flexible capitalism, corporations may operate free from strong links with nation-states, through the planetary integration of financial markets and the fragmentation of productive processes on a global scale. Hence the neoliberal program for state downsizing and the consolidation of multilateral agencies’ power (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, etc.). Multilateralism ends up in multinational military alliances. Today many members of the national elites are transnationalized, a situation that has diminished hopes over the role that “national bourgeoisies” could play in national development – a typical 1950-1970’s mindset. The practices of segments of elites in several Latin American countries have not been studied nor theorized. From drug dealers to entrepreneurs, these social agents have already been operating in post-imperial ways, laundering their money in fiscal heavens in the Caribbean or in conspicuous consumption in cities such as Miami.
5. Post-imperialist research

A post-imperialist research program calls for understanding a) the nature of connections that Latin American capitalists keep with advanced capitalism, with diverse transnational elites and with formulators of multilateral agencies’ development policies; b) the insertion of national elites in globalization processes, in neoliberal adjustment programs; c) relations of the consolidated and “emergent” middle classes with globalization processes; d) different flows of information, capital and people from and to the region; e) the use that different segments of the Latin American lower classes are making of globalization processes through the sizable expansion of sales of global gadgets in popular markets globalized by “smuggling” or by the “piracy” of cultural industry products (all forms related to computer and electronic capitalism); f) resistance to the nation-state via Internet, a fact well epitomized by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation; g) the new migratory waves of indigenous peoples, peasants and lower urban middle class that colonize vast urban and rural areas and economic spaces in the United States. In the same vein, it would be important to redefine, in specific national contexts, the place and identities assigned to ethnic segments and other minority groups. At the same time, the issue of mestizaje cannot be overlooked and needs to be re-examined, given the impact of Anglo-Saxon interethnic ideologies such as multiculturalism.

At the symbolic, cultural and political levels the post-imperialist critique has many tasks ahead. First, the struggle against hegemonic mediascapes and ideascapes circulating within the world system is a priority for two reasons: it is a basic task of any social scientific effort and it has a strategic meaning given the sensibility of global financial capital to information. It is not the case of once again taking on the struggle against cultural imperialism since the latter may make too strong a call for stressing particularities which, in turn, may help to create unviable chauvinisms in a world of globalized markets as well as undesired political consequences that may reach the form of exacerbated and politically active racisms. What we need is to increase both pluralism and the circulation of heteroglossic narratives and discursive matrices through the apparatuses that dominate the global communication networks and the international circuits of academic
production. The absence, for instance, of horizontal relations among Latin American researchers is a central problem even today (Cardoso de Oliveira 1999/2000). The fact that several Latin American anthropologists, for instance, are leading figures in initiatives such as the World Anthropologies Network (www.ram-wan.org) and the World Council of Anthropological Associations (www.wcaanet.org) shows that there are Latin American scholars already working towards a more heteroglossic and plural transnational academic community.

Comparative research on Latin American migrants may show their relevance for the economy, politics and culture of our countries as well as their importance in the (re)production of new forms of hybridism. The existence of a “Latin American press in the United States” is another fundamental research topic. It creates, through linguistic means, a collectivity of participants belonging to the same symbolic universe. The growing relevance of the ethnic press in the United States shows that this terrain is not only politically and culturally significant but also of economic importance. A 1997 survey of New York’s ethnic press indicated the existence of 143 newspapers and magazines, 22 TV and 12 radio stations, in more than 30 languages (Dugger 1997). The growth of a “latino” middle class, a market that, in the mid 1990’s was estimated at US$ 250 million, caught the attention of popular magazines such as People that started a Spanish edition and led to a noticeable increase in the “Hispanic” press (Arana-Ward 1996). In New York City alone, it was estimated that the media in Spanish, one of the largest ones, is made up of at least 56 publications, two local TV stations (members of networks) and five radio stations (Ojito 1997). Arlene Dávila (2001) shows how the Spanish-speaking TV networks are dominated by “Hispanics” and have financial and production ties with Latin America (mainly with Mexico and Venezuela). These networks create a “latina” transnation within the United States, unifying segments of immigrants of several nationalities. The “Hispanic” press is also important for Brazilians, since many of them watch Spanish-speaking channels, some of which include Brazilian news and other materials in their programming. But Brazilian TV is available on cable TV in many American cities, a recognition of the growing relevance of Brazilian migrants in that country (see Ribeiro 1999). As is well-known, technologies of communication create imagined communities (Anderson 1991) that often become
political actors. Language is also an important factor in the unification and creation of consumer and labour markets in a globalized world.

Awareness of the growing importance of the “Latina” community in the United States has prompted conservative reactions in the academic world. Samuel Huntington (2004) considers that “Hispanics” represent a threat to the unity and territorial existence of the American nation-state. In a certain sense, Huntington recognised that the United States cannot exist without the “Hispanics”. What can the study of the Latin American imagined communities inserted in American interethnic systems teach us about ourselves and about processes of globalization and transnationalism? Who but the “undocumented” migrants win the daily wars, in a sort of microphysics of power from below, against the most powerful nation-state in the world?

The impetus to study Latin American populations living in the United States should be complemented with other endeavours. If a post-colonialist working agenda is to “provincialize Europe” (Chakrabarty 2000), for the post-imperialist critique the goal is to provincialize the United States. There is, thus, an urgent need to conduct research on American society from a Latin American standpoint, an inversion of a quasi-colonialist flow that prevails in academic and scientific life. Where are the systematic studies of American political, social, economic and cultural life from a Latin American perspective? Post-imperialism aims as one of its central goals at decolonizing the images that are held about the United States in Latin America. It should also make a profound critique of nationalist canons, the efficacy of which can be noticed in the exercise of hegemony against the region’s subaltern segments.

6. Final Comments: Heteroglossia, Transversal Politics and Political Bricolage

Post-imperialism does not conceive of time in a unilinear fashion, in the sense of positing a new and more advanced time in history. The prefix “post” indicates the possibility of drawing other cognitive maps (Jameson 1984) that allow for the re(construction) of visions external to dominant orthodoxies. Post-imperialism’s main concern is with the power private and public corporations exert in shaping the futures of collective and individual social actors under the hegemony of flexible
capital in a globalized and transnationalized world. But it is also concerned with the responses of these social actors to new power configurations, responses that foster the maintenance and growth of heterogeneity in a world full of homogenizing forces.

One of the aims of the post-imperialist critique is the struggle against all kinds of chauvinisms and the amplifying of voices present in the dialogues internal and external to the nation-state. Within a post-imperialist perspective, nativism and nationalism, in their excluding formulations, have no space. In reality, new activists of different types (environmental or indigenous causes, human rights, for instance) prove, with their affiliation to transnational networks of activism (Keck/Sikkink 1998; Mato 1999), that political practice in a globalized world requires broader horizons and alliances. A point calling for attention refers to the limits and dangers of “strategic essentialism” that often goes together with the politics of identity. Fragmentation without articulation results in vulnerability. A possible working solution for these dilemmas may lie in the acceptance of hybridism as the political force underlying all possible coalitions of different actors. Nonetheless, hybridism is also fraught with difficulties. It supposes subjects aware that their places in the world are much more the result of many fusions and con-fusions over time than of any foundational ideology, clearly and coherently defined, based on history, ethnicity and nation. The size of this kind of political subject is still small as a consequence of the ways that institutional politics, the media and the educational system operate.

Perhaps all this leads to the conclusion that intellectuals and activists need to keep a critical attitude towards essentialism and to promote plural, decentered and democratic coalitions that keep negotiated universalist programs in common. However, one should never forget a central tension that animates the particular/universal relationship: if the distorted limit of universalism is the arrogance of empire colonizing all other perspectives, the distorted limit of particularism is the arrogance of a unique perspective that believes to be above all others. In their distorted limits, each pole of the universal/particular tension considered exclusively in itself and canonized is equivalent to other present and insurmountable difficulties that mark an underlying resistance to democratic heteroglossic dialogues.
“Cyborg politics” (an expression associated with Donna Haraway’s work) or “transversal politics” seem to formulate relations between difference and democracy in a manner appropriate for considering a transnational and post-imperialist democracy. I repeat what Werbner (1997: 8) wrote about this:

Cyborg politics – or ‘transversal’ politics, as Nira Yuval-Davis calls them – are about opening up and sustaining dialogues across differences of ideologies, culture, identity and social positioning. The recognition of the right to be different animates and sustains such exchanges, despite conflictual perceptions and partial agreements. What is accepted, in other words, is the enormous potentiality of imperfect communication. Transversal politics thus organise and give shape to heteroglossia, without denying or eliminating it.

Transversal politics also calls for spotlighting Alcida Rita Ramos’ insight on political bricolage (1998: 192), a way of bringing together different actors in the struggle for political representation. In order to contribute to the construction of political communities where heteroglossia and uniformity can coexist as a paradox and not as a contradiction, we need to think and act more like bricoleurs would in the face of the multiple forms of reproducing politics and culture in the contemporary world.

Bibliography


Gustavo Lins Ribeiro


Joining the Club:
Lula and the End of Periphery for Brazil*

1. Introduction
Brazil’s insertion in the global political economy has usually been painted as a situation of “periphery”, perhaps most vividly, although he was not writing exclusively about Brazil, by Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, who is now Secretary General of Itamaraty and whose “500 years of periphery” is now required reading for incoming Brazilian diplomats (Guimarães 2001). From that standpoint, Brazil’s peripheral international status is not understood as a situation of “mere” marginality but instead as the continuing result of a dynamic relationship between a centre that benefits from its asymmetric character and works at perpetuating it. In that perspective, Brazil’s foreign policy is primarily reactive and essentially defensive.

My starting point is different. Brazil’s peripheral status in the world for most of its history, and for the purpose of this paper, specifically since WWII, is accepted. It is understood, however, as a situation of mutual irrelevance: Brazil has had a superficial insertion in the global political economy and in the global strategic landscape. This has meant that, all the talk about dependency notwithstanding, the world has had relatively little bearing on Brazil. Its political and economic disasters as well as its successes have been essentially of its
own making. Domestic factors, in other words, have been the main determinant of Brazilian foreign policy, they have had the most influence on the definition of the interests that were defended and promoted, on the resources mobilized for that purpose, and on the way in which that policy was implemented. Brazil’s insertion in the world is now changing because Brazil is.

The argument of this paper is straightforward: Brazil’s peripheral status is ending, in part because the world is becoming more relevant to its fate, but mostly because Brazil has become more appealing to the world, particularly to its dominant powers, as a result of its consolidation as a stable, democratic and liberal power. While the country’s diplomacy has always been extremely competent and while it has also been increasingly assertive, particularly since the mid-1980s, a number of domestic factors had severely constrained it. Chief among those, Brazil’s political system remained in transition, the fundamental direction of its economic policy and the fate of its economic adjustment were still uncertain and its international image was still marred by dramatic social inequities. On all three counts, the elections and the months that followed changed the equation.

This domestic dynamic is outlined in the following section. An overview of Lula’s foreign policies follows, and their impact are assessed in a third part.

2. The Election of Lula and Brazilian Foreign Policy

2.1 Democratic Consolidation

A classic test of democratic consolidation is a real change in governing authorities. This is one of the reason why political scientists for a long time questioned the depth of democratic roots in Japan where one party, the LDP, ruled essentially unopposed for some forty years. The test is particularly significant when a large ideological distance has traditionally separated contending forces, for instance when conservative or liberal parties are replaced by socialist or communist ones. When such a change takes place without significant upheaval, there are extremely sound reasons to conclude that a political consensus exists regarding the legitimacy of the political institutions of the country. This is why the return of the Peronists to power was so important in Argentina, and why the electoral success of the FMLN and the vic-
tories of the Liberals, of the PAN and of the Frente Amplio were so significant in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Uruguay. This is also why doubts will be justified about Guatemala until the Left wins something significant, and about Venezuela until Chavez and his party lose one election, if only to win the next one.

Such a fundamental change is the huge step forward that Brazil took in 2002. The victory of Lula and the spectacular success of the PT in congressional elections clearly demonstrated that Brazil’s democracy was sound and that its various political forces, its military, and its economic elites were willing to let clean elections rule the day. Obviously, the process was well under way and in fact, the commitment of Brazilian elites to democratic arrangements had been successfully tested a number of times, beginning with the smooth passage to José Sarney, following the death of Tancredo Neves, and particularly on the occasion of the resignation of Fernando Collor de Mello. The test of ideological alternance, however, was still to be passed as the same political coalition, the Centrão, had basically been in power since the return to civilian rule, in 1985.

The institutional soundness demonstrated in 2002 has a number of meanings that are relevant for Brazil’s foreign policy. Some are absolute: the country’s foreign policy can claim a degree of legitimacy, both domestic and international, that were simply out of reach during the authoritarian period. In addition, the democratic consensus ensures a degree of political stability that gives credibility to the country’s international commitment. Other implications are relative: in South America, and more broadly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, this kind of political stability is increasingly uncommon, and the fact that it is to be found in the largest and most powerful country of the region readily confers to Brazil the status of a political and strategic anchor.

2.2 (Neo-)Liberal Consolidation

In its specifics, the liberal economic cookbook remains highly contentious (Naim 2000). Feminist, post-colonial and post-Marxist academics have raised numerous and sometimes compelling doubts about its assumptions and theoretical claims, while in the streets, during international meetings and People’s Summits, thousands have denounced its practical implications. In global policy circles, however, and in
national central banks and finance departments the world over, there is little debate about the broad contours of a “sound” economic policy, and these contours are unmistakably liberal or, more precisely, neoliber al: fiscal equilibrium, low inflation, open markets, secure property rights and an independent central bank – formally if possible, informally if necessary (Yusuf/Stiglitz 2001; Bhalla 2002). It is not that all the governments in the world are abiding by these rules and requirements, but few of the “delinquents” present their current policies as anything but a “state of exception”, promising to correct their faults as soon as the conditions permit.

The liberal “grammar” also dominates global trade regimes and multilateral institutions, and a credible commitment to broadly respect its rules is a sine qua non to joining those regimes or to engaging with its major players. The global economic game, in other words, is governed according to a liberal rules book, and the only way to join it is to accept its dictates.

This clearly was the previous government’s view. Cardoso, ever since he introduced the Real Plan as Itamar Franco’s finance minister, played the game and he was widely praised for doing so. In many ways, he was also very successful, launching the first period of economic stability that Brazil had known in a generation.

Brazil’s long-term commitment to this outlook remained in doubt, however, both domestically and internationally, for very simple reasons: the most powerful and prestigious left-wing party in Latin America, the PT, was a strong critic of the neo-liberal consensus, everybody knew that it would be a very credible contender to the Presidency and, undoubtedly, that it would remain a powerful player in the Brazilian congress. Logically, as the electoral campaign progressed in the summer and fall of 2002, and as Lula stayed ahead in the polls, a mild panic set in, capital started flowing out, and the Real went into a minor tailspin (Williamson 2002).

Lula’s team was quick to present itself as a credible player, assuring private and multilateral bankers that a PT government would service its debt, guaranteeing the domestic private sector of its commitment to fiscal discipline and “moderation” and, as further proof of “credibility”, supporting publicly the Cardoso government’s agreement with the International Monetary Fund. In the end Lula won, the PT became even more powerful in Congress, but the first two years of
the new regime have been the story of the consolidation of economic orthodoxy. An analysis of that policy lies beyond the scope of this paper, but a few landmarks are worth mentioning: in the first session of the new Congress, the government successfully articulated a coalition to block an – admittedly demagogic – attempt to raise the minimum salary; the IMF agreement was renewed by the government and monetary and fiscal policies remain to this day extremely restrictive; a well-known international banker and card-carrying member of Cardoso’s PSDB, Henrique Meireles, was chosen to head the Central Bank; the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which heavily constrains the government’s spending ability, was maintained; and, in the face of growing restiveness on the part of the Left of the Workers’ Party, radical members of its deputation in Congress were condemned as irresponsible and then expelled altogether from the party.

If there is a consensus in the public and academic discussion about Brazil, in fact, it regards the surprising conversion of the PT in power to neo-liberalism. The agreement is universal: from the sad musings of Fernando Gabeira about his “having dreamed the wrong dream”, to the accolades of the IMF (2005);1 from the spite of the PT’s Left, of the Movimento dos Sem Terras, and of North American radical academics about Lula’s treason (Petras 2005; Chossudovsky 2003), to the Financial Times Group’s Direct Investment magazine’s selection of Lula as its “Personality of the Year” for 2004. Wherever one looks, moreover, there is nothing in the country’s economic policy to challenge the Right’s praise or, for that matter, the Left’s curses.

This “turn” of the PT, and this non-turn of the government’s economic policy, has a number of significant implications for Brazil’s foreign policy. The first one is that the country’s economic stability has been bolstered, with the fall 2002 panic quickly evaporating as the country went from moderate growth but total macro-economic stability in 2003, to remarkable growth and continuing stability in 2004. If anything, the initial lack of growth further contributed to the credibility of the government’s commitment to fiscal discipline. In the context

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1 “Directors welcomed Brazil’s impressive economic achievements over the last two years, and the remarkable track record of performance under the Stand-By Arrangement, which reflected the authorities’ continued pursuit of strong macro-economic policies and steady progress with structural reforms” (IMF 2005: 2). Italics are mine.
of the crisis in Argentina and Uruguay and of the continuing uncertainty in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, this makes Brazil a haven of tranquillity. The global prestige of the PT and of Lula, in particular, also confer a massive credibility to the “TINA” (“There Is No Alternative”) crowd, which quickly reacted by bringing Brazil on board, from Davos to Washington. The doubts about Brazil’s commitment to the neo-liberal recipe book have disappeared as the policy, but also the message, became as clear as could be: in an article written barely one year into Lula’s mandate, Paulo Roberto de Almeida, referring to the competing World Social and World Economic fora, wrote “Porto Alegre Sim; Davos Não” (Almeida 2004), although Lula was the first world leader to go to both summits. The year after, Lula chose Davos and skipped Porto Alegre and, a year later, he did not show up either in Mumbai, where the social summit had moved. What message could be crisper?

2.3 The “right” (Left) Image

The third impact of Lula’s election is more immaterial. It has to do with the credibility in the North of Brazil’s claim to be a voice for the global South and the promoter of a more equitable international distribution of wealth and power. Traditionally, it must be emphasized, Brazil has been somewhat lukewarm about assuming such a stand. Neither in the 1950s nor later did the country join the Non-Aligned Movement and its traditionally independent foreign policy was meant to be so in relations both to the superpowers and to the so-called Third World. This “autonomous insertion” (Vigevani/Cepaluni 2007) was perhaps most vivid under Fernando Collor de Melo who, at the beginning of the 1990s, explicitly sought to symbolically attach Brazil to the First World (Hirst/Pinheiro 1995; Cervo 2005).

Collor’s resounding failure, both political and economic, somewhat discredited that “First World” stand. Yet the project of Brazil’s reinventing itself as a “Southern” voice – the “Third world” having disappeared along with the Second – needed to overcome a number of obstacles. Under Cardoso, and even leaving aside the shallow historical roots of such an identity, the sophisticated diplomat-intellectuals of Itamaraty and their multilingual, PhD-holding aristocratic President could hardly pose as the embodiment of the wretched of the earth. This was especially problematic given the massive social and racial
inequities that plague Brazil and make their worldly, wealthy and white foreign service poorly representative of a country that remains largely poor and mulato.

From that standpoint, the election of Lula and his strong involvement in foreign policy effectively opened up a whole new symbolic repertoire for Brazil (Burges 2005). Progressive global social stands were natural for him and he looked the part. His waging the “Fome Zero” (“Zero Hunger”) campaign both domestically and globally is the best expression of Brazil’s claim to speak and work for the poor and for the South. The fact that Lula set up a double-headed foreign policy machinery, imposing Marco Aurelio Garcia, a party activist, on the Itamaraty establishment, only reinforced the credibility of a progressive global agenda that the latter had scarcely identified with in the past.

The stage was set, in sum, for a vastly different diplomacy.

3. Lula’s Foreign Policies

This overview organizes Brazil’s activities in three broad categories: trade, security and, for lack of a better word, “politics”, by which I mean that part of Brazilian foreign policy that is directed to global governance. The issues I will discuss under that heading regard primarily but not exclusively the UN.

A huge caveat is in order before starting this overview. As Paulo Roberto de Almeida recently pointed out (Almeida 2004), to characterize Lula’s foreign policy after barely two years is a perilous exercise and if the descriptive part of what follows is pretty sound, the interpretations I propose must be considered tentative.

3.1 Trade: Playing the Game and Winning

It is certainly on the trade front that Brazil has made its most spectacular gains in recent years. These were made both within existing regimes (the WTO) and in the negotiations to expand those (the Doha Round) or to establish significant new ones (FTAA, EU-Mercosur).

In its trade policy, Brazil’s current objectives are quite straightforward: getting as much as possible in the areas where the country is already most competitive (i.e. primarily agriculture), and giving as little as possible in those where the cost of adaptation – short, medium
or long-term – would be most severe, i.e. primarily in agriculture and possibly in services. In its general contours, this strategy is no different from that of the vast majority of WTO members: in the liberal age, paradoxically, mercantilism rules trade policy.

These objectives have been pursued extremely effectively and, by any standards, Brazil’s performance on the global trade scene over the last few years has been extraordinary and has made the country a central and highly visible player, out of all proportion to its still limited weight in global trade.

Two of the highest points of recent years involved the use of the regime itself against those who had designed and, until now, ruled it, namely the US and the EU. Brazil’s challenge of the US government’s subsidies to cotton production and of the European Union’s support for its sugar producers were received and accepted by the World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution mechanism and they survived appeals (WTO 2005a; 2005b). While the ultimate outcome of the disputes, which are now in the hands of the US and the EU, is uncertain, the decisions represent a massive victory for agricultural exporters from Southern countries, on substance and on principles, and for the WTO itself, on legitimacy.

In addition to these clear victories, Brazil has also made effective use of the WTO in its ongoing dispute with Canada regarding subsidies to their respective aircraft manufacturers. While the outcome, in this case, is less clear cut, as both countries’ programs were faulted and as both were also allowed to impose tariff compensations (Goldstein/McGuire 2004), the process as such showed that Brazil could exploit existing rules very much to its advantage.

Such effective use of the WTO by Brazil has not been limited to disputes with rich northern countries. In fact, most of Brazil’s requests to the WTO, which concerned anti-dumping investigations, involved products from developing countries, overwhelmingly China and to a lesser extent India, but also South Africa and even Mexico and Venezuela (WTO 2004: 64). These are not introduced by the government, arising instead from private companies’ complaints, but they imply that the Brazilian private sector is now also able to fully exploit the regime. The frequency of those complaints has changed little under the new government as the latter, except recently and somewhat indirectly in the very peculiar case of China – which is discussed below –
does not seem to be discouraging these practices, even when they are directed to Southern partners.

While Brazil has on the one hand done quite well under the “old” regime, it has nonetheless contested some of its dispositions, particularly in two broad areas. The first is intellectual property rights, where the TRIPS agreement has enshrined a distribution of guarantees that puts low-tech countries in an extremely disadvantageous position. The other is agriculture, where protectionism and subsidies dominate existing policies.

Brazil’s strategy on both these cases, which has not changed fundamentally with the new government, has been primarily political. On property rights, the government has challenged the very legitimacy of the existing regime and its impact on the poorest countries, particularly regarding anti-retroviral drugs. In concrete terms, Brazil has been a key player, along with South Africa, in the ultimately successful fight against brand name drug companies’ attempts to limit the rights of governments to impose compulsory licensing, something Brazil has done under Cardoso, and something it continues to do (CIPR 2002: 11-56).

On agriculture, aside from the full use of the prerogatives enshrined in the Marrakech agreement, Brazil has set up and led, alone or with key allies, such as India, a range of veto coalitions that were able to basically disable trade negotiation processes that did not involve substantive concessions on protection or subsidies from the United States or the EU. Given the unwillingness of the latter – or their political inability – to make such concessions, this strategy has contributed to the failure of the Cancun meeting of the WTO and to the paralysis of the Doha Round of global trade negotiations (Jank/Monteiro Jales 2004). It has also led to the stalling of the FTAA process, and to the postponement of any agreement between Mercosur and the European Union.

On substance, it is difficult to see much difference in Brazil’s negotiating position between this administration and the previous one. All the major challenges at the WTO had been launched under Cardoso and Brazil’s stand has not changed substantially. The strategy adopted, however, particularly at the WTO, has been distinct, involving the establishment of coalitions meant to transcend the specific negotiation sessions. These coalitions, in this case, were distinctly
South-South, and they were explicitly given a broader political significance, primarily by Brazil, but also by India and South Africa. The two main outcomes of this strategy, the G-20 and the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) initiative, have in fact become somewhat institutionalized, the first through formal meetings, and the second through a formal declaration and a program of action.

In addition, to these broad multilateral initiatives, a number of smaller arrangements have been promoted involving Mercosur with various countries. None of these agreements involve major economies or even major economic partners of Brazil, most have not advanced beyond expression of interest and none has yet implied the liberalization of significant sectors of the Brazilian economy or access for its exporters to significant markets.

Another issue, very recent, also merits mention. On the occasion of the prolonged state visit by China’s President along with a large and high-level delegation, the Brazilian government accepted China’s request to be formally considered a market economy in the framework of the WTO. Given the overwhelming prominence of China as a target of dumping accusations by Brazilian companies, this is extremely significant: it means that Brazil recognizes that the price of products in China is not determined by state intervention, and thus that the dumping assessment procedure must involve very complex, time-consuming and ultimately expensive investigations in China itself. In practice, it means that anti-dumping has now become much less effective as a defensive weapon against China’s cheap exports to Brazil. Given the broadly recognized challenges the latter represent for Latin American manufacturers as a group (Moreira 2004), it is no wonder that private sector organizations have complained bitterly (OESP 2005a).

Up to this point, and perhaps surprisingly, little mention has been made of Mercosur. Over the last two years and in part because of the economic crisis in Argentina, the regional agreement has been going through one of its periodic bouts of crisis and mutual criticism. In addition to a succession of “wars” between the two countries – from fridge and washing machines to shoes and salted flour –Argentina is now asking for the formalization of mechanisms meant to balance trade between the two countries and to authoritatively allocate FDI among Mercosur members. Brazilian business organizations have in
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A formidable amount of writing has been produced to show how much trade has grown between the two countries, how much Mercosur has become part and parcel of the trade policies of its four members, how it is now developing into a major trading block through association agreements with basically all of Brazil’s neighbours on the continent, how useful it has been as a core negotiation bloc in global multilateral fora and how different it is to the other neo-liberal models existing or being promoted in the hemisphere (Thorstensen 2002). In addition, one could also point to the manifold political ramifications of the agreement and to an expanding institutional framework that now includes a dispute resolution mechanism to which a “Mercosur Parliament” could even be added. Beyond the recent proliferation of pitched battles and tensions, however, a growing number of analysts point to the challenges confronting the regional regime (Pinheiro Guimarães 2003; Souza 2003) and even to its crisis, progressive decay and growing dysfunctionalities (Costa Vaz 2004: 248; Lambert 2004).

From the standpoint of Brazil’s trade policy and especially in broad economic terms, moreover, it appears that Mercosur remains utterly marginal: in 2003, after more than a decade of integration, total manufacturing trade between Brazil and its three partners, at US$ 11.7bn, represented less than 2.5% of Brazil’s GDP (WTO 2004: 3, 187, 189). Notwithstanding the continuing economic problems of its three junior partners and the tensions with Argentina, fast growing trade with China is quickly leading to the marginalization of the bloc as a trading partner for Brazil. From the standpoint of the current trade negotiation processes, finally, the cooperation with South Africa, India and especially China clearly dwarf the contribution of the Brazil’s Mercosur partners. This does not necessarily mean that Mercosur’s survival is at stake, but suggest that there is little economic reason for Brazil to consider it a priority.
3.2 Security: Pragmatic Assertiveness

Ever since WWII, Brazil has had a very low profile on international security issues and in fact, with a few exceptions – its formal leadership of the Inter-American expeditionary force in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in particular – it has been essentially absent from the global and even from the regional security picture. As a slightly troubled, self-centred and benign non-interventionist giant, and through a professional and effective diplomacy, it has certainly contributed to the remarkably low conflictivity of international relations in South America. There is little open debate in the political establishment about the basic tenets of the country’s international security policy: pacifism, multilateralism, non-intervention, respect for sovereignty and non-proliferation have been little contested since civilian rule was re-established in the 1980s. The new government, far from challenging these principles, has in fact loudly reaffirmed them in the face of the US-pushed war on terror, of its challenges to multilateralism, of its aggressive interventionism and of its challenges to sovereignty (Almeida 2004).

While the rhetoric has been consistent and even insistent, the new government’s commitment to those principles appears to be less solid or at least more complex. Brazil’s policy seems in fact to have been guided much less by such abstract principles than by a very pragmatic attitude structured around, on the one hand, the consolidation of its autonomy and influence in the hemisphere and, on the other, by the Brazilian government’s quest for a larger and more visible role at the global level, in part through its accession to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

The most visible and perhaps most surprising foreign policy initiative of the new government has been its involvement in Haiti. On the face of it, and also in the official story, Brazil is only doing there what it has done efficiently and with honour in more than twenty other countries over the last thirty years: keeping the peace and helping stabilise, following a request by the UN, a country reeling from a recent conflict, or riven by political tensions and threatened by violence (Lula da Silva 2004; Amorim 2005). As was clear from the very beginning, however, Haiti is a somewhat peculiar case. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whose regime had admittedly little to recommend it, was
nonetheless broadly recognized as the legitimate President of his country. The circumstances under which he left his post remain muddled, but it is very clear that America’s and France’s pressure, and possibly their soldiers’ presence and attitude, led to his leaving the Presidency and the country altogether in the midst of a civil war (ICG 2004: 11). The formalities were respected, with the Security Council adopting the required resolution authorizing the deployment of mostly French and American troops (1542), and with most UN State members recognizing the new government of Gérard Latortue. This nice international consensus, however, was strongly challenged by a number of states whose democratic credentials are, for the most part, pretty sound: CARICOM countries strongly denounced the intervention and even South Africa refrained for quite some time from recognizing the new government. While these governments have by now fallen back in the global fold, Venezuela is still holding firm, with Chavez vocally denouncing the new regime as illegitimate during the October 2004 Rio Group meeting (OESP 2004f).

The Franco-American intervention risked becoming increasingly expensive politically in the face of the forceful mobilization of Aristide’s Lavallas partisans, incensed at his departure, and bolstered by the former President’s rabid denunciation of the coup, from his South African exile. The search was therefore on for an international force that could maintain a degree of stability while giving a more neutral face to the foreign presence. Lula’s Brazil volunteered to lead the mission and to provide the largest contingent. In a situation eerily reminiscent of the 1965 coup in the Dominican Republic, Brazilian soldiers under a multilateral flag were giving a political cover to a US initiative which even The Economist has called “a coup” (The Economist 2004). Given that context, the Brazilian mission has received a surprisingly warm welcome in the country and, in spite of the language barrier, of the delays in other countries’ contribution of soldiers and money, and through the most deadly hurricane to hit the island in a century, they appear to be doing a reasonable job (ICG 2004; 2005). Much noise was admittedly generated by a critical report published by students from Harvard Law School and the Centro de Justiça Global
Jean Daudelin

(HLSAHR/CJG 2005), but the latter wildly inflated expectations\(^2\) simply cannot be used as a template to assess. Still, the situation remains extremely tense and confused, hundreds of people have been assassinated, and a real stabilization of the situation is clearly not in sight. For Brazil, moreover, it is somewhat of a stretch to reconcile the provision of a cover to such a blunt external intervention with a hard commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention. Most analysts have not even tried, linking instead Brazil’s involvement with its campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Sader 2004; The Economist 2004). And indeed, when Colin Powell visited Brazil in October 2004, he made a point of emphasizing the country’s contribution of hemispheric stability, “particularly in Haiti” (OESP 2004d; 2004e).

Such a pragmatic attachment to principles also appears to dominate Brazil’s commitment to multilateralism, under this government as under its predecessors. Indeed, Brazil appears to be quite selective regarding the level at which multilateralism is to be sought. Specifically, Brazilian diplomacy pursues the consolidation of multilateral institutions at the global and sub-hemispheric levels, but emphatically not hemispheric ones. The logic of such a preference is quite straightforward: for a country that globally ranks only as a middle power, global multilateralism offers the promise of great power management through balancing coalitions; in a hemisphere shared with the world’s largest power, this simply is not an option as no coalition can truly hope to balance the hegemony; at the regional level, conversely, the crystallization of power relationships in multilateral institutions creates constraints that are much stronger for the large number of little players than for the dominant one. What Brazil seeks at the global level – balancing coalitions – is out of question for its competitors in South America, and what it denies the US at the hemispheric level

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\(^2\) One wonders what recent multilateral peace mission, including passed ones in Haiti, could satisfy the lofty hopes of those critics: “Armed with a robust mandate, MINUSTAH has the potential to end Haiti’s cycles of violence, develop fair and democratic institutions, and nurture a culture that honors and promotes human rights” (HLSAHR/CJG 2005: 48). MINUSTAH, in other words, “has the potential” to radically change centuries of political decay, authoritarianism and corruption in a matter of months...
– the institutionalization of regional dominance – it seeks in South America.

While this general “model” of selective – or tactical – multilateralism also appears to be followed in its trade policy, Brazil’s behaviour in regional security fora since Lula’s election certainly expresses it most vividly. In recent hemispheric summits on security and defence, in Mexico (2003) and Quito (2004), the US and its Canadian ally have promoted a number of propositions that sought to consolidate hemispheric security institutions (OAS/CHS 2003; 2004). The most ambitious ones regarded the reform of the Inter-American Defence Board, the formalization of continental cooperation on terrorism and the involvement of the military in the fight against organized crime. On all these counts, Brazil was one of the main voices of opposition and, given the general scepticism of most American states in the face of arrangements that would simply enshrine the massive military asymmetry that prevails in the hemisphere, all the relevant proposals were defeated. Ironically, given that the Quito meeting took place while Brazil was committing to staying one more year in Haiti, the debate was won to a large extent in the name of national sovereignty and non-intervention (OCSD 2004a; 2004b). Conversely, Brazil has been keen, at the annual reunions of the Rio Group and at the founding meeting of the South American Community of Nations, on proposals for military cooperation at the sub-hemispheric level.

The third security dimension touches again the issue of multilateralism, but it regards something that had become a kind of taboo in Brazilian foreign policy circles: non-proliferation. Ever since the Sarney government and its followers launched and then sealed the rapprochement with Argentina around the burial of their respective military nuclear programs, a turn was taken regarding proliferation that appeared to be co-substantive with democratization itself: the social consensus that had existed regarding the need for the country not to abide by such an asymmetrical regime as the NPR appeared to morph in a few years into its opposite, with non-proliferation becoming a core principle of the country’s foreign policy. While this appeared to gel under Cardoso’s international strategy of “participatory inclusion” (Vigevani/Cepaluni 2007), a number of incidents suggest that Lula himself and quite a few people around him partake of the older outlook (Goldemberg 2004).
The first incident took place during the electoral campaign, when Lula, addressing a military audience, complained that “the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed by Brazil, only creates obligations for the weaker countries” (OESP 2002). Immediately, the possibility that a PT government would denounce the treaty were quickly dismissed as misrepresentations and support for the country’s commitment to the regime was strongly reaffirmed. Once Lula was elected, however, the theme kept popping up in declarations of his Minister of Science and Technology. Again, the implications of the latter were minimized and the general thrust of the country’s policy reaffirmed. More recently, however, a row developed between Brazil and the IAEA regarding inspections to the Resende nuclear facilities. That row was resolved to the satisfaction of the IAEA authorities, but not before doubts were raised, particularly in the US, albeit not mainly from the Bush administration, about Brazil’s commitment to the NPR (Aronson 2005; Deutch/Kanter et al. 2004: 75-78).

There are no grounds at this point to think that Brazil wants to develop nuclear weapons. This series of events, however, suggest that the government wants to assert its ability to decide for itself how it is to deal with the issue, without interference from foreign countries, intrusions from international organizations, or abstract attachment to principles. This attitude, stronger with this government although not new, expresses again a degree of pragmatism towards multilateral institutions and even a growing scepticism about those regimes that are felt to unfairly limit the ability of the country to pursue its own objectives and to defend its own interests. Such a stand on nuclear energy, along with those that regard intervention and multilateralism, must be understood as part of the broader, less abstractly principled outlook of this government’s foreign policy.

3.3 Political Diplomacy: Seeking Recognition and Getting it

Brazil’s foreign policy under this government, or for that matter most previous ones, cannot easily be subsumed under the defence and promotion of economic or security interests. Lots of efforts and resources have been devoted to endeavours whose concrete material and political implications are ambiguous and even sometimes contradictory. There is something else at stake that simply cannot be reduced to nar-
rowly defined interests and one must consider that power and prestige as such, independently of their potential “use”, are a central objective of that policy. In the case of the current government, the most important manifestation of these meta-endeavours is certainly Brazil’s intense and even aggressive quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

In September 2004, an article in the *Estado de São Paulo* stated bluntly that Foreign Minister Celso Amorim had convinced “Lula to make the country’s aspiration to a permanent seat in the Security Council the main objective of Brazilian diplomacy” (OESP 2004d). While the primacy of the objective might be disputed, it is impossible not to see that references to this goal are now standard in foreign policy statements and in analyses of foreign policy (Guimarães 2001; Saraiva 2005).

Yet, both Brazil’s rhetoric and its international behaviour force one to look beyond that objective and focus instead on its meaning. For what is sought in fact is a broad and belated – from Brazilian elites’ standpoint – recognition of Brazil’s importance in the world. That famous permanent seat should thus be seen essentially as a symbol of that recognition, a symbol that is now being sought with increasing energy. And indeed, Brazil’s claim to that seat has been a constant in the country’s diplomacy and a sine qua non in Lula’s numerous meetings with foreign leaders, from Omar Bongo to Vladimir Putin. It cannot have escaped Brazilian diplomacy, however, that in practice, a permanent seat on the Security Council, especially as part of a significantly expanded council, could make the latter even less responsive and relevant to the management of global security issues.

Along with most proponents of an expanded Council, however, Brazil and the other contenders – Germany, Japan, South Africa, India, and perhaps also Egypt or even Indonesia – argue that the heightened legitimacy of an expanded structure would ipso facto make it more effective, an argument that was also supported by an independent commission on UN reform, and by Kofi Annan himself (OESP 2004c). Given the insistence of the seat-seekers on their own individual candidacy, however, one is left with the strong impression that none of them would withdraw its claim, even if it were shown that an expanded council would be less effective. For all of them, in sum, the
whole issue appears to be primarily symbolic, with UN legitimacy and effectiveness a lesser if not a marginal preoccupation.

In the case of Brazil for instance, the claim is presented above all as a matter or realism and justice, not in terms of what Brazil’s presence would concretely add. “Representation” strictly speaking, i.e. the diplomatic construction of a major international power identity appears to be the core driver of the campaign – something it arguably has been since the very beginning of that quest, shortly after WWII.

The process through which Brazil promotes its candidacy, however, is possibly as revealing of the logic and ultimate motives as its quest for a permanent seat. It shows how much Brazil has now outgrown the Americas, how effective it is at alliance- and coalition-building, how pragmatic it is in its choice of partners and institutional basis, and finally how ready it is to pay a price for reaching for what are not by any means material or security gains.

Brazil has explicitly and systematically sought support for its claim through bilateral contacts and visits, particularly with current permanent members. It has in fact received such support, more or less explicitly from, among others, Russia, France, the US, and China. It has also joined a formal coalition of potential joiners, the G-4, along with Germany, Japan, and India (OESP 2004b). In parallel, it has also formed, with India and South Africa, a multi-faceted quasi-alliance, now dubbed IBSA (Taylor 2004), whose members also present themselves as natural candidates to the Council. Brazil, finally, has also tried to enlist the support of Latin American state groupings, particularly the Rio Group and now the South American Community of Nations, albeit without convincing them of its exclusive claim to represent them at the Council (LAWR 2004).

Aside from diplomatic pressure and work with self-interested groupings – the G-4 and IBSA – Brazil’s campaign has also implied costs and concrete commitments. Sometimes, as in the case of Gabon, it simply involved forgiving a debt of $30 million that would never have been paid. With the countries that count, however, i.e. primarily the Council’s permanent members (P-5), more apparently needed to be offered, and more was. Here, the question of Haiti for the US and France has to have played a role, and Colin Powell suggested as much when, visiting Brasilia, he mentioned together Brazil’s possible membership in the Council and its significant contribution to the stability
of the region, particularly in Haiti. With China and Russia, commercial concessions – China’s “market economy” status – and strategic collaboration, for instance around space initiatives, certainly have helped generate openness.

That being said, it would probably be a mistake to make a narrow reading of these agreements between Brazil and current permanent members of the Council. Clearly, the latter are open to Brazil’s growing involvement in the world or at least they see it as something normal. The Club, in other words, appears to be interested and the recent intensification of collaboration must probably be seen less as instances of short term bargaining than as points in a much broader pattern of collaboration.

Brazil in sum, appears to be increasingly successful in its claim to “big powerdom”. In political diplomacy, as in trade and security, Brazil’s commitment to current multilateral arrangements, in this case the UN system, goes hand in hand with a challenge to their legitimacy and effective diplomacy and coalition-building geared at challenging their existing make-up.

4. Success? The Prize and its Price

In general terms, there is little doubt that Lula’s foreign policy has been a success: the visibility, prestige and influence of Brazil in the world have never been greater. Not only has Lula’s hyper-active diplomacy taken him all over the planet, but conversely, at this point in time, Brazil appears to be the most popular partner or the preferred guest in the whole world: at the G-3, G-4, G-7, G-8, G-20, G-22 and L-20; in New York, Davos, Libreville, Luanda or Delhi; or of Bush, Chirac or Putin. Brazil, its President, its foreign minister and its diplomats are becoming “normal” and a sought after presence in fora where significant trade, political and even security issues are discussed. To the extent that such a recognition of Brazil’s influence and prestige is a fundamental goal of the country’s diplomacy and a keen desire of its elites since at least the beginning of the century, the foreign policy of this government is a resounding success.

Moreover, and although it is much more difficult to assess, the progress made looks unlikely to be undone, for two main reasons. The first is Brazil’s sheer demographic and economic weight in the world.
As much of the Western world – except the US – is shrinking demographically, as prospects for rapid growth in fast-greying Europe and Japan appear to be disappearing for good, as Russia’s institutional weaknesses look increasingly intractable, and as Africa looks set for many more decades of misery, a stable and liberal Brazil looks convincingly, after China and India, like one of the few significant major players in the new century’s global game (NIC 2004; Boyer/Truman 2005: 147-148). Brazil’s massive and unchallengeable prominence in South America is the second basis of its definitive claim to global relevance. The economic and political consolidation that followed Lula’s election crystallizes that prominence in a region blighted by seemingly intractable problems. While Brazil’s explicit claim to regional prominence remains contentious politically, contenders such as Argentina and Venezuela, however noisy, will simply never be able to challenge it.

For both these reasons, what happens at the Security Council is, symbolism aside, irrelevant: Brazil has joined the Club and, as Germany, Japan and now India have shown over the years, a permanent seat at the Council is not a requisite for membership. The foregoing analysis suggests in fact that Brazil’s global gains derive more from the changes that took place domestically than from the hectic activism that has characterized its foreign policy in recent years.

Now, if Brazil’s diplomatic activism is not the fount of the country’s newly minted global prestige, what has it produced exactly? Well, the least one can say is that concrete results, while far from negligible, are not bountiful.

Some political gains certainly have been made, especially in trade fora, as Brazil has established itself as a major power broker, contributing mightily to a redefinition of the politics of global trade policy, notably at the WTO, but also in the FTAA process. The extent to which this implies a democratization of the process is less clear. Brazil, like every country involved, seeks less a change of the system than a change in the system, whereby its own ability to influence outcomes is maximized. The tensions with some African countries around agri-

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3 This is especially true from the US’ standpoint: in 2002, Brazil, with $91.8bn worth of US investment, was second only to Mexico (at $137.3), and significantly more important than Korea ($75.4) and China ($28.0). Cf. Boyer/Truman (2005, Table 5.1 and 5.2, respectively p. 148 and 150).
cultural subsidies and tariffs, which Brazil seeks, but about which former European colonies and net food importers are more ambiguous, is a case in point (Panagariya 2004).

This particular problem points to the limits of the South-South agenda to which the government has committed itself and devoted so much jet fuel and rhetoric: beyond generalities about under-development and “periphery”, the “South” simply does not define a general community of interest, a shared identity or a common outlook. As Brazil finds out on a daily basis, the closer the neighbours, the lesser the support for its global endeavours: Leaving aside the bitter fight that opposed Brazil and Uruguay about the position of secretary-general of the WTO – which both countries ended up losing – no significant Latin American country supports Brazil’s claim to a permanent seat at the UN security council. Further abroad, one cannot but be sceptical of the long-term potential of IBSA, given India’s rigid stance on so central an issue as agricultural liberalization. South Africa’s very “independent” views on Haiti – whose exiled President has taken up residence in Nelson Mandela’s quarters – also promise less than automatic blessing for Brazil’s global endeavours. As to China, there is no indication that its policy will be any less cold-blooded towards Brazil than it is towards everybody else.

The launch of the South American Community of Nations in Cuzco (December 2004) proved to be an anti-climax: only five Presidents showed up, none from Brazil’s Mercosur partner countries; of those five, only three signed on a founding Protocol (Brazil, Chile, and Peru) that includes no specific target beyond an abstract commitment to total integration in 15 years. The first South American and Arab Countries Summit, in Brasilia (May 10-11, 2005), proved to be similarly disappointing: beyond the announcement of a still-to-be-signed free-trade framework agreement between the Gulf Cooperation

4 These tensions came to the fore during the campaign for the general secretariat of the WTO, in which the candidate from Mauritius was seen as a threat for Brazil: “No ponto de vista do governo brasileiro, sob a condução do chanceler das Ilhas Maurício [Jaya Krishna Cuttaree], a OMC tenderia a concluir a Rodada Roha sem os avanços pretendidos na eliminação de subsídios e outros esquemas tortuosos do comércio agrícola que, supostamente, favorecem os países africanos.” O Estado de São Paulo, April 19, 2005, “Brasil pode apoiar Lamy à OMC”.

Council and Mercosur – which barely trade at all at this point – not only were the Presidents of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others, absent, but the biggest event of the meeting was the very public snub of Nestor Kirchner, who left the event after one day, even though Argentina’s requested statement on the Malvinas had been included in the final declaration (OESP 2005b).

It appears in fact that relations with the North hold much more promise and are likely to be much easier to manage than with a fractured, poor and unstable South. Security Council reform is a case in point as support for Brazil is much stronger among Northern powers than almost anywhere else in the world. The paradox is momentous but inescapable: it is only in the North that Brazil finds support for its claim to be a voice of the South... Which says a lot about the “success” of the government’s South-South campaign.

From a narrow economic standpoint the results are also extremely thin. At a time where constraining fiscal and monetary policy make its economy’s health more dependent than ever on exports, Brazil secured significant market access... nowhere. Its diplomats were able to lead, organize or single-handedly man blocking coalitions in all the trade fora where concessions were asked, but little was offered: Doha, the FTAA, the EU-Mercosur negotiations. They were able to launch a plethora of smaller trade initiatives and to sign a variety of agreements with a multitude of partners: India and South Africa, the South-American Community, Bolivia, the Andean Community, the South African Community Union (SACU), the Gulf Cooperation Council, and so on, but none of those agreements really has sizeable implications for the tenth biggest economy in the world. Admittedly, not much was on offer, but the results remain disappointing.

On security issues, finally, the continuing inability of the US to consolidate a hemispheric regime that would reflect its priorities – terrorism and organized crime for now – is consistent with long-held and unchanged Brazilian priorities. However, Brazil’s foray in Haiti,

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5 According to Brazil’s Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce, Luiz Fernando Furlan, South America’s exports represent only 1% of Arab countries’ total imports.

6 See Cervo (2005) for a wildly favourable reading of the Brasilia Summit, which the author compares, albeit with some reserves, to the Bandung conference in 1956.
which gained its government much credit from Western powers, looks increasingly like a political swamp from which the country will soon want to extricate itself, leaving not much in its wake except resentment among CARICOM countries and diffidence from every other small state in the Americas.

This experience, however, in all its ambiguities, could well be the precursor of many more, especially if Brazil wants to keep its credit among big powers, particularly the US: as trouble expands among its neighbours, calls from Washington for Brazil to assume “its responsibilities” will no doubt become more strident. Already, Condoleeza Rice has pointed to Brazil’s crucial role in containing Venezuela’s ambitions. Moreover, as the Andes sink ever deeper into crisis and instability, Brazil’s own interests are converging with those of the US: can Brasília really afford chaos and failed states in its immediate neighbourhood any more than Washington can thousands of kilometres from its Southern border? Regional security is indeed developing into the area where Brazil’s claim to a global status will be tested the most acutely. It is also an area where the country’s options are quickly disappearing: regional “leadership”, however contested, is simply the only choice Brazil has, something that Lula, at least, seems ready to accept. Such a move has profound implications, in terms of diplomatic and military capabilities, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, in symbolic terms. As China and India have discovered, after Russia, Japan and especially the US, membership to the Club comes with a price: hegemonies, global or regional, are not liked; they are at best tolerated, at worse deeply hated. As Brazil consolidates its position in South America, it will need to shed its self-image of a benign giant and see itself through others’ eyes: a self-interested power seeker, a member of the Club, resented and feared by outsiders, accepted and relied upon by its members.

5. Conclusion

Lula’s election, precisely because it led neither to significant policy changes nor to political instability, represents a major breakthrough for Brazilian foreign policy. It created the conditions for Brazil’s successfully claiming of a place, for the first time, among the few dominant global powers.
Beyond the specifics of an hyperactive foreign policy, one can detect in Brazilian foreign policy patterns that are consistent with the behaviour of such powers. The most striking one is the opportunistic resort to international rules and regimes: when existing arrangements suit one, they are fully used; when they don’t, their rules and principles are strongly contested and if necessary, violated. International norms and regimes now appear purely as instruments to be used or ditched as befit circumstances. Long – apparently? – a principled regionalist, multi-lateralist and non-interventionist, Brazil has now become a tactical one. Mercosur is the right lever in some negotiations, the G-20 or IBSA in others, and the G-5 (with other Security Council hopefuls) in still others. China is the right ally on some issues, South Africa, Venezuela or Chile on others, and the United States, France and Russia on still others. Non-intervention is a fundamental principle one day at one place, a relative one the week after or somewhere else.

Such calculating behaviour is not, as such, bad or good. It is the mark of those who can adopt it, and get away with it. It is the mark of a global power. Brazil’s full membership in the club might not yet be perfectly clear, especially to Brazil’s own political and diplomatic elites. This is why so much of its foreign policy remains wrapped in a South-centred, dependency-laced rhetoric. Soon enough, however, prodded in no small measure by denunciations from its closest neighbours, Brazil’s foreign policy will discover that its fate lies not in “leading” the periphery but, in more than one way, in leaving it.

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Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra

Successes and Limits of Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004

From January 1999 the Brazilian administration supported both by the international and the domestic financial community, together with the IMF, formulated a macroeconomic policy based on three pillars: a) a floating exchange rate and free capital mobility for the adjustment of external accounts; b) high real interest rates to ensure the achievement of inflation targets; c) increasing primary surplus to constrain public sector indebtedness. This macroeconomic model has proved to be able to bring forth economic cycles by following expansion and retraction movements in world trade and liquidity. However, it has not succeeded in putting the country back on a path to social and economic development. This path is meant as a consistent expansion of investments, especially higher and long-term ones (such as those in infrastructure or heavy industry) or riskier ones (such as those with high technological content), along with employment increase, wage increases and improved income distribution.

This paper supports the thesis that exchange, monetary and fiscal policies with free capital mobility are contradictory and contribute to obstructing sustained growth, the elimination of external vulnerability, the tackling of infrastructure constraints, and the expansion of social expenditure. The paper is divided into four sections. The first part deals with the external account adjustment and the possible impacts of exchange rate valuation as from mid-2004 on. The second section analyses how inappropriate the inflation target policy is under domestic pricing conditions. The third part describes the fiscal policy role, an adjustment variable of the macroeconomic model, since it bears the impacts of exchange rate and monetary policies. Final considerations outline possible alternative policies as an attempt to dismantle the vicious circle of the macroeconomic model with financial liberalization.
1. Floating Exchange Rate and External Adjustment

The three devaluation shocks of the Brazilian currency during this period (1999, 2001, and 2002) made possible a pronounced adjustment of external accounts (see Chart 1 and 2). The balance of trade skyrocketed from a US$ 6.6 billion deficit in 1998 to a US$ 33.7 billion surplus in 2004. This resulted in a reversion in the current account balance from a US$ 33.4 billion deficit to an US$ 11.7 billion surplus. In 2004 the recovery in commodity prices – which rose by 17.5% on average – and the growth of 23.4% in manufacturing exports led to a higher trade balance despite an increase in imports. Encouraged by an extremely favorable international conjuncture, including 18% growth in world trade, low inflation rates, and near-zero or negative real interest rates in major developed countries, Brazilian exports reached the level of US$ 96.5 billion.

The dynamism of the agribusiness (soya, meat, wood and its byproducts, sugar and alcohol, paper and cellulose etc.) along with the expansion of the agricultural frontier, genetic improvements sponsored by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), and world economic growth was one of the factors which most contributed for the export boom. The agribusiness trade surplus totaled US$ 34.1 billion in 2004. It corresponds to a 32.1% growth when compared to the figures from the previous year. Another relevant factor was a change in strategies adopted by foreign corporations in the country: either their direct participation in foreign trade by exporting higher technological content products and in faster growing areas, or their association to or acquisition of local companies which stimulated reaction from Brazilian corporations (Baer/Cintra 2004).

Foreign direct investment reached US$ 32.8 billion in 2000. It played a relevant role in the consolidation of external accounts, especially at moments of high levels of risk aversion in the international financial markets (see Chart 2). First, foreign corporations attempted to explore the potential growth in the domestic market. Only a few export strategies went beyond regional integration. An example is the automotive industry, in view of the constitution of the Mercosur (Southern Cone Common Market). Faced with persistent frustration with the poor performance of the Brazilian economy and the exchange rate devaluation, foreign corporations started to adopt a more active export strategy through expansion to new markets and redistribution of production lines among transnational affiliates. In a few cases the
domestic market scale and/or specialization derived from the dynamics of the domestic market also implied export activities, including the field of higher technological content products. Thus, there was sales expansion in higher aggregate value manufactures, such as automobile parts, chassis, vehicles, tractors, planes, machinery, furniture, electronic products, pumps etc.¹

In sum, exporting efforts were combined not only with the opportunity to use idle productive capacity, but also with economies of scale, productivity increase, and some sort of technological catch-up. In addition to synergic gains, access to new markets and improvements in distribution systems, exports by (foreign and domestic) corporations have resulted in higher revenue in foreign currency, representing a hedge mechanism able to guarantee parts and components imports and the payment of foreign debts, and to reduce dependence on new loans abroad, since it contributes to an improved risk rating and opens up external credit lines in more favorable conditions. Finally, exports have become strategic for foreign and domestic companies.

The total foreign debt dropped from US$ 241.5 billion in 1999 to US$ 220.2 billion in December 2004 (see Table 1). This movement has been led by long- and short-term private debt which fell from US$ 140.8 billion to US$ 105.5 billion as a result of corporate decisions to reduce liabilities in foreign currency. This posture, especially from those companies which do not manufacture tradable goods, is

¹ Furtado (2004: 4) supports that: “it can be stated that the Brazilian industrial fortress rests on metal-mechanics, which ranges from natural resources (mineration) to iron and steel industry (natural resources and scale), and then mechanics (and a broad range of electrical equipment which can be classified in this type) to which different manufacturing processes are joined. Brazil built up solid positions in these sectors. […] Brazil has demonstrated itself to be competitive in mechanical and electrical equipment segments, both at a large/small scale and manufactured to order. Many of these companies export production shares larger than those of leading companies in the agroindustrial complex. In the Brazilian metal-mechanics industry there is already an element which was previously unknown in these activities and in most industries: an export-oriented plant”. Transport materials industries (US$ 16 billion, 16.6% out of the total) and metalurgic products (US$ 10.3 billion, 10.7% out of the total) have been leading exports, followed by the soy bean complex (US$ 10 billion, 10.4% out of the total) and meat (US$ 6.2 billion, 6.4% out of the total). The signing of trade agreements with Chile and Mexico also helped promote sales of trucks, buses, and agricultural machinery.
associated with the perception of higher instability in global financial markets, exchange rate volatility, and precariousness of exchange rate hedge as a result of the reduced offer of exchange rate indexed public bonds. As a counterpart, the external public debt rose from US$ 100 billion to US$ 114.7 billion. The reduction in debt stock favored an improvement in different external indicators of the Brazilian economy, such as interest payments/exports, debt service/exports, foreign debt/GNP, foreign debt/exports etc. (Prates 2004). However, anticipated amortizations totalling US$ 41 billion in 2005 and US$ 31 billion in 2006 maintain the need for high external funding. This requires the continuity of a policy for reduced dependence from extremely volatile international capital flows, since they are subject to euphoric and depressive moods.

Table 1: Total foreign debt by debtor (US$ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium- and long-run debt</td>
<td>199.001</td>
<td>189.500</td>
<td>182.276</td>
<td>187.316</td>
<td>194.736</td>
<td>182.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non financial public sector</td>
<td>97.364</td>
<td>87.780</td>
<td>92.755</td>
<td>110.310</td>
<td>119.785</td>
<td>114.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial private and public sector</td>
<td>101.637</td>
<td>99.720</td>
<td>89.521</td>
<td>77.005</td>
<td>74.950</td>
<td>67.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-run debt</td>
<td>26.609</td>
<td>27.420</td>
<td>27.658</td>
<td>23.395</td>
<td>20.194</td>
<td>18.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non financial public sector</td>
<td>3.318</td>
<td>2.578</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign debt (A)</td>
<td>225.610</td>
<td>216.921</td>
<td>209.934</td>
<td>210.711</td>
<td>214.930</td>
<td>201.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercompanies loans (B)</td>
<td>15.859</td>
<td>19.236</td>
<td>16.133</td>
<td>16.978</td>
<td>20.484</td>
<td>18.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign debt plus intercompanies loans (C=A+B)</td>
<td>241.468</td>
<td>236.156</td>
<td>226.067</td>
<td>227.689</td>
<td>235.414</td>
<td>220.183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1/ Excludes principal stock relative to intercompanies loans. It considers a revision in indebtedness position as from March 2001.

The domestic interest rate increase as from September 2004, along with open capital accounts and a floating exchange rate, triggered rapid short-term capital inflows, which sought to make arbitrage among interest rates – while the US federal funds rate was 2.25% per year in December 2004, the Selic rate reached 17.75% per year – by
appreciating the Brazilian currency (see Chart 1). On the one hand, the currency overvaluation acts as an auxiliary mechanism for inflation control. Thus, it helps to achieve the 2005 inflation target. On the other hand, it jeopardizes the consistent increase in both trade and current account surpluses which helps stabilize the balance of payments and constrains foreign vulnerability. The currency overvaluation forced the Central Bank and the Treasury to buy international reserves at the spot market, as well as to intervene in the derivative market (Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros, BM&F). It is estimated that US$ 7 billion were purchased on the exchange market from December 2004 to January 2005. Net international reserves (excluding IMF resources) rose to US$ 29 billion in early February 2005. However, reserve purchasing has an impact on the public debt stock if the Central Bank decides to sterilize them, and/or on domestic liquidity (and therefore the GNP growth rate), if it decides for a non-sterilization policy. The first alternative proves to be contradictory to one of the macroeconomic policy goals, i.e. to reduce the net public debt-GNP ratio; the second alternative is contradictory to the pursuit of an inflation target. The Central Bank chose the sterilization of the domestic currency by partially reversing efforts for public debt reduction during 2004 in order to limit an excessive valuation of the Real.

Despite the successful exporting strategy, Brazilian exports are still concentrated on agricultural and industrial commodities characterized by high price and volume volatility. This fact makes exports strongly dependent on the dynamics of the international economy. Under these circumstances, a real exchange rate favoring exports and import replacement becomes crucial for a sustainable path to the Brazilian economy. The appreciation of the Real combined with excessive exchange rate volatility may jeopardize the creation of expectations favorable to productive investment, particularly the export-oriented one. Thus, the appreciation of the Real threatens the sustainability of the dynamic export sector in the forthcoming years and makes it difficult to consolidate external adjustment. The constraint of short-term inflationary pressures associated with the prolonged and expressive currency valuation does not seem to offset the risk of future external imbalance.
2. Interest Rates and Inflation Targets

In June 1999, after the currency crisis started on 13 January, an institutional framework was conceived for monetary policy: the inflation target regime. This policy aimed to replace the exchange rate as an anchor, which was effective during the first phase of the Real Plan (1994-1998) for a system which was able to affect the demand level and expectations of economic agents by means of simple and automatic interest rate management rules. The Brazilian inflation target regime was established as follows:

- the Extended Consumer Price Index (IPCA) calculated by the IBGE Foundation has been selected as the price index to determine the achievement of an inflation target, not excluding more unstable prices;
- the inflation target would bear a variable tolerance interval up and downwards (initially 2%, then 2.5%, and again reduced to 2% in 2006);
- targets and tolerance intervals would be set by the National Monetary Council (CMN) 2 a year and a half in advance, for instance, the target (4.5%) and the tolerance interval (2%) for 2006 were set in July 2004;
- the chosen target should be achieved over a calendar year (twelve months);
- the Central Bank conducts an opinion survey with market analysts (Boletim Focus released on the Central Bank homepage every Monday) to gain expectations of so-called “rational agents”. It represents one of the major parameters for monetary policy decision-making (see Chart 3). In this regime, the chief monetary policy tool is the short-term interest rate (Selic) – because of anticipated inflation and the output gap 3 – in order to make the index price converge with the target previously set (Farhi 2004: 82).

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2 Members of the CMN are the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and the Central Bank President.

3 A output gap is defined as the difference between the “potential output” and the economy’s actual output. The “potential output” would correspond to the achievable production level without any mismatch between supply and demand, thus not causing any price raise. The inflation target “model” of the Central Bank would be supposedly based on a production function where the “potential output” could not exceed GDP growth limit of 3.5%.
Inflation remained within the tolerance limits in 1999 and 2000 and exceeded them in the following years, especially in 2002 and 2003.\(^4\) The inflation acceleration was basically determined by the supply shock represented by the currency devaluation and its dissemination mechanisms. These implied higher price indexes in late 2002, during the election of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (see Chart 3 and 1). Indexed prices made it difficult to reduce the inflation rate. With the recovery of economic growth at international and domestic levels in 2004, agricultural and industrial commodities experienced a price increase shock and profit margins of corporations had little relative room for recovery. Nonetheless, the inflation rate remained within the tolerance limits.

Thus, the peculiar Brazilian framework of pricing caused the exchange rate devaluation and/or other exogenous supply shocks (agricultural commodity prices, oil, iron etc.) to affect most prices of goods and services. The strict target regime became inadequate, since only non-controlled price behaviour proved to be sensitive to short-term interest rate movements. Tradable goods prices – comprising the exports – are directly impacted by exogenous shocks such as an increase in international prices of commodities and semi-manufactured goods. Some segments, especially commodities (soya or paper pulp), manage to adjust internal prices which are equivalent to the currency parity. These sectors became insensitive to the interest rate, for they can partially reduce their production share of the domestic market or even export their whole production to foreign markets.

Government-regulated prices (comprised by services in their majority) are also affected by the exchange rate, but not by the interest rate. For instance, agreements for privatization of telecommunications and electricity distribution companies define yearly tariff adjustments based on the General Price Index – Market (IGP-M). This index strongly influences wholesale prices and it is very sensitive to supply shocks.\(^5\) Therefore, the yearly adjustment scheme of administered

\(^4\) Core inflation targets were: 8% in 1999, 6% in 2000, 4% in 2001, 3.5% in 2002, 4% in 2003 – however, it was later adjusted to 8.5% due to its unrealistic estimate –, 5.5% in 2004, and finally 4.5% in 2005 (see Chart 3).

\(^5\) This index is calculated by the Getulio Vargas Foundation. It is calculated from the weighted average of: the Wholesale Price Index (IPA-M) corresponding to
goods based on the IGP-M accrued in past twelve months created an important vector of inflationary inertia and a pass-through of currency devaluation, and other exogenous shocks, on domestic prices. Goods of which prices are government-monitored are also insensitive to interest rates for their own adjustment mechanisms.

As to non-tradable goods prices (in the domestic market), they adjust themselves to the aggregate demand caused by the interest rates increase by means of the reduction of (wage) costs and profit margins. Nevertheless, these prices account for just one third of IPCA – adopted as the reference index to determine and to calculate the inflation target – whereas the aggregate share of tradable and administered goods reaches approx. 69%. Therefore, the monetary policy needs to be extremely restrictive to constrain the demand, so that a price reduction in the non-tradable goods sector and in a few segments of the tradable goods sector offsets the adjustments of government-regulated prices and some tradable goods insensitive to interest rate variations. During this period, the short-term real interest rate (Selic), less the accrued inflation of the previous twelve months, consistently remained at a nearly 10% level except for the year 2003 (see Chart 4).

A overly short-term horizon for the achievement of the target (twelve months) also contributed to maintaining a restrictive monetary policy. This fact had a negative impact on growth, employment, in-
vestment recovery, as well as on the evolution of public debt stock, despite continuous and increasing fiscal surpluses.

Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Inflation Target System (Sistema de Metas para a Inflação <http://www.bancocentral.gov.br/>).

In addition to these limitations of the inflation targeting regime associated with a peculiar pricing mechanism, the slight signs of recovery of consumers’ purchasing power fostered the consumption-credit market in 2004 and reduced the efficacy of the high interest rate policy in the short run. First, the banking system extended loan terms as a result of increased confidence in debtors’ solvency (individuals or corporations). In this scenario, the gradual Selic rate increase is offset by a term extension of consumer loans which keeps instalments almost constant. Secondly, the securitization of receivables was consolidated with the economic expansion and sales growth, leading to increased corporate liquidity. Thirdly, credit expansion by means of payroll check discount made possible the entry of new consumers into the market, such as retirees and those who managed to refinance their debt (overdraft protection agreement, for instance) for this credit modality, and to later expand their consumption. Fourthly, the strategic partnership between retail corporations and the financial sector – Pão de Açúcar-Itaú, Panashop-HSBC, and Casas Bahia-Bradesco – increased the potential commitment of retailers to consumption credit and stimulated sales (Barros/Baer 2004). In spite of these innovations in the consumption credit segment the Brazilian loans volume remains extremely low, i.e. approx. 26.3% of GDP in December 2004, marked
by short maturity and extremely high interest rates. This makes the current banking system unfit for economic development funding.\(^6\)

The inflation measured by IPCA should converge with the 5.1% adjusted target\(^7\) in 2005. Market analysts, however, still estimate an inflation rate of approx. 6%. Thus, the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) of the Central Bank started to raise the short-term interest rate in September 2004 in order to slow down growth (from 5.2% in 2004 to approx. 3.5% in 2005).\(^8\) This perpetuates the low and discontinuous growth evidenced by the Brazilian economy since the 1980s (see Chart 5). In this scenario, the private sector continues to show low levels of investment rates (18% of GDP in 2003), especially in the domestic market-oriented industries, despite a relative amplification of the investment rate in 2004. Major obstacles to investments result from uncertainties regarding the economy’s prospects associated with

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6  The credit-GDP ratio was 37% in 1995. See Cardim de Carvalho (2005). According to the Central Bank in December 2004 average interest rates on loans were 31% per year to the corporate sector and 61.5% per year to individuals.

7  In 23 September 2004 the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) decided to adopt a 5.1% adjusted target for 2005 since it seemed unrealistic to pursue the 4.5% target.

8  Such deceleration will not necessarily lead to a recession, although the GDP growth rate fell to 0.4% in the forth quarter of 2004. As the current levels of international liquidity persist, along with low interest rates in major markets, and the world trade growth rate reaches approx. 21% per year, the dynamism of the Brazilian economy may proceed at approx. 3.5%, despite the macroeconomic policy and infrastructure bottlenecks. In this case, a longer cycle may prevail in the following two or three years, but with low growth rates. However, it is apparently not enough to foster the social and economic development of the country.
structural factors (external vulnerability, high public debt stock, high interest rates), amplified by the excessively orthodox management of the macroeconomic policy. As long as there is no evidence of sustained economic growth, chances for a new private investment cycle are apparently poor. Frustration with the domestic market expansion potential is still very strong in investors’ minds. Under these circumstances, investments have been determined by very solid comparative advantages, such as in the agribusiness (soya, meat, paper and celluloses etc.); the competition dynamics which require continuous investment, for instance, in telecommunications and retailer distribution; international price behaviour (mining, iron metallurgy and petrochemicals). Furthermore, the squeezing of some production chains and the investment stagnation caused bottlenecks in the supply chain. These bottlenecks can only be solved through higher expenditures in the development of new capacities, which demand proper policies for credit provision, trade and technological innovation. The development of competitive advantages requires state policies which are able to sustain higher investment rates in relation to GDP and, simultaneously, to bypass balance-of-payment constraints through an accelerated expansion of net exports (Resende 2004). Needless to say, these policies are antagonistic to the current policies based on inflation target, currency valuation, and fiscal surpluses.

In sum, concentrated market structures capable of transferring international price changes, high indexation levels, and a consumption-oriented credit market forced significant relative price changes. These changes lead to higher inflation rates in an economy like the Brazilian one, without necessarily causing a price rise in every sector. Nevertheless, the inflation targeting system governing the monetary policy decision-making determines the maintenance of real interest rates at approx. 10% per year. This combination of inflation targeting regime and floating exchange rate subject to great fluctuations proved to be extremely perverse and led to recurrent stop and go cycles. It has also made sustainable growth difficult by discouraging investment, with negative impact on the public debt and the employment rate.

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9 Cf. Fraga et al. (2003): “the volatility of all variables – inflation, exchange rate, output, and interest rate – and the inflation level are higher in emerging economies in comparison with those observed in developed economies”.
3. Fiscal Surplus and Reduction of Public Indebtedness

In the beginning of the Real Plan the financial status of the Brazilian public sector was very good. The previous administration had conducted a huge budget and public indebtedness adjustment. A primary surplus of 2.6% of the GDP was observed and the public sector net debt was relatively reduced in relation to GDP in 1993 (Belluzzo/Almeida 2002). Nonetheless, during the first phase of the Real Plan (1994-1998), the federal administration unloaded the burden of the monetary policy and later that of the exchange devaluation on the public sector as a whole. The public debt stock and interest payment rose dramatically. In the period 1994-1997, the net capital inflow led to an expansion of foreign liabilities and of Central Bank reserves. The monetary sterilization policy implemented by the Central Bank led to a domestic public debt increase. During the phase of net capital outflow, the reserve dropdown was followed by an interest rate rise. This fact made debt service grow and determined a rapid increase in the net public debt-GDP ratio (see Chart 6). These factors were responsible for steadily feeding the net debt, and not excessive public expenditures. Therefore, the domestic public debt evolution bears a phenomenon of financial and monetary nature with certain serious fiscal implications.

Finally, monetary and exchange policies in a context of finance liberalization resulted in higher fiscal and financial fragility in the public sector. Since a large amount of the debt was indexed to the short-term interest rate (Selic) and to the exchange rate, its stock was extremely volatile. The attempt to reduce the net public debt in relation to the GDP – converted into a goal together with the IMF – made fiscal policy implementation perverse. By means of high interest rates, low GDP growth rates, and a floating exchange rate, the strategy of reducing public debt started to require increasing primary surpluses\(^{10}\) and, therefore, a relative squeezing of social expenditures and an absolute squeezing of public infrastructure investments.

After IMF resource inflow in November 1998 the primary balance of public accounts at three federative levels of government – federal, state, and local – became one of the macroeconomic policy priorities.\(^{11}\) In order to establish a pattern of budget balance at all levels of government – Federation, States and municipalities – different programs were implemented: the Incentive Program for the Reduction of the State Public Sector in Banking Activities (Circular N° 2.742 dd. 1997 issued by the Central Bank), Program for Support and Restructuring of State Fiscal Adjustment (Law N° 9.496 dd. 11 September 1997) followed by the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Supplementary Law N° 101 dd. 4 May 2000) and the Law on Fiscal Crimes (Law N° 10.028 dd. 19 October 2000).

The fiscal adjustment aimed at increasing revenues and decreasing expenditures to save resources for the achievement of fiscal surplus and public debt reduction targets. The domestic tax burden rose from 29.33% to 34.01% of GDP corresponding to a 4.68% increase in the period 1998-2003. Afonso/Araújo (2005: 7, 20) showed that the taxation increase “has not resulted in an equal variation in expenditures on goods and services by the public sector”. The government demand dropped from 21.93% in 1998 to 21.59% of GDP in 2003 and investment expenditures fell from 2.8% to 1.7% of GDP in this same period. Resources were partially allocated for payment of social benefits (income transfers). However, its majority was allocated for payment of

\(^{10}\) Fiscal surplus targets were increased from 2.8% in 1999 to 3.5% in 2001; 3.75% in 2002; 4.25% in 2003; and 4.5% in 2004.

\(^{11}\) Since then the Brazilian government has signed four agreements with the IMF totalling US$ 80.1 billion and has drawn US$ 58 billion (see Table 2).
### Table 2: Agreements signed between the Brazilian government and the IMF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998 (a)</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005 (b)</th>
<th>2006 (b)</th>
<th>2007 (b)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans US billion</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawn Value US$ billion</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafts US$ millions</td>
<td>5.212</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.044</td>
<td>18.709</td>
<td>19.260</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid interests US$ millions</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1.189</td>
<td>1.244</td>
<td>1.196</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** International Monetary Fund


**Notes:**
- a) Brazil received funding from other international organisms along with IMF loans totalling US$ 41.5 billion; 
- b) An estimate.
the public debt service of which interest rates rose from 5.19% to 7.77% of GDP.

In fact, since 1996 the Brazilian public sector has disbursed interest payments of approx. 7% of GDP, except for 1997, when it dropped to 5% of GDP, and during crises in 1999 and early 2003 when it rose to 15% of GDP (see Chart 7). Not only exchange and monetary policies immobilized fiscal policy, but also implied a transfer of increasing interests to creditors. This fact deteriorated domestic income distribution (the richest 10% population absorb 44% of the domestic income whereas the poorest 10% absorb just 1%).


The Federation, States, municipalities, and state-run companies achieved a primary surplus (revenues less expenditures, excluding interest payments) of 81 billion Reals during 2004. This value corresponds to 4.6% of GDP above the target set by the government (4.5%) and above that agreed with the IMF (4.25%). This primary result was enough to pay 63% of interests which reached 128.3 billion Reals that year corresponding to 7.3% of GDP (see Chart 7). Thus, the public sector nominal deficit was 47.1 billion Reals corresponding to 2.7% of GDP. The net debt stock of the public sector rose from R$ 913.1 billion in December 2003 to R$ 957 billion in December 2004. Nonetheless, the public debt-GDP ratio fell from 57.2% to 51.8% in this same period (see Chart 6). This 5.4 percentage point drop interrupted an uptrend observed since 1995. However, it implied neither any improvements in the funding framework of the Brazilian state, nor a route to public debt sustainability in the medium run (three to five years).
Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004

years), despite the generation of high and increasing primary sur-
pluses. Crucial factors for explaining this performance were the eco-
nomic growth estimated at 5.25, a lower interest rate in the period
April-August 2004 (stable at 16% per year), and the currency appreci-
cation along with fiscal restriction.12

Some improvements have been observed in the debt management: ex-
change rate-indexed bonds declined from 20.5% of total in Decem-
ber 2003 to 9.3% in December 2004; Selic post-fixed bonds fell from
55.5% to 54% in this same period; and pre-fixed bonds rose from
11.4% to 19%. This facilitated the monetary policy management.
Nevertheless, despite efforts made by authorities, the relationship
between the Central Bank and the banking system has changed little
concerning public bond liquidity and turnover.13 These assets kept
their basic feature of a quasi-currency (transactions concentrated in
extremely short terms) and the average maturation of bonds issued by
the Central Bank was 15.8 months and that of bonds issued by the
Treasury was 11.2 months in December 2004. Therefore, a flight risk
against the Real resulting from any foreign disturbance remained la-
tent.

In addition to the restricting character of the fiscal policy, an in-
creasing sacrifice in public investment is observed. Its lowest level
since 1984 was recorded in the period 2003-2004. The Treasury – sup-
ported by “technical” arguments found in the IMF agreement – pur-
sues an increasing fiscal surplus and restricts infrastructure expendi-
tures. This represents a hindrance to tackling economic infrastructure
bottlenecks: a precarious road network, insufficient railway capacity,
port saturation, difficulties in expanding electricity generation and
basic sanitation systems. However, infrastructure expansion represents
one of the major requirements for ensuring sustained growth. Consid-
ering the sector nature – long maturation term and uncertain imple-
mentation costs, extensive capital requirements and amortization pe-

12 Prospects for 2005 do not seem very optimistic. These factors shall be less favor-
able except for the exchange rate. The reference interest rate has been rising since
September 2004 and a GDP deceleration is estimated at approx. 3.5%. A relevant
discussion on the domestic public debt renegotiation (80% of the GDP) is beyond
the scope of this paper. As an example see Carvalho (2005).

13 It is still too early to evaluate impacts of a change in taxation rules of investment
funds according to their maturation period effective since early 2005.
ried, low economic return, environmental risks – the expansion of these investments shall be conducted without the decisive participation of the public sector. This is a contradiction in view of the current magnitude of the interest rate and fiscal surplus.\textsuperscript{14}

The clearly regressive fiscal policy and successive fiscal adjustments have not even allowed compensatory policies to struggle against unemployment, social scarcity (education, healthcare, land reform etc.) and to tackle poverty problems. Sustained economic growth emerges as a necessary condition for facing these matters by means of employment expansion, wage recovery, and further taxation (Salin 2005). In 2004 growth recovery led to a decrease in the unemployment rate of the economically active population from 13.1\% in April to 9.6\% in December (see Chart 8). Precarious labor conditions increased in metropolitan areas despite this unemployment rate drop.

The number of employees working 40 hours a week and earning less than a minimum wage was 2.7 million in December 2004 according to the Employment Monthly Survey by IBGE. This figure was 2 million in March 2002. Seven hundred and twenty thousand people were added to the number of underpaid employees corresponding to 36\% (Soares 2005). Thus, the ratio between underpaid workers and total workers rose from 8.7\% to 14\% in the same period. This increase in underpaid employees represents the most perverse face of workers’ real average income decline. It dropped consecutively for the seventh year (see Chart 9). Accrued income losses reached 18.8\% in the period 1996-2003.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{14} Some sectors support the participation of private capital in developing a physical infrastructure in the country in view of funding and fiscal restrictions in the public sector which limits its investment capacity. Nevertheless, private capital requires the establishment of a secure legal environment with reduced risks to performing infrastructure investments. This is the reason behind the debate on the role of Regulatory Agencies, the Bankruptcy Law, and the Public-Private Sector Partnership. However, the existence of a stable legal environment does not exclude the conflict between investments in limited or uncertain profitability fields and the high level of the real interest rate. It remains an obstacle to expanding infrastructure expenditures. The historic experience seems to suggest that the recovery of such investments, even in partnerships with the private sector, requires the structuring of coordination and support mechanisms (credit, tax) as well as long-term economic prospects (Biasoto 2004).\end{footnotesize}
Although the labor market has shown a recovery – new positions and formal employment –, the economic recovery did not reflect an average increase in purchasing power. This means that new positions paid lower wages. Moreover, more members of the same family had to find a job as an attempt to offset the income loss by the head of the family. This phenomenon helps explain the increase in underpaid workers, since these people tend to accept lower waged-jobs and frequently poorer work conditions. According to the IBGE survey the majority of this group is comprised of women, non-white workers and those without a formal contract or self-employed ones (young and elderly people). Unfortunately, this mismatch between the income and occupation evolution shall not be relieved, because the Central Bank promotes a
deceleration in productive activities by means of interest rate increase to achieve the inflation target. This restricts any prospects in increasing workers’ employment and income.

The persistent stop-and-go dynamics amplifies the obstacles to reversing the picture on social exclusion which is aggravated not only by poor economic growth, but also by changes imposed by the modernization of the productive structure itself as a consequence of the dismantling of institutions of the so-called “wage society” – increase in insecure work contracts, non-affiliation to trade unions, subcontracting, employment deindustrialization, growth in personal services –, as well as extremely low wages. Under these circumstances, poverty and social exclusion affect larger and larger portions of the working class.

In conclusion, financial liberalization and IMF rules force an increasing fiscal surplus to pay the public indebtedness (foreign and domestic) which perpetuates the financial fragility of the public sector and hinders infrastructure funding and expansion of social expenditures. The macroeconomic model makes it very hard, if not impossible, for the implementation of an autonomous fiscal policy which characterizes a modern public sector able to sustain and foster an expansion in income, employment, physical infrastructure, universalization of public policies, and income redistribution.

4. Final Considerations

There is an intense debate over the improvement of the macroeconomic model in the country. The flexibilization of strict inflation targets is suggested by adopting stable targets and not declining ones over time, the extension of terms to achieve them, the pursuit of a core target and not the full index, and so on. These changes would allow a lower real interest rate, and reduce the deleterious effects on production, employment, investments, public debt stock, and exchange rate. As to the elevated fiscal surplus targets, the IMF itself signaled a US$ 1 billion-drop per year in the primary surplus for the period 2005-2007 in order to make possible infrastructure investment projects (roads, ports etc.) approved by its supervisory team. Lower real interest rates and further public investments would sustain economic growth and meet expectations of public debt solvency (a drop in the
net public debt-GDP ratio over time). Finally, the debate on how to restrict currency overvaluation considers the introduction of a Financial Transactions Tax (IOF) on short-term foreign currency transactions to restrict speculative capital inflow attracted by high interest rates. Reserve purchase and derivative transactions by the Treasury and the Central Bank would be insufficient to constrain the appreciation of the Brazilian currency with future impacts on the trade balance and external adjustment.15

Finally, in the 1990s, capital account liberalization and financial deregulation were defended as policies capable of mitigating income and consumption fluctuations in developing countries. The assumption was that net foreign capital inflows would foster growth and employment. The reality proved to be totally different. The emerging economies – Mexico, Eastern Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Argentina and so on – faced several financial and currency crises since international financial markets were subject to liquidity constraint and expansion cycles.

15 A former president of the Central Bank, Affonso Celso Pastore, supports the idea that the Real has been appreciating with the short-term capital inflow. This may both reduce the current account balance and hinder the implementation of the monetary policy. Foreign investors amplify the demand for CDI (Interbanking Certificate of Deposit) contracts or 180 to 360-day swap contracts at the Futures and Goods Stock Exchange (BM&F) by raising their prices and reducing the long-term interest rates. Thus, capital movements introduce a distortion into the interest rate framework: although the Central Bank raises the short-term interest rate, capital inflows reduce the long-term interest rate and weaken the efficacy of the monetary policy. The use of the IOF on capital inflows was then suggested (Lamucci 2005). The introduction of the IOF does not initially seem enough to restrict the excessive valuation of the Real since the appreciation trend has been determined by derivative transactions abroad and at the BM&F, i.e. merely virtual transactions, without any movement of net capital inflows. The interruption of this speculative movement would require more radical decisions such as: prohibition of derivative transactions at the BM&F by foreign investors; margin rise in derivative transactions by reducing their leverage level; forcing banks to impose higher capitalization in foreign currency transactions and derivatives; taxation of capital gains from speculation and arbitrage against the dollar etc. (Farhi 2005; Guimarães 2005). Decisions announced by the Central Bank on the evening of 4th March 2005 signalled the opposite direction, i.e. the full convertibility of the Real. The deepening of the Brazilian currency market deregulation facilitates foreign currency transactions by domestic and international investors and increases safety and speculative and arbitrage movements, both in periods of high international liquidity and in periods of high risk aversion. See also Cardim de Carvalho/Sicsú (2004).
From 1999 on, developing countries started to show current account surpluses led by Asian and oil-producing countries. Experiences in Asian countries (China, Korea, Hong Kong, India, and Thailand) seem to show that the achievement of positive trade balances and reserve accumulation have enabled technological progress, as well as the implementation of laxer monetary policies favoring the expansion of domestic credit, production and employment. Reserve accumulation – through high trade balances and non-borrowing of new loans – meets the demand for strong currency liquidity and ensures exchange rate stability. Finally, the defense of a devaluated exchange rate, current account surpluses, and high reserve accumulation has become crucial in a world of high capital mobility and asymmetry between currencies (Belluzzo/Carneiro 2004). This seems to demonstrate that strong national states can accomplish development projects if they strengthen their autonomy, i.e. not depending on international financial markets.

As a counterpart, developing countries have become net exporters of financial resources to developed economies (Cintra/Farhi 2003). Developing economies transferred US$ 1.23 trillion in the period 1998-2004, according to the IMF (2004). Because of risk asymmetry, foreign fundraising by these countries pay 3%-4% interest on their reserve stocks (invested in T-bonds or in bonds of developed countries’ corporations).

Under these circumstances, preventive controls on capital inflows and outflows need to return to the economic agenda in order to allow more room for manoeuvre in the conduct of domestic macroeconomic policies. As pointed out by The Economist (May 3, 2003: 4):

[…] the global capital market is a turbulent and dangerous place, especially for poorly developed economies that may be ill-equipped to navigate it. […] for some countries, imposing certain kinds of control on capital will be wiser than making no preparations at all.

This stance survives even in surprising corners. Some IMF representatives came to the conclusion that “there is little evidence that the financial integration has helped developing countries stabilize fluctuations in consumption growth” (Prasad et al. 2003). Only industrial countries with large domestic financial markets and convertible currencies benefited from this situation.
Other studies, such as that conducted by Epstein et al. (2003) show that the countries which continued to control capital flows and the exchange rate succeeded in achieving higher growth rates, lower production and income fluctuation, and reduced vulnerability in external accounts. The most successful countries were Chile, India, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and China. By pursuing this path, the Argentinean and Colombian administrations implemented preventive controls on short-term capital flows. Capital that was not assigned for direct investment in companies or foreign trade will have to remain at least 180 days within the country. The purpose is to prevent an excessive appreciation of the domestic currency which jeopardizes exports.

An IMF report acknowledges that liberalizing reforms implemented by Latin American countries – trade and capital account liberalization, deregulation of domestic financial systems, and state reform – did not achieve their goals in terms of growth in their gross domestic product, their balance of payment, and their public sector. As Singh et al. (2005) remark:

Few countries succeeded in managing the transition – from current account deficit with fixed exchange rate –, especially in an environment of high international capital mobility. [...] The imposition of controls on capital inflows may have played a role in Chile.

The Brazilian macroeconomic framework – floating exchange rates, high real interest rate, along with decreasing quantitative targets for inflation and fiscal surpluses – ensured monetary stability, a temporary adjustment of external accounts, a relative reduction of the public debt, and preservation of financial wealth in the domestic currency though in the short term. It is responsible for triggering expansion and contraction cycles. However, it does not seem able to foster social and economic development by expanding employment, raising real wages, and improving income distribution. Based on the Brazilian macroeconomic equation, up to the present moment, there is no historic experience of sustained development.\footnote{The Brazilian experience is not unique. For a criticism of the Chilean model, see Valdivia (2004) and Carcanholo (2004); for the Mexican model, see Palma (2003).} Contrary to common beliefs of conventional theory, the floating exchange rate does not lead to higher autonomy in fiscal and monetary policies under conditions of financial
liberalization, high external liabilities and low international reserves. Even when the current account deficit is reduced, the floating exchange rate does not exclude an exchange risk and the Central Bank is still forced to intervene (for appreciation or devaluation). This fact has an impact on the public debt stock and requires increasing fiscal surpluses (Carneiro 2004). The use of a restrictive monetary policy to mitigate the effects of the floating exchange rate on domestic prices also increases the required funding by the public sector. In addition, it also increases the opportunity cost for private investments. Finally, the perverse relationship between exchange, monetary, and fiscal policies govern the stop-and-go behaviour of the GDP and have deleterious impacts on employment and income distribution.

Contrary to the statement by the Minister of Finance Antonio Palocci, that “experiments failed in Brazil”, boldness would be required to interrupt the vicious circle of the “light failure” of the Brazilian economy: even if it does not enter into default, it does not create development either. This seems to demand the build-up of an alternative political coalition – founded on production and labor interests – in order to overcome the alliance of creditors which is the basis of the Brazilian current political and economic power.

Bibliography


The Discourses of Participation and Accountability in the International Context at the End of the Twentieth Century

1. Introduction

The recent crisis of legitimacy experienced in several Latin American democratic countries reflects a transformation of politics (Lechner 1998) that is the result of the new historical context in which social action takes place in the region. First of all, it is necessary to recognize the complex phenomenon of the “decentering of the State”: the reduction of the role of the State in the economy and in public life in general. Of course, this process is relative, and varies from country to country, but it is certain that the spaces the State left vacant are occupied both by the market and by uncivil social actors (interest groups with the ability to control economic, social and political spaces), as the extreme case of Colombia demonstrates. The process affects many countries. It involves a relative separation of the logics of the economic, political, social, cultural and legal subsystems. This differentiation is, in the international sphere, a product of globalization and neoliberalism and in national spaces, of the maturity and specialization of markets and of the debilitation of corporativism and of the State intervention in the economy. This separation has also resulted in the fragmentation of the spaces of social action, both public and private.

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1 This text is based on research supported by the Ford Foundation by means of the project “Programa de Investigación Comparativa y de Formación sobre la Sociedad Civil y los Espacios Públicos en América Latina y de Profundización de una Agenda de Investigación sobre la Sociedad Civil en México”. In addition, a number of the ideas presented here are the result of numerous debates with my colleagues Evelina Dagnino and Aldo Panfichi, so the focus, central arguments and some of the conclusions should be considered the result of collective work. Nevertheless I have sole responsibility for any deficiencies the reader may find in this chapter.
Certainly, the social, cultural and moral plurality of society has increased at an unprecedented pace, in such a way that multiple identities are emerging. This greater social pluralization may be accompanied by a relative strengthening of certain sectors of civil society, since the new context implies the weakening of certain authoritarian social relations and the unfolding of processes of secularization, detraditionalization and recognition of differences that give space to new types of civil associationism. Nevertheless, civil society develops unequally, with the organization of popular sectors experiencing an increasing weakness. In the political sphere, the consequence of this situation is what Lechner calls the “decentering and informalization” of politics itself. This means that politics as a space for the constitution of the state and of the economy, that is to say, as the producer of order, is fading and turning into a subsystem that is increasingly self-referring, incapable of recognizing and expressing at its core the enormous diversity of the emerging social, cultural and political options. In addition, the old ties between social groups, parties and governments no longer exist, given the fluidity and multiplicity of the groups, the nomadic character of identities and the short-term strategies of the parties. Politics is also becoming increasingly informal, that is to say, it operates outside the institutional realm.

Paradoxically, it is in this context that discourses, projects and practices are emerging that propose a greater participation of society in public life, as well as new projects for the emancipation of society that address the political and economic subjection provoked by an unjust economic system and a political system increasingly closed within itself. These aspirations and practices lack an integral and common project. We are living in a time of searching for new ideas and concepts. In recent years, actors as heterogeneous as international financial agencies, NGO’s that work on a global scale, Latin American governments, international foundations and a large variety of social actors are building a surprisingly common language that hides a plurality of meanings and projects. This is the case of the concepts of civil society, citizen participation, social capital and others. The

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2 I would like to thank Sérgio Costa for having me take note of this process. See Costa (2002); Olvera (2003).
3 About the idea of emancipation, see Santos (2000).
different uses of these words establish a wide variety of symbolic and conceptual relations with the rights of citizenship and create multiple imaginaries about the character of public life.

In this chapter I take a first look at a type of political project, the one that emanates from the multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and some global NGOs, which has been adopted, at least in discourse, by most Latin American governments. This project is the most visible face of the discursive globalization we are experiencing today (Mato 2004). It does not involve a coherent set of principles and programs, but the co-existence of very diverse ideas and theories that in their contradictory unity constitute a good example of the reigning confusion.

The chapter will present the diversity, heterogeneity and juxtaposition of the discourses that lie at the very heart of the complex and diverse international political society, albeit only the main subjects will be addressed. It also includes some brief final considerations that analyze the connections between projects of international institutions, national governments and social actors.

2. Programs of International Agencies and Governments for Civil Society and Participation in Latin America

The historical process we are analyzing is situated within the framework of the surprising historic coincidence of two opposing processes. On one hand, the last decades of the twentieth century were marked by the “Third Wave of Democratization” (Huntington 1991), including the fall of communism and the adoption of democratic institutions and markets in most Eastern European countries, while in the eighties the same process had taken place in Latin America. Certainly, the spread throughout the world of formal democratic institutions does not imply an authentic adoption of democratic cultures and practices nor the democratization of social relations (Avritzer/Santos 2002). To the contrary, we experience a sort of “depletion” of democracy that weak-

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4 The concept of political project, used with many meanings in the sociological literature, has been redefined by Evelina Dagnino (2004) as a heuristic tool that allows the analysis of the meaning of political action, of the collective imaginary and of the normative expectations that guide the political process of the actors.
ens social rights, increases social inequality and limits the political
game to a mere struggle for positions between political parties that are
increasingly distanced from the citizens (Oxhorn 2006). On the other
hand, this same historical period has been the time in which the most
recent phase of globalization developed, under the political protection
of the “Washington Consensus” a sort of international political ac-
cord concerning the “desirability” and “inevitability” of globalization.
This process was promoted by means of relatively open markets, that
is, the breaking of barriers to trade and investment, coupled with the
reduction or complete elimination of most national regulations and in
nearly all types of markets.

Both new and old democracies had to execute, whether by convic-
tion or by need, the economic liberalization program. At the beginning
of the process, the turn to neoliberal policies enjoyed legitimacy. It
was a political decision that appeared to be a plausible means to get
rid of the corrupt and inefficient state companies and of inter-elite
agreements and pacts that allowed the reproduction of populist and
dictatorial regimes. The “external factor” was seen as a modernizing
element, a way to break with deeply rooted interests that impeded the
economic development of most countries. This at least was the view
of conservative technocrats and politicians, international development
agencies and educated national elites. In addition, under this light,
democracy was seen by these same actors as a means to create some
sort of citizen control over corrupt bureaucracies capable of appropri-
ating State revenues. This understanding of change during this period
helped to legitimate the private sector, particularly in those countries
with a “statist” or Socialist past. International development organiza-
tions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank,
the International Monetary Fund and various U.N. agencies promoted
this process with determination.

5 If the Washington Consensus originally supposed a global accord in the simulta-
neous desirability of development and democracy at the world level, in practice,
the emphasis on the market as the cornerstone of the project ended up making the
“Consensus” a program that promoted economic liberalization, without real in-

6 A paradigmatic case is that of Mexico, where President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
came to enjoy enormous popularity by waving the flag of modernization and in-
tegration with the world. See Olvera (2003, chap. 1).
The State was no longer seen as the central actor of the economy, and interestingly this lack of centrality was extended to the field of social regulation as well. In contrast to the omnipresent and inclusive concept of the populist State – which in one variation or another had been dominant in the most important countries of Latin America in the post World War II period (with the exceptions of Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Central American countries)\(^7\) – a new principle is created: society itself has a capacity of self-organization and management that allows it to establish a relationship of “joint responsibility” with the State in the design and execution of public policies. This “decentering” of the State pointed to the heart of the hegemonic forms of state legitimacy until the mid 1980’s in Latin America (Haggard/Kaufman 1995).

Meanwhile, another form of globalization developed: the growing internationalization of certain segments of civil society such as human rights groups and the ecologist, pacifist and feminist movements, whose struggles created a previously non-existing front of civil pressure against some international agencies (Fox/Brown 2000; Mato 2004). From this dynamic emerged, since the end of the 1980’s, a symbolic revaluation of civil society, which closely followed the recovery of this concept that various social actors had promoted in the 1970’s and 1980’s, particularly in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cohen/Arato 1992).

The concept of civil society became a substantive element of the lexicon of the international development agencies, national governments and international foundations, but with a specific meaning: the participation of citizens’ organizations in public affairs as a way of forcing the government to be more efficient (Tussie 2000). Here the idea of civil society is limited to a network of associations whose objectives, object of action and form of constitution have no analytic relevance, insofar as they are only valued for their potential for cooperation with the government in the implementation of public policies. The heterogeneity of the sector was plainly ignored. For this reason international financial agencies tended to equate the idea of civil society with the non-governmental organizations (Mato 2004), not

\(^7\) See Larraín (2004) and Malloy (1987).
recognizing the fact that civil society is much more complex and heterogeneous than NGOs (Olvera 2003).

By the end of the 1990’s, the debate about the democratic potential of civil society in Latin America seemed over. The surprising consensus shared by political parties, governments, multilateral development agencies and most civil actors was the result of a hegemonic vision that attributed considerable value to the contributions of civil society to democracy. Nevertheless, behind the apparent unity of concepts and proposals a diversity of projects and a weak idea of civil society were hidden. Civil society was reduced to an amorphous “Third Sector” understood as a set of private entities oriented to the production of public services. In this way, the critical profile that the idea of civil society carried in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s was discarded (Olvera 2004). The jump from a notion based on the opposition of civil society and state to an idea of full collaboration between them was surprisingly fast. This relationship became surreptitiously depolitiziced.

Meanwhile, in the international public arena a language of citizen participation was simultaneously developed (Rivera 1998; Cunill 1997). Participation was understood as a type of cooperation between citizens and government in the implementation of public policies. Multiple governments around the world adopted the discourse of participation and even instituted some mechanisms that appeared to meet this claim (Hevia 2005).

Nevertheless, the historic coincidence between the neoliberal implantation and the processes of redemocratization in most of Latin America also opened space to reconsider the themes of civil society and citizen participation in a distinct manner (Calderón, Assies y Salman 2002). The analysis of transition to democracy included an evaluation of civil society as the promoter of the struggle for political rights and as a moral opponent to authoritarianisms of all types (Avritzer/Olvera 1992). The role of civil society in the transition had indeed a liberal reading, grounded on the opposition between a virtuous civil society and an evil State, but also a republican reading that stressed the participative and co-generating dimension of a new democratic power that emanated from below. The republican discourse was articulated as an explicit political project in Brazil, where the idea of participation was the platform for a program oriented to the “so-
cialization of power”, that is to say, a “sharing of power between society and the political system” (Alvarez/Dagnino/Escobar 1998). In this case the notion of participation pointed out to a type of political co-management, whose moral and legal principles were molded into the Constitution of 1988. This legal framework allowed the unfolding of innovative experiments such as the management councils (Dagnino 2002), participative budgets (Avritzer 2002b) and other forums and institutionalized public spaces.

The participative project is also present, to a lesser degree and with less ambition, in the Colombian constitution of 1991, and with much greater rigor and clarity in the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999. It should be noted that the Peruvian Constitution of 1993 also contains this class of precepts, as does, in a certain form, the Bolivian Constitution of 1994. Nevertheless, it should be noted that only in Brazil the participative project as co-management went all the way from the Constitution to operative institutions that now have more than ten years of experience. As shown by Hevia (2005), in other countries secondary laws were never enacted and the scarce new institutions had no capacity to promote effective citizen participation, and therefore the experiences are more ambivalent than in Brazil.

In most countries, the participative project coexists both at the constitutional level and in political practice with pluralistic and neo-corporatist devices of representation of interests that have a long tradition, some of them having roots in the corporatist regimes. For example, the history of the Economic and Social Council go back to the Vargas’ government in Brazil, but recently, under the Lula government, the Council came to adopt a pluralist and neocorporativist content, that is, a consultative and plural character, stressing the symbolic unity of diverse and conflictive political and social actors in support of a national project. In Colombia the “grand peace accord” expressed the shared aspiration of political and social actors about the need to put an end to the internal armed conflict and to extend the rule of law to the entire nation. This pluralist matrix took as well the form of “representative” councils, more or less recognized publicly, which discuss specific public policies. This model is based on the principle that the interests represented in it are organized interests, those of the
economically, socially and politically powerful social groups. Their recognition and legitimacy are based on the relative strength of each sector. Certainly, this kind of fora cannot, by their own nature, address moral or legal dilemmas. But the issue of representation is very easy to resolve: the stronger, more visible, more influential actors must have a place in the councils.

It is worth mentioning that there is another version of the liberal project: the citizen seen as a user of services, that is, as a client of public services. This line has been encouraged since the early 1990’s by the World Bank. It is related to the introduction in Latin America of the “New Public Management” school, which insisted on the need of a State’s administrative reform to make it more sensitive to citizens’ demands and more efficient (Cunill 1997). The nodal principle of this school of thought is to consider public management as an extension of private management, and to force the former to function under the latter’s principles. Thus, citizens come to be understood as “clients” and government as a “service provider”. As a consequence, the rights of citizenship are of no concern for this school of thought. There is no talk of rights and obligations, but only a liberal-corporate vision of the functions of the State. The institutions that under this scheme are promoted in Latin America (committees of users of services, committees of beneficiaries of subsidies, etc.), are a sort of equivalent to consumer associations, thus representing the insertion of a mercantile logic in the relationships between the state and its subjects.

Both liberal perspectives share a problem: neither is grounded on rights. Pluralist participation and the satisfaction of clients are concepts that have no legal way of enforcement. Subjects depend on the good will of the government or on the ad-hoc pacts between social actors and government officials. This is a theme of great political transcendence, because in the absence of rights to which citizens can

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8 For a broad vision of these processes, see Haggard/Kaufman (1995); Maxfield (1990).
9 See the website of the Consejo Latinoamericano para la Administración del Desarrollo (CLAD) for the most complete presentation of these and other influences on Latin American public administration <<www.clad.org.ve>>.
10 The World Bank has encouraged most of these mechanisms. For a review and a summary see the bank’s site <<www.worldbank.org>>.
appeal, the final decision about which spaces to open and to whom, falls unilaterally into the hands of government.

The neoliberal project for the participation of citizens, in its various versions, lacks a suitable legal and institutional anchor and is based explicitly on the depolitization of the relationships between the government and the citizens. The schemes of participation that emerge out of this model serve first of all the efficiency and the effectiveness of state action, guiding the interaction through a cooperative practice in which conflict is conceptual and symbolically absent.

Coherent with this approach is the use of the concept of social capital, also promoted by the World Bank, which supposedly explains the sociological substrate of the social relations of cooperation between civil actors and government.\(^\text{11}\) Certainly, the concept of social capital describes the ties of mutual trust and the trajectories of knowledge that allow generalized confidence in the institutions, a reasonable expectation that the agreements reached will be complied with and that conflicts will be discarded while cooperation is established. The merit of the concept of social capital is that it concentrates on the cultural factors of social action, transcending the narrow horizons of mere institutional design. Nevertheless, the main problem with this concept is that it is not able to clarify how ties of trust can be created in political contexts in which laws are not respected, the social and cultural inequality among the actors is abysmal and the legitimacy of the state institutions is very fragile. Moreover, the theory of social capital was never able to explain how interpersonal trust can turn into trust in institutions (Offe 1999). Despite all this, the notion of social capital still informs much of the direction and objectives of public policies in Mexico\(^\text{12}\) as well as in other countries of Latin America.

In this context emerges the new discourse of accountability. It is understandable that the disenchantment and frustration with limited concepts and practices of participation would give birth to strong

\(^{11}\) Reintroduced by Robert Putnam (1993) into the contemporary sociological discussion, the concept of social capital launched a broad international debate. For a review, see Edwards/Foley/Diani (2001); for a substantive theoretical debate see Warren (2001).

\(^{12}\) As of 2005, the best examples are the web sites of the Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (www.sedesol.gob.mx) and of the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Social <www.indesol.gob.mx>. 
demands for real citizen control over the exercise of government. The idea of accountability literally refers to the presentation of accounts and therefore, to the transparency and disclosure of state activities. It does not involve cooperation in the definition of public policies, but requiring the government to explain its actions to the citizens. This discourse was adopted by international development agencies in order to attain the desired effectiveness of their own actions in favor of development and democracy.13

The accountability discourse is also a reaction of civil society actors to the continuity of generalized practices of corruption that characterize the majority of governments and the preservation of the bureaucratic secretiveness on which the discreitional power of the politicians and bureaucrats is based (Peruzzotti/Smulovitz 2002). In other words, this new discourse and practice of society is a response to the inability of governments to reform themselves, to create a professional and responsible bureaucracy, and to open their accounts to public scrutiny (Olvera/Isunza 2006). Thus, the struggle for accountability can also be understood, at least in some of its cases, as a social movement that defends the broadening of the concept of human rights as to include the rights of information and participation.

In sum, the hegemonic neoliberal discourse in Latin America has sought to depoliticize the relations between the State and civil society, to symbolically annul the existence of social conflict, to conceive of social capital as an undifferentiated cooperation between citizens and government, all without reference to the rights of citizenship. This conceptual effort is coherent with and complementary to the neoliberal project in the economic field.

The participative project developed by the Brazilian left and by certain social movements in other South American countries is grounded on the defense of rights, recognizes the existence of social conflict, postulates the need to institutionalize spaces for dialog and negotiation between society and the State and recognizes the plurality of society. Nevertheless, the two projects use the same language and the same concepts, which is precisely what Dagnino (2002), calls the

13 Once again the World Bank has given emphasis and visibility to this concept in recent years. See its website.
“perverse confluence”, a situation that has created a tremendous conceptual, political and ideological confusion

3. Final Remarks

The countries of Latin America suffer, to a greater or lesser degree, and in various forms, a crisis of legitimacy of democratic institutions and are experiencing a condition of political confusion characterized by the overlapping of political discourses and projects. If the origin of the problem there is a complex set of historic circumstances that configure a new space for politics that eliminates the centrality of the State and leads to the informalization and mediatization of the political system. It is also true that the multiplicity of voices pronouncing the same words with different meanings, both in the State and in society, contributes to the confusion, diminishes the critical capacity of civil society, makes it more difficult to distinguish the political projects in struggle and to recognize the democratic innovations with greater potential for transformation.

The contradictions and paradoxes of contemporary politics are condensed within the State. Perhaps the main contradiction, from the point of view of the relations between the State and civil society, is the “perverse confluence” (Dagnino 2002) of the neoliberal project with the initiatives for change coming both from a sector of civil society as well as from some leftist parties. In practice, this fundamental dichotomy is complicated by the multiple combinations and connections between these two projects and by the form in which the multilateral development agencies intervene in the political debate and practice in Latin America. Unique combinations of participative discourses, glorifications of civil society and convocations to co-responsibility are presented in each Nation-State.

This situation is even more complicated by the fragmentation of the State in horizontal, vertical and spatial terms. Each State agency applies distinct participative policies. Frequently, state and municipal governments understand and use participation in different manners. Thus, within a single country we can observe both notable experiences of an authentic democratization of public life as well as the worst authoritarian fictions, both supported by the same language and by the same legal and institutional foundations.
This cacophony of discourse and practice makes it difficult to clearly distinguish the nature of the projects in play and to evaluate the quality of the democratic innovation underway, the depth of the cultural transformations that are being produced and the relative strength of the trends of change that are being experienced in the region. Notable confluences of language among political and social actors are produced that follow distinct projects. Frequently, potential alliances are not created because of lack of trust and political confrontation, or to the contrary, political alliances are formed on the basis of apparently common discourses that are soon perceived to be fictitious.

The fact that Latin America is subsumed by the conditions imposed by globalization, and that the State has lost centrality in the entire region, does not eliminate spaces for democratic innovation. The great paradox of our time is that despite the context of political crisis found in some countries, a democratic imaginary has emerged that far transcends a simple electoral democracy (with greater or lesser force in each country). The discourse about rights, citizenship, participation and accountability is firmly established on the normative horizon of public life. It still needs to be translated into projects that are even more broad and shared, the bases of which already exist in concrete practices and institutions that are available in the collective experience, but that remain somewhat hidden in the reigning confusion of discourses and in the mixture of social practices that combine distinct projects and interests.

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The Discourses of Participation and Accountability


In the last few decades, the processes of universalisation of human rights, as an expression of the expansion of values associated with western modernity to the rest of the world, has generated a debate in which at times the universalist vision is exalted as allowing a superior form of social coexistence, and at others is condemned for dissolving local habits and customs. Thus the heated sociological discussions of globalisation are almost always charged with robust normative and prescriptive content that limits the analytical potentialities of this phenomenon.

The recent debate about globalisation and cultural systems seems to have revived an old dispute in sociology between the theory of modernisation and the currents of culturalist inspiration. In the first case, the theory of modernisation, which had an important impact on the Latin American social sciences, considers that the surpassing of traditional values prevalent in these societies would come about through, among other factors, the emergence of modernised elites. Such elites would be responsible for the introduction of a set of institutions, such as the market, education, the legal system etc., that would substitute traditional motivation and patterns of behaviour (Germani 1969).

Contrary to this theory, the culturalist and historicist currents emphasize the processes of resistance to the structural and cultural changes introduced by modernisation. The strengthening of communitary cultures, the vigour of religious adhesion and practices, and the production of popular cultural manifestations would be interpreted as movements expressing resistance to modernity (Berger/Berger/Kellner 1974).

This work seeks to escape from the antinomy between modernity and resistance, in order to approach the complexity of the phenomenon of the local reception of universalist discourses through analysis
of feminist practices aimed at expanding the global agenda of women’s rights in Brazil.

We intend to show that the feminist agenda inspired by individualist, egalitarian and universalising values is transformed, and, at times, shifts away from the original intention. This occurs by virtue of the process of appropriation and transformation of this agenda, as well as of the institutions inspired by it, by local social players inserted into specific socio-cultural contexts. It does not constitute, however, a simple game of acceptance or rejection of modern values by local players, but a tense and sometimes paradoxical articulation between institutions based on human rights and rules of sociability present in significant portions of the Brazilian population.

It has already become commonplace in the international literature of the social sciences to recognize that the post-60s feminist movement had an overwhelming impact on the ways contemporary societies think of and question themselves. Today, it seems impossible to think of democracy, citizenship, social inequalities, changes in family organisation, forms of work, among so many other dimensions of social life, without taking into account as a reference the constitution of a new social subject, women, and a form of domination, that of gender, created by feminist discourse.

As is well-known, the feminist movement in the developed countries arose and constructed its principal formulations, practices and institutions, in creative dialogue with values and principles built into the Western tradition of liberal democracy and citizenship.

It is evident to any social scientist that Brazil is very far from practising a democracy that fulfils developed country standards. Nevertheless, the social, economic and political transformations undergone by Brazilian society in the last few decades, the political democratisation, the expansion of higher education, the development of means of communication, have caused the emergence of social groups bearing democratic values and expectations.

The feminist movement that re-emerged in Brazil in the mid-70s is a product of the modernisation in the country. The social origin of its activists is found in highly educated middle class professionals and who, therefore, are more exposed and sensitive to the developments of international feminism.
In fact, the typical path followed by feminists of that time included passage through the experience of militancy in left-wing organisations in Brazil or in exile, followed by passage through feminist groups in the country or abroad and through action in the broad movement against the dictatorship during the long years of the “democratic opening” which extended into the 1980s.

The active participation of feminists in the country’s movement for democratisation brought them into closer contact with feminists from other social groups, diversifying their experience beyond the existential and political world of the middle classes. In fact, the resistance movement to the dictatorship aggregated social forces, until then isolated from each other, popular groups from the outskirts of large cities, middle class professionals, trade union leaders, housewives, businessmen, clergy and priests, to cite just a few components of the great coalition that rose up against the military dictatorship.

The consequence in Brazil of the historical experience of participation of feminists in a broad political alliance was the creation of a feminism much more sensitive to the questions of social inequalities, unlike what occurred in other countries in North America and Europe. This historical experience is also reflected in the focus of the feminist movement on the problems that women from the working and poorer classes had greatest difficulties in facing: health, violence and work.

The construction of an agenda of claims to the State concentrated the efforts of the Brazilian feminist movement during the democratic period. The creation of public institutions specialised in attending to women in these matters was the result of a long process of pressure and negotiation with the State.

We must recognize, however, that local social practices – values, political culture and traditional forms of domination – attribute new meanings to the social institutions inspired by feminism. Instead of adopting a linear perspective that aims at measuring the distance between the feminist utopia and social reality, in the style of the old theories of modernisation, we intend to analyse the interactions between the feminist agenda and current social practices. It is therefore a matter of recognizing that the Brazilian historical and social context operates a complex process of (re)elaboration of the discourse and the social institutions inspired by feminist ideals, despite its universalising aspiration.
We would like to illustrate the complexity of the process of diffusion of the feminist agenda in the Brazilian context with two examples. The first refers to the specificities of the form of utilisation of the police apparatus of the *Delegacias Especializadas de Atendimento à Mulher* – DEAMs [Special Police Stations for Women] by the victims of conjugal violence, and the second identifies some unintentional consequences of the frequency of women rape victims using the health services recently created to help them.

1. **Conjugal Violence: Crime or Misbehaviour?**

   According to what has already been affirmed, reception of the feminist values in Brazil has not been linear, but has implied conflicts and settlements. In countries with a liberal, democratic tradition, the political language prevalent in the feminist movement was that of the individual rights of women to decide over their own bodies, enshrined in the slogan “our body belongs to us”.

   In Brazil, it is the social rights that provide legitimacy to the feminist discourse, as the validation of sexual rights as an exercise of women’s individual rights met with strong resistance. On the one hand, the conservative sectors, in general linked to the Catholic Church, managed to mobilize a powerful anti-liberal discourse. On the other hand, sectors of the left-wing and also some of feminism, manifested intense discomfort with the formulation that espouses individual liberty. In fact, for these segments, the recognition of the profound privations marking the living conditions of the majority of Brazilian women seems more important than the affirmation of their free will regarding their bodies. From this formulation there arose a set of social policies that aimed, above all, at the guarantee of access to public services in the area of violence and reproductive rights, like pre-natal accompaniment, access to contraception methods – indeed a full range of female health services.

   Regarding the emergence of the theme of conjugal violence, the contrast with the reality in developed countries is great. Here this theme has become a political issue and has been seen as a social problem since the beginning of the 80s. The great repercussion in the press of the murder of women from middle class families by their husbands, was the deflagrating event upon entry of this theme into the public
agenda (Sorj/Montero 1985). In France and the United States, as Machado (2002: 3) stressed, while the question of conjugal violence comes to the surface from women’s quotidian experiences and from denunciation of masculine control over their bodies, in Brazil, it was the exposure of some extreme cases of men’s power over the lives of women that was the element capable of arousing public opinion. The consequence of this fact was the delimitation of the perception of conjugal violence in its most extreme and threshold expression, which favoured a vision of the aggressor as deviant, sick, perverse, passional etc. Thus, conjugal violence was not understood as a behaviour inscribed within the field of possibilities of unequal gender relations, but as an exceptional event in the man-woman relationship. The understanding of conjugal violence as an exceptional fact in family relations was subjacent to all the institutional initiatives to combat violence in the country.

At the end of the 1970s, the women’s movement began to denounce on a broad front the acquittal, by court juries, of wife murderers on the allegation of “legitimate defence of honour”. At the start of the 1980s, feminist groups arose in various cities all over the country, called SOS-Mulher [SOS-Women], which provided legal, social and psychological services to women who were victims of violence. The then strong and successful politicisation of the theme of gender violence by SOS-Mulher gave rise to prioritisation of this theme in 1983, in São Paulo, with the establishment of the Conselho Estadual da Condição Feminina [State Council for the Female Condition], created under the Franco Montoro government. The first police station of this type arose in 1985 in the city of São Paulo, but while today there are over 350, they cover only 10% of the Brazilian municipalities, São Paulo representing around one third of them.

The DEAMs constitute the principal public policy for combat and prevention of violence against women in Brazil, especially conjugal violence. They are considered the most important Brazilian institutional innovation in the area of violence, with an important repercussion in other Latin American countries, above all for having introduced the world of law, justice and impersonality into the private sphere, into the realm of conjugal intimacy. Its legal function is to detect legal offences, investigate their source and criminalise domestic violence.
However, some years after establishing the DEAMs, feminists were surprised by the behaviour presented by a large number of women who resorted to the service provided by the special police stations. This behavioural pattern on the part of the victims, which may reach 70% of cases, is that the woman seeks out the police station, presents a denunciation or complaint against her aggressor, but then desists from proceeding with the police inquiry. In Brazil, significant discrepancies are identified between the number of complaint registrations and the number of police inquiries, the latter always being much less.

Researches (Soares 1996; Brandão 1997) reveal that the use of the DEAMs by women seem to follow a diverse logic of the police institution and inspiration of the feminist movement, given that the most frequent motivation for women in going to the specialised police stations consists of using police power to renegotiate the conjugal pact and not to criminalise the partner.

If in other contexts of liberal tradition, the police are as a rule a legal institution activated every time rights to privacy and to life are at stake, in Brazil the police are called in predominantly as a form of extra-official arbitration, with the aim of renegotiating domestic pacts. The police officers, in general female, end up intervening in the conflicts brought to the police station, calling the parties to a meeting in which they seek to mediate the conflicting interests. These interventions, reportedly at 93% of the police stations in the country (Machado 2002), often seem to have a certain impact on the solution of conjugal quarrels.

Besides the mediating function, the police are activated for extra-judicial punitive intervention. When the accused are called to make a statement, they are reprimanded, receive a “telling off” or “advice” from a policewoman to contain the conjugal violence. In this case, police power acts as coercion of the aggressor if he persists with his violent conduct. It constitutes therefore a game in which the victims seek to take some advantage from the effect of police authority over the aggressive spouse.

In comparing the women’s police station in João Pessoa, Paraíba State, with the Canadian experiences in the field of “conjugal violence”, Rifiotis (2003) identified that, despite the great differences among the Brazilian and Canadian policies, there is in both cases on
the part of the players in the institutions, a significant degree of dissatisfaction with the results achieved in the development of these services. For the author, the research conducted in Montreal attracted attention, as, “despite the multiplicity of public, state and non-governmental means available, the evaluation of the results is that they always seem to remain below the desired level” (Rifiotis 2003: 17).

On the one hand, this finding stimulates reflection on aspects that may be intrinsic to any public policy linked to the dimensions of intimacy and the private world, in which modern public institutionality of conjugal violence is a significant mark. On the other hand, the affirmation of the author reinforces the need to underline content peculiar to the Brazilian case. Here, everything indicates that the victim, generally from the lower classes, is not interested in entry to the universal, impersonal world of law. She takes advantage of the police apparatus in a peculiar manner for mediation of a private conflict, which does not correspond to the primary function of punitive police, which is to verify and investigate the crime. Without doubt, this was an absolutely unforeseeable result of the policies to combat gender violence in force then.

From the point of view of the feminist agenda, even more unexpected was the institutionalisation of the Juizados Especiais Criminais (JECRINs) [Petty Crime Courts], regulated through approval of Lei Federal 9.099 and established as of 1995, which ended up decriminalising conjugal violence.¹ These courts were conceived to promote mediation between the parties involved in interpersonal conflicts, facilitating agreements between victims and aggressors. As of the promulgation of this law, police stations were expected to forward denunciations of conjugal violence with women victims to these courts, even though in many Brazilian states there still prevailed the practice described in the paragraphs above. Thus, conjugal violence was considered a crime of lesser gravity, in which punishment of the aggressor, in general, was limited to supplying baskets of basic food, services rendered to the community, participation in therapeutic groups etc.

¹ This institution, which seems to exist only in Brazil has as its guiding principles, orality, simplicity, informality, celerity, procedural economy, conciliation and transaction (see Burgos 2001).
This case points out another facet of the complex relation that exists between the feminist movement, the State and women victims. On the one hand, the feminist movement inaugurated a new perception that conjugal violence should be considered as a crime and the aggressor penalised. For such, it fought for the implementation of police stations specialised in attending women in the expectation that the theme of conjugal violence could be treated in the criminal sphere. Once the DEAMs had come into action, the experience of the users showed that women used the police stations much more as a space for mediation of conflicts and re-establishment of conjugal and family relations, with the aim of freeing themselves from violence. In other words, their objective was not to penalise the aggressor, but to reform him under the threat or counselling of a police authority. If it is true that women were making this type of use of the police institution, the Juizados Especiais Criminais (courts) meet the expectations of the victims, expectations that, in turn, oppose the perceptions of feminists about the way conjugal violence should be handled by the State.

Thus, we can consider that the JECRIMs convey in a peculiar manner the combination between the criminalising perspective of conjugal violence and the conciliatory perspective manifested by women, as shown by the experiences at the police stations. Obviously, conjugal violence has entered the legal world, but its institutionalisation has acquired local content where the family and conjugality constitute important values in gender identities.

The difficulty in imposing universal legal norms, founded on an individualist, egalitarian and universalising sociability, on the settlement of conflict, poses serious challenges to the expansion of the feminist agenda in the local context and indicates the complexity of reception of the ideology and the institutions inspired by feminism in Brazil.

2. Sexual Violence: Vices and Virtues of Denunciation

The second example of the paradoxes of the expansion of human and women’s rights in the country refers to the services provided to victims of sexual violence by public health units.

In this case too, the feminist debate was responsible for the formulation that became defined as “sexual violence”, a specific type of violence directed at women and inscribed in the ambit of gender rela-
tions (Sorj/Montero 1985). The category, sexual violence, has thus become a central component of feminism, mobilising public policies. These initiatives had the important objective of going beyond mere police or legal action, thus avoiding accusatory visions of the victim.

In 1999, fulfilling the goals of the women’s rights agenda, the Ministério da Saúde [Ministry of Health] created a technical norm to orientate and regulate prevention, and provide treatment for sexual violence in the Brazilian public hospital network.

Such regulation not only extended this practice to all health units that provide gynaecological and obstetric services, defined as therapeutic support and social assistance, including medical care and nursing services related to the collection of material for the identification of aggression, emergency contraception, prevention of sexually transmitted disease (STDs), but also systematic service for women with pregnancy arising from rape, with provision being made for the victim to opt for a legal abortion.

The institutionalisation of the problem of sexual violence in the ambit of public health has provided many victims with the possibility of going beyond the exclusively police, legal and stigmatising vision of their experiences.

The passage of such women through the hospital service allows alteration of the public image and of her self-image, by endowing her with the genuine condition of a victim. While the denunciation made at the police station maintains the veracity of the report under suspicion, medical treatment confers accreditation to the statute of victimisation, giving credibility to the event. This new practice of medical and therapeutic care has ended up strengthening the assumption of rape in the minds of family members, friends, neighbours, work colleagues and acquaintances.

In a society influenced by the idea that rape is an individual problem of women and where this occurrence is seen in a moral dimension, which often ends up blaming them, the frequency of the victim’s visits to the hospital to be cared for/treated/protected potentialises in

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3 Such as the creation of PAISM (Programa de Assistência Integral à Saúde da Mulher), forms of government and political representation (state and national councils of women’s rights, advisors, co-ordinators etc.) and, later, police stations specialised in attending women (Camargo 2000; Barsted 2002).
several ways the publicity of the event, with a significant reduction in the weight of the accusatory system.

The establishment of norms for the service provided by the hospitals includes respect for the victim’s right to decide not to make a denunciation. Therefore, treatment is not conditional upon a need to publicly assume the event. However, the new situations women experience in using these services (therapy, face-to-face interaction with professionals often encouraging reports to the police, informative posters distributed throughout hospital premises inciting denunciation of crimes, etc.) have encouraged a significant number of victims to reveal the incidences to their relationship circles.

The assumption of rape before family members, acquaintances, neighbours and other relationships has nevertheless reinforced an old social practice of the defense of codes of honour and personal initiatives for the solution of violence, producing absolutely unexpected situations for those in the spectrum of the human rights agenda and the feminist ideal. When the event of rape becomes public knowledge in places of residence and in the family and friendship circles of the victims, the expression of support and solidarity assumes a violent character.

The mistrust in police institutions, in the legal system and the revolt provoked by the belief that rape injures masculine honour, motivates the private action of investigation and punishment of the rapist by the men in the community. This occurs, principally, when the woman is attacked near her home.

Women sexually attacked in public streets are approached, principally during the night or in early hours, often when returning from or setting off for work. As a rule, these victims reside in urban areas in the outskirts lacking public services, which inevitably contributes to placing certain groups of women at risk. These are eerie places, without police patrols or street lighting, waste land covered by thick bush, abandoned constructions etc. In these areas, there prevails the idea that the rape victim, especially if young, must have her “honour” and matrimonial “future” preserved by capture, or even death, of the rapist. Groups of friends, acquaintances and people from the neighbourhood are mobilised to generate strategic action for “protection” of the image of the victim and to prevent other residents from being attacked and similarly tarnished. These protective strategies include vigils organ-
ised by the residents, who start to control entry and exit of the people in their residential area and to institute rotas among the men to escort young women, waiting, for example, at bus stops or other places. The capture and avenging of aggressors may also involve criminals who have control of the local power, or even police known to be willing to act under the logic of informality and illegality.

The objective of identifying and punishing the aggressor in order to deter repetition of the event in the area may assume more or less violent forms that range from capture and delivery of the aggressor to the police to removal of the aggressor from police power to impose justice via torture or death. The torture to which the rapist is submitted depends partly on the circumstances and extent of his acts in the eyes of his “judges”, but, principally on the profile of the avenging agent (criminal, father of the family, etc.) and the degree of revolt and anger of the community.

These violent responses and the seeking of private solutions may be restricted to the family circle and/or a partner in a loving relationship, without involving the community. In this case, the victimisation by sexual violence starts to be taken as a “problem” that also affects the players with whom the victim lives. The male members of the family (father, husband, brothers, even brothers-in-law, uncles etc.) may also manifest their support for the victim by organising parallel tactics of investigation and location of the aggressor. The feeling of revenge and the need to “clear” the name of the woman and/or her family motivate these actions.

Thus, it can be observed how the expansion of a new right leads to violation of the legal system, as justice against the aggressor is carried out with one’s own hands. The public services to attend to victims that, in the feminist banners, had the idea of removing sexual violence from the cover of silence and the private domain, stumbles upon unexpected results that create new forms of violence.

In Brazil, the presence of drug traffic in communities seems to impinge directly on the phenomenon of sexual violence. Taking as an example the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, it is noteworthy that in the period 2001 to 2003 the greatest number of reported sex crimes, in absolute terms, was found in administrative regions that did not correspond exclusively to areas suffering the direct influence of domination by drug traffic (Moraes/Soares/Conceição 2005). In the period men-
tioned, in regions corresponding exclusively to shantytowns with a recognized presence of drug traffic, there was practically no report of sex crime.

These data may be approached from two perspectives. The first reinforces the notion that in these communities the victims avoid police involvement in solving this type of problem. Residents of areas under the control of the traffickers know that a police raid, resulting from denunciation, may cost the denouncers embarrassing or even irreversible predicaments. The second concludes that in fact cases of rape in areas with these characteristics are rare, and that probably one of the reasons for this is the moral control exercised by the parallel power perceiving rape as the most condemnable and despicable of offences, hardly tolerated even among traffickers. In this case, it constitutes control and a moralisation of the community performed by vigilantes related to the drug traffic. And paradoxically it also refers to the imposition of a sexual moral that may result in the reduction of sexual aggression targeting women.

It is necessary here to stress that a good number of women avoid publicising rape in the areas where they recognize the reaction to it is inscribed in a logic of revenge, of personal and illegal solutions. Even in situations in which public assumption of rape is inevitable, they reinforce their will to follow the legal procedure, await the official investigation, and, when consulted by these “private agents of justice” about the outcome they desire for the rapist, they manifest imperatives of legality. Most often this behaviour is aimed at protecting members of the family or community, given that, in the near future, these will be called to make statements to a justice official.

These situations illustrate, in summarised form, the unintentional, and even paradoxical, consequences of the policy to expand human rights and feminist principles and values. If the publicity of sexual violence is encouraged due to its citizenship nature, in doing so, the victim may promote a set of actions of solidarity with the family and the community that are supported by traditional moral, hierarchical and extra-legal codes.

The selected examples show that the various facets of Brazilian society, such as hierarchy and equality, or tradition and modernity, are not dichotomous dimensions of reality, nor are they even found in a linear process of evolution from one pole to the other. On the contrary,
our social identity and political culture articulate and transform both terms, producing a peculiar modernity worth unveiling.

Bibliography


Patricia Pinho

Brazil in the Map of Africanness: Examining Roots Tourism and International Black Relations

1. African-American Tourism to Brazil: Brief History and Main Aspects

African-American roots tourism can be situated in the long history of the search for Africa by Afro-descendants in the New World which includes such important events as the actual migration of Afro-descendants to the African continent during the foundation of Liberia in 1822, as well as the influential Pan-African congresses which acknowledged the commonality between Africans and the world’s dispersed blacks. It was only in the early 1970s, however, that African-American roots tourism to Africa started to operate as such. The 1976 publication of Alex Haley’s bestseller *Roots* greatly inspired African-American culture and politics in a period marked by a growing awareness by diasporic blacks of the need to recover – or, according to Stuart Hall (1998), produce – both their links with Africa and their

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1 This article is part of a wider, ongoing research project which analyzes a very specific kind of tourism carried out by U.S. African-Americans who travel to Brazil, among other destinations within the African diaspora, seeking what they consider to be their African roots. In addition to other reasons, African-American roots tourism is stimulated by the belief that there is a dispersed black sibling-hood – the African diaspora itself – waiting to be reconnected. The novelty brought by this kind of tourism is that it inverts (although not completely) the secondary position occupied by Brazil in a context marked by the hegemony of US-centric conceptions of blackness, thus promoting cultural expressions developed in the southern hemisphere as important references of blackness and Africanness for northern blacks. On the other hand, these tourists travel with the purpose of exchanging their “modernity” for the “traditions” of the local black communities with whom they interact. Therefore, this study takes into account the asymmetry which permeates the relations between blacks located in the North and the South of the American continent, focusing on their cultural and political consonances and dissonances, and their unequal access to global currents of power. The concept of the “map of Africanness” is herein developed to assist in the analysis of the significance of Brazil for African-American tourism as well as in the broader black Atlantic world.
own Africanness. Before that, Richard Wright’s influential book *Black Power*, published in 1954, had also contributed to increasing the image of Africa among African-Americans. By the late 1970s African-American roots tourists expanded their routes to include non-African countries. These countries were, nonetheless, inhabited by significant Afro-descendant populations, and known for having a legacy of well preserved African cultures.

The African-American roots tourists focused on here represent a very specific kind of tourist, not just because they are searching for what they believe to be their roots, but most of all because, in contrast to common tourists who are usually interested in finding the exoticism of the “other”, African-American roots tourists crisscross the Atlantic hoping to find the “same” represented by their “black brothers and sisters”. In this sense, African-American roots tourism represents a way of re-connecting the fragmented transnational African affiliation. Thus, I prefer to call this phenomenon “roots tourism” rather than, for example, “ethnic tourism”, even though this term could certainly be employed to describe “roots tourism”, as I have done on other occasions (Pinho 2002/2003). Roots tourism is indeed a kind of ethnic tourism because it sets in motion people who are searching for elements that can be used to compose their black ethnic identities. However, there are two reasons why I am opting for the term “roots tourism”. First, “ethnic tourism” has been employed by authors such as Dean MacCannel (1992) and Pierre van den Berghe (1994) to describe the process by which people from overdeveloped countries travel to poor areas to cohabit with the “exotic cultures” of the “other”, sometimes even aiming to “go native”. In roots tourism, the primary goal is to find the “same”, even though this “same” is usually not quite as “similar” as most tourists would like it to be. In fact, the frustrations and disenchantments of the roots tourists in Brazil are important outcomes of their visits, even if not as much as their satisfaction with the “Africanness” of the people and the “authenticity” of the culture they encounter in their trips.

The second reason for the use of the term “roots tourism” is the magnitude of *African roots* in African-American popular culture in general, and in African-American tourism specifically. Among the most important motivations for visiting Brazil, African-Americans view the country as a place where they can gain access to their roots.
By *roots* I mean mainly two aspects: first, the *cultural roots*, the abundant “African traditions” that African-Americans believe they have lost but which are considered to have been preserved among Brazilian blacks. The second notion of roots is the idea of *family roots*, of course not in the sense of encountering blood relatives like in Alex Haley’s quest for Kunta Kinté; but *family roots* in the sense of the diasporic family that has been dispersed by slavery and colonialism.

Due to their search for *cultural roots* or preserved African culture, roots tourists elect the Brazilian state of Bahia, especially its cities of Salvador and Cachoeira, as the main historical place where they believe African traditions have been more carefully maintained. The most important “pilgrimage site” is clearly the town of Cachoeira, where the tourists participate in the annual event held in August by the black Sisterhood of the Good Death (Irmandade da Boa Morte). Founded in 1823, the Sisterhood is composed exclusively of older black women, who are both Catholics and practitioners of *Candomblé*.² Like most of the syncretic Afro-Brazilian parties, the Festival of the Good Death begins as a sacred ceremony, with secret rituals held indoors for the sisters only, and ends as a profane one, with a public *samba-de-roda*³ and a generous Afro-Brazilian feast prepared by the sisters and offered to all visitors.

Besides Cachoeira, the lost and therefore sought out African traditions that are so valued by the roots tourists can be found also in Salvador, in the many places where Afro-Bahian cultural events take place, like the rehearsals of the *blocos afro*, in the houses of *Candomblé*, and in the schools of capoeira. Bahian Africanness can be relished even in the trays of the *baianas*, women street vendors who dress in traditional white African clothing and sell African-derived

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² *Candomblé* is the most well known Afro-Brazilian religion.
³ *Samba de roda* is a traditional form of dancing samba in a circle.
⁴ The *blocos afro* are black cultural organizations that emerged in Bahia the 1970s seeking to overcome racism within the sphere of Carnival. Responding to racial-aesthetic discrimination, which excluded blacks from participating in carnival groups (*blocos*), a group of black activists founded their own *bloco*, called Ilê Aiyê, one in which only people with very dark skin would be allowed to participate. At present, the *blocos afro* surpass the boundaries of Carnival and entertainment, producing new references of blackness and involving themselves in the dynamics of political culture.
delicacies such as *acarajés* and *abarás*. African-American scholar Rachel J. Christmas describes the “African flavor” that Bahia offers to its African-American visitors:

We felt the African pulse in the beat of samba, known as *semba* in Angola; swallowed it with the spicy food, made with nuts, coconut milk, ginger and okra also used in African cooking; witnessed it in Candomblé ceremonies, rooted in the religion of the Yorubas of Nigeria; heard it in the musical Yoruban accent of the Portuguese spoken in the state of Bahia. [...] Today Bahians seem far more aware of their origins than African-Americans are (Christmas 1992: 253-254).

Bahia is described in this statement as a complete menu, in which the tourists can delight in the flavors of the various African origins of the traditions found in Brazil. Most of the African-American visitors I interviewed believe that Brazilian blacks enjoy the privilege of having better maintained the African culture of their ancestors. They also believe that as a consequence of their preserved African culture, Brazilian blacks are “more aware” of their African origin than are African-Americans.

The search for African traditions is tied up with the tourists’ longing to find “authenticity”. The desire to find “original black culture” has led them to deviate from the predominant route followed by international tourists in Brazil, one which usually takes them to the so-called “post-cards of Rio de Janeiro” (the statue of Christ – Corcovado, the sugar loaf hills – Pão de Açúcar, the beach of Copacabana, etc.). Roots tourists prefer Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, because they argue that in Rio “African culture” has been disjointed from its origin, while in Bahia one can still find “more preserved” elements of the original culture brought by the African ancestors. Bahia is considered the producer of black symbols labeled with the stamp of “African authenticity”. In Rio de Janeiro, the syncretic presence of Umbanda, together with a carnival that has been transformed into a spectacle, point to a black culture that is believed to have become “too mixed” and “detached from its origins”, while in Bahia, elements like Candomblé and samba-de-roda seem to provide proof of the “perpetuation of Africanisms” and therefore of a supposedly authentic (and purer) kind of black culture. The image of Bahia as the “blackest state of Brazil” results partially from scholarly work, such as its high position in Melville Herskovitz’s rank of Africanisms (1941), but it also has more
recent sources, among them the State Government’s efforts in promoting Bahia as the “land of blackness” (Pinho 2004).

Even within Bahia a specific cultural hierarchy is established, one that places more value on what is considered more “deeply African” among the cultural sets of Bahian “Africanness”. Instead of “capoeira regional”, which is considered “mixed”, the roots tourists prefer “capoeira Angola” seen as “pure”. Rather than the younger houses of Candomblé, which are more explicitly influenced by Western Spiritism, they favor the old “traditional” houses. In place of the bloco afro Olodum, which appears too modern, greater status is given to Ilê Aiyé because it is seen as more “faithful to its African traditions”. The blocos afro headquarters, the oldest of which is 30 years old, are gaining a similar reputation of traditionality as the centenarian houses of Candomblé, also becoming “sacred places of pilgrimage” (Turner 1969).\(^5\) I argue that the specific meanings of Brazil as a place to find “preserved African traditions” should be analyzed alongside the meanings attributed to the other countries which compose the “map of Africanness”.

2. The Map of Africanness

I am coining the term “map of Africanness” to refer to the group of countries visited by the African-American tourists. Evidently, I do not mean that African-Americans limit their tourism to these countries only. In fact, several of the tourists I interviewed are members of organizations such as the Travelers Century Club, which give awards to people who have visited 100 countries, 200 countries, and so on. This fact tells a great deal about who these tourists are since it indicates that many of them have a significant amount of disposable income to spend on leisure. Obviously not all African-Americans can afford to travel abroad. If there are so many differences – pertaining to age, religion, geographical origin, etc. – among African-American tourists, even greater discrepancies exist within the African-American population as a whole. Heterogeneities among African-Americans are cer-

\(^5\) It is important to notice that this notion of Bahia as a source of Africanness has also stimulated a yet incipient but growing internal cultural tourism in Brazil, in which black activists from Rio and Sao Paulo travel to Bahia to find the “source of Brazilian black culture”.
tainly taken into account in this research project, as well as the different ways in which African-Americans from different social classes envisage Africa.6

The “map of Africanness” that I am sketching here contains only those countries which the tourists visit with the explicit purpose of heightening their sense of black identity. One could correctly argue that visiting a European country would also be valuable for that effect. However, if I am to examine the tourists’ discourse, then the “map of Africanness” includes only those countries located in Africa and in the African diaspora. There is a hierarchy within this imaginary “map of Africanness”, in which each place is assigned a different meaning. Egypt is considered the “place of black pride”, the great proof of the existence of a magnificent black civilization prior to Rome or Greece, and therefore a reference to counter hegemonic Eurocentrism with an Afrocentrism based on the richness and great discoveries of the Nile. West African countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria and Benin are understood as the “place of origin”, the location from where the ancestors left to face the horrors of the Middle Passage; hence the dungeons and staging areas of the slave trade are the main attractions for the tourists in these countries. Brazil also has a specific meaning inside this map: it has become the “place to find preserved traditions”, hopefully the same traditions that are believed to have been lost among blacks in the United States.

Consequently, the visitors sense the pride of visiting and connecting with the sophisticated Egyptian and Ethiopian civilizations; they experience the suffering undergone by their ancestors when they go to the infamous “Doors of No Return” in West Africa; and they also feel the joy of attesting to the reality that descendants of slaves like themselves were able to maintain a rich African culture in the New World. Feelings of pain, joy, anger, and the jubilation of reconnection are inspired in each place visited in the “map of Africanness”.

In Wonders of the African World, a pedagogical documentary created to explain Africa to African-Americans, U.S. scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. travels throughout the African continent, stopping at

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6 The film Little Senegal, by Jean Bréhat and Rachid Bouchareb, offers a very interesting portrayal of the meanings of Africa and Africans for underprivileged African-Americans.
most of the countries that constitute what I am calling the map of Africanness. One of the reasons that stimulated Gates Jr. to make the documentary was that, in his own words: “like most African-Americans of my generation, I’m obsessed with finding my roots”. While visiting Elmina Castle, Ghana, Gates Jr. affirms:

We feel at home here because we are surrounded by black people. That’s why we come. But the memory of slavery and of what our ancestors must have gone through is always lurking. Even a pretty little harbor town like Elmina is dominated by a slave castle. And for us a slave castle is like Auschwitz.

This is a strong statement and is obviously not the first to associate the horrors of African slavery to the terrors of the Jewish Holocaust. Indeed, the comparison between African-American tourism to the slave dungeons in Africa and the so-called “holocaust tourism” carried out by Jews who visit the Nazi concentration camps is a very important—one for both analytical and political reasons, and is examined in my work. However, as we can hear in Gates Jr.’s statement, African-Americans visit Elmina and other slave sites in West Africa, not only to mourn the memory of the ancestors, but also “to be surrounded by black people”. Being among a black majority is undoubtedly one of the main reasons that attract African-American tourists to Brazil as well. The difference, nonetheless, is that in their visits to Brazil, the tourists don’t have to deal with the suffering attached to the fact that some Africans were themselves active slave owners and slave dealers, since in Brazil the “brothers and sisters” they reconnect with are perceived as “siblings in destiny”, a term I am coining to represent the feeling of being among those who are marked by a similar trajectory.  

Evidently, the idea that Afro-descendants in the diaspora form a special kind of transnational “family” is not a new one. It can be traced back to the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism, and was of crucial importance for Marcus Garvey’s movement, and for the discourses of Négritude. African-American tourists in Brazil constantly comment that they could have been born there instead of in the United States. The unpredictability of the destiny of their ancestors is conceived of together.

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7 There certainly were Brazilian Afro-descendants actively involved in the slave trade, however, this is not publicized by the Brazilian tourism industry.
with the certainty of their own common fate, marked by slavery, oppression, struggle and resistance.8

African-American film maker Thomas Allen Harris describes his search for the African homeland outside of Africa: in Brazil. In his documentary, which carries the suggestive title That’s my Face (É a Minha Cara), Harris describes how his personal longings overlap with a wider African-American quest for a place where it is possible for a black person to feel comfortable. Revealingly, Harris finds “his face” in Bahia. “To find what I was looking for I had to go to Brazil”, we hear him declaring as if answering a whispering female voice that continuously sings in the background: “Go to Brazil: find the Orixás there…” Walking in the streets of Salvador on an ordinary hot afternoon, Harris comes across another African-American visitor, who explains to him the reason for her visit:

I needed to feel what it feels like to be part of the majority. I needed to be in a place where everyone else looked like me. I needed to be in a place that felt like home, not because I was born there, but because my spirit was at home there.

Why has Brazil become an imagined home for African-Americans? How do we define “home-places” vis-à-vis “other people’s places”? How are these definitions related to how we conceive of the inhabitants of the places we select, especially when we elect “home-places” in other countries? And how are these choices connected to our identities or to what we consider our identities to be? For Gillian Rose (1995), there are three ways in which emotions about places can be connected to the notion of identity: identifying with a place; identifying against a place; or not identifying. When we identify with a place it is because, in some way, we feel that we belong to that place. We identify with places in which we feel comfortable, where we feel at home, because “part of how you define yourself is symbolized by certain qualities of that place” (Rose 1995: 89). Senses of place can

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8 The statement of Congressman Charles Rangel upon the introduction of the House Concurrent Resolution 47 (2004) (that recognizes the connection between Afro-descendants in Latin America and the Caribbean and Afro-descendants in the US) reveals this feeling of kinship: “These people are our brothers and sisters through the slave trade and like us they are suffering from similar problems. The ships that brought us to the U.S. could have easily taken us to the Dominican Republic, Colombia or Brazil. I introduced this resolution as a reminder of our common history and need to work together to address our common problems.”
have different scales: local, regional, and national. What is novel about roots tourism is that it stimulates senses of place on a trans-national scale, which goes beyond the boundaries of nations, and conceives of dispersed people as part of a same group; in this case, the African diaspora: the black family.

Having or wanting a place where we feel we belong is part of how we understand our own place in the world. The map of Africanness imagined by African-American tourists encompasses a number of different countries with different and specific meanings. Which are the places that African-Americans feel they belong to? Which are the different feelings they have for each of these places? I find the term “map” useful to reflect on these questions. Maps indicate a sense of shared connotations, a collective system of senses in the vein of what Stuart Hall has defined as “maps of meanings”: “the systems of shared meanings which people who belong to the same community, group, or nation use to help them interpret and make sense of the world” (Hall 1995: 176). As Hall indicates, having a position within a set of shared meanings gives us a sense of who we are, and where we belong, in other words: a sense of our own identity.

For Dolores Hayden (1995), we should think of places taking into account the many meanings of this word, and analyze them as cultural products. To “know someone’s place” implies spatial and political meanings. This expression has been widely used in Brazil in reference to black people. To say that “black people should know their place” is an obviously racist, but unfortunately still often heard statement, and implies at the same time physical location and social position. Since I am also interested in the impacts of African-American tourism on local people, it seems relevant to consider that the tourists have access to “places” (in both their spatial and political meanings) that Brazilian blacks many times do not. Expensive restaurants and fancy hotels, inaccessible for many Brazilian blacks, are easily accessed by black American tourists. On the other hand, even though black, they are still foreigners; they are still tourists, and are therefore seen as entitled to visiting expensive places. What does it mean for Brazilian blacks to see African-American visitors overcoming spatial barriers, if it indeed means something? This question is, as of yet, unanswered.

Explaining the connections between power and place, Hayden (1995) asserts that one of the strategies used for disempowering cer-
tain groups has been by limiting their access to space. Women and members of minority groups have been historically subjected to that kind of limitation. Gender and race can be mapped as a struggle over social reproduction, for which the production of place is essential. For Hayden, the expression “knowing one’s place” is revealing of the limitations imposed on these excluded groups. Consequently, the effort to regain places, or to establish new places as one’s own, is a struggle that occurs in the realm of power.

Following Hayden, I argue that, by imagining their “physical” place as not just one but many places, African-Americans are struggling to expand “their place” in US society, in the sense that they are not accepting the boundaries previously established on their social position. On the other hand, however, when choosing to visit places where they can find “African roots”, it seems to me that they are at the same time “knowing their place” since they are limiting the possibilities to those places which are supposedly “African” or where one can find “African traditions”. For that reason, I argue that the map of Africanness carries the contradiction of being at the same time broad and limited. It is broad for the reason that it includes a large number of countries and because it dares to envisage affiliations beyond national borders. On the other hand, the map of Africanness is limited because it upholds racial boundaries by restricting the imagined affiliation to specific countries and peoples considered to be holders of African roots.

Traveling to places because we believe there are cultural traditions to be found there relates to a common and widely accepted notion that cultures – and, as a consequence, cultural identities – are embedded in places (Massey/Jess 1995). According to Stuart Hall (1995), we have a tendency to landscape cultural identities, to give them an imagined place or home. Diasporic affiliations, however, open up the possibility for contesting the way in which place has been traditionally connected to culture and identity.

From the diaspora perspective, identity has many imagined “homes” (and therefore no one, single, original homeland); it has many different ways of “being at home” – since it conceives of individuals as capable of drawing on different maps of meaning, and of locating themselves in different imaginary geographies at one and the same time – but it is not tied to one particular place (Hall 1995: 207).
It seems to me, nonetheless, that there are interpretations of the diaspora which do not necessarily break with the notion of tradition as the element which links us to our origins in culture, place and time. In the case of roots tourism, the notion of diaspora is very much stimulated by a conservative conception of tradition which understands it “as a one-way transmission belt; an umbilical cord, which connects us to our culture of origin” (Hall 1995: 207). The map of Africanness, as imagined by the tourists, tries to fulfil the wish of a shared system of meanings among blacks in the diaspora but the more it is crisscrossed, the more it entails heterogeneity, especially in the ways in which blackness itself has been conceived.

The concept of the map of Africanness is valuable because it indicates that there is a correlation between the many places visited by the African-American tourists. The meanings attributed to one spot in the map are connected to meanings attributed to other places in the very same map. Consequently, it is a map built by complementariness and opposition. The uniqueness of a place in the map of Africanness is established in relation to what supposedly lacks in the other places, but most of all, within what African-American tourists believe lacks within themselves, or in the places where they live. The map of Africanness is thus a diagram which traces the routes that are tracked in search of roots (Gilroy 1993).

Although the many different places wandered by the tourists should be understood as complementary pieces of the same “map of Africanness”, there is, however, a fundamental distinction between the roots tourism developed in the West African countries and the one that is carried out on the “Diasporic side” of the Atlantic, and that distinction is one that involves pain and joy. The experience of visiting the dungeons and the menacing “Doors of No Return” evokes the horrors

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9 David Harvey points to the limits of place-bounded identities: they have to rest at some point on the motivational power of tradition. However, it is difficult to maintain a sense of historical continuity in the face of the space-time compression of globalization. For Harvey, “the irony is that tradition is now often preserved by being commodified and marketed as such. The search for roots ends up at worst being produced and marketed as an image, as a simulacrum or pastiche (imitation communities constructed to evoke images of some folksy past […]). At best, historical tradition is reorganized as a museum culture […] of how things once upon a time were made, sold, consumed, and integrated into a long-lost and often romanticized daily life […]” (Harvey 1989: 304).
suffered by the ancestors, and many tourists are reported to have wept in silence or screamed out loud to express how deeply devastated they felt when visiting these places. Conversely, while visiting Brazil, the roots tourists don’t have to deal with the pains associated with the horrors of slavery. Instead, being in Brazil instils in them the joy of connecting with “a culture that was able to survive”, and with a people that managed to preserve the cultural connections with Africa.

3. The Place of Brazil in the Map of Africanness

The feeling of joy felt by the tourists in Brazil is mainly promoted by the tourist agencies that have little interest in publicizing the country’s enormous racial and social inequalities and the still very present legacy of slavery. Although there are agencies in Brazil that specialize in exploring poverty and which carry out “favela-tours”, Bahia is still mostly rhymed with “alegria”, an image in which black culture plays the central role. A symptomatic example of this is the way in which Pelourinho is represented. The word pelourinho was used in the slavery period to describe the public places where slaves were whipped (sometimes to death). Today, the term Pelourinho names the neighborhood located in the most touristy area of Salvador. There is no monument there symbolizing the pain inflicted on the slaves. Instead, Pelourinho is associated with pleasure. Its colorful streets are filled with souvenir stores and it is the place where the bloco afro Olodum holds its concerts for natives and tourists. Pelourinho is a must-visit place for anyone that comes to Bahia, and those who visit it ironically dance, drink and enjoy themselves while treading on the same cobblestoned streets in which African slaves were beaten and punished not much more than a hundred years ago.

However, in spite of all the joy and excitement experienced during their visits to Brazil, African-American visitors also have to deal with their own frustrations, especially when they realize that Brazilian blacks have other ways of understanding blackness and Africanness. One of the most striking disappointments among the tourists revolves

10 The word “alegria” means joy, happiness, pleasure, bliss. Besides the constant rhyming of Bahia with “alegria” in songs and poems, the official slogan of the State Government tourism agency (Bahiatursa) is “Bahia: terra da felicidade” (“Bahia: land of happiness”).
around the fact that the black Sisterhood of the Good Death worships a white saint. The affiliation of the sisters to both Candomblé and Catholicism, already confusing and disappointing enough for the tourists, is usually understood as a lack of “purity” and “authenticity”. For the Sisterhood, however, the cult of Our Lady of Glory is located within a context of religious syncretism that, in itself, represents a strategy of struggle and survival of African beliefs. Therefore, it is important to analyse the different ways in which black communities conceive of blackness and Africanness, recognizing that ready-made constituencies are many times frustrated and go un-corresponded.

Roots tourism in Bahia can be analysed as part of the wider process of international exchange of black symbols and objects throughout the diaspora, or what Paul Gilroy defined as the black Atlantic, where elements of black politics and aesthetics constantly travel among black communities, detaching from their local origins and becoming re-elaborated in new contexts. The novelty brought by black roots tourism is that it destabilizes the hegemony of US-centric conceptions of blackness by promoting locations previously seen as peripheral in the African diaspora.

Nevertheless, roots tourism does not completely invert the hierarchy within the black Atlantic. First, there is an intrinsic inequality in tourism between those who have access to travel and those who do not (MacCannell 1992). And in the case of African-American roots tourism, a second kind of inequality is propagated through the visitors’ belief that they will exchange their modernity – represented especially by the history of Black Power and the Civil Rights movement – for the traditions that Brazilian blacks are supposedly privileged to be able to maintain. This obviously unequal and hierarchical exchange between African-Americans and the local black communities they visit takes place not only in Brazil, but also on the African continent, as demonstrated by Paulla Ebron in Performing Africa:

Indeed, the travelers expressed their worry that Africa unfortunately lagged behind in material ways. Luckily, they had a solution to the continent’s “problems”. As businessmen, with a consciousness of course, they would develop Africa (Ebron 2002: ix).

Thus, at the same time that the process of roots tourism offers the possibility of challenging traditional North-South flows of cultural exchange, it also confirms the existing hierarchy within the black At-
lantic. The most important poles remain firmly situated in the Anglo-
phone North, a fact which reflects the weak positions of African and
Latin American countries in the context of the global configuration of
power. The unequal distribution of power has terrible consequences
not only for those located in the southern hemisphere but also affects
those who inhabit the economic and political centers, especially by
increasing their already sizeable unawareness toward the “rest of the
world”.

African-American tourists, earnestly interested in building trans-
national connections and, of course, favored by material resources,
manage to transcend this generalized ignorance. Therefore an exami-
nation of roots tourism promises to reveal the ways in which Southern
communities are creating new definitions of blackness and exporting
their own symbols, objects, concepts, and ideas – all of which demon-
strate that new paths are being opened up and that international chan-
nels of communication and circulation can follow other directions.

There certainly are alternative ways of understanding the African
diaspora and the webs that connect and multiply dynamic, inter-
changeable and hybrid black cultures. More than mere repeaters of
traditions, black cultures can be understood as cultures that are created
through dynamic global fluxes of communications and exchanges, and
that does not mean we must refute their African inheritance or their
black particularity. My intention with this analysis is neither to evalu-
ate the purity of cultural claims, nor to measure their level of truth or
falsity. Valuing imagination and invention, the notion of the map of
Africaness assesses tourism as a space for the creation and struggle
over discourses of identities, memories of Africaness and represen-
tations of blackness. As an open-ended search, roots tourism carries
within it an immeasurable treasure: the possibility of overcoming the
very geography of power which thus far has permeated the map of
Africaness.
Brazil in the Map of Africanness

Bibliography


Films

Little Senegal. Jean Bréhat et Rachid Bouchareb présentent; une coproduction 3B Productions, France 2 Cinema, TaunusFilm International, Tassili Films; avec les


Marjo de Theije

Migration and Religious Transnationalism:
Recent Research and the Case of the Brazilians in Suriname

The Brazilians have the same problems here as they have in Brazil
(Female member of Deus é Amor church in Paramaribo, Surinam, March 2004)

1. Introduction

In Latour, a working-class neighbourhood on the outskirts of Paramaribo, three Brazilian catholic priests run the parish. They are members of the Congregação Missionária Redentorista and arrived in Suriname in 2001 to replace the Dutch Redemptorist friars that had served the Surinamese Catholics for many decades. In Combé, another part of the capital of Surinam, there is a Deus é Amor (God is Love) church, founded in 1998 and there are now already six other groups formed, four congregations in the town or nearby, and two in the woods, at the garimpos Benzdorp and Vila Brasil respectively, all founded by Brazilian missionaries. There is also an Assembléia de Deus (Assembly of God) church, linked to the Surinamese Gemeenten Gods (Surinamese Communities of God), but with a Brazilian pastor. And finally there is a Baptist mission with Brazilian missionaries involved in it, as I was told.

Next to these religious people an unknown number of lay Brazilians is living in Paramaribo now, many of them in a part of the Tourtonne neighbourhood that is nicknamed Klein (i.e. small) Belem, or (in Portuguese) Belenzinho.1 These Brazilians came to Suriname in a very recent flow of migration: In the past few years tens of thousands of Brazilians have come to Suriname, and to British and French

1 Belem is the capital of the Northern Brazilian state Pará, connected directly to Paramaribo through six flights weekly. Klein Belem is located at the Anamoustraat, in Tourtonne, Paramaribo-North.
Guyana. According to journalistic sources as many as 40,000 Brazilians have found a home in Suriname since 1995, although other commentators hold lower numbers, e.g. the vice-consul estimated that 20,000-30,000 Brazilians live in Surinam in 2005. The census of 2005 comes up with an estimation of almost 20,000 in the same year (Algemeen Bureau Voor De Statistiek 2006); in any case we are talking about a considerable population. Of these not even 3,000 were registered at the consulate in March 2004. 2 Many of these Brazilian migrants arrive as gold prospectors or are involved in related activities, such as commerce or prostitution, and start their trans-border life in the woods, but increasingly they are settling in the country’s capital.

Throughout its history, Brazil has experienced an intense movement of internal migration, from the coastal zones to the interior states and from the northeastern countryside to the industrial urban areas in the Southeast. Millions of Brazilians moved in the past century, but they largely remained within the borders of the nation. Brazilians leaving the country only started to become large in numbers during the economic crisis of the 1980s. More than one million Brazilians lived outside the country in the 1990s, mainly in the USA, Japan and Paraguay. 3 The movement of people between Brazil and its neighbouring countries is quite stable, with Argentina both receiving and sending most migrants over the last decades (Hasenbalg/Frigerio 1999). A specific type of migration is the trans-border movement, in the Amazon region, a movement that is relatively invisible, and involves a constant come and go instead of a stream in one direction. It’s invisibility results from the fact that it concerns manual workers and peasants, and in the case of Suriname garimpeiros, who don’t have legal documents and who largely work outside the registered and monitored circuits of the urban centres. From the 1980s onward tens of thousands of Brazilians also migrated to French Guyana, to find a

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2 Interview ambassador and vice-consul, March 11, 2005.
3 Wilson Loria (1999) writes about 600,000 to one million Brazilians living in the U.S. alone. Major cities where there is a Brazilian agglomeration are Newark, New York, Miami, Boston, Framingham, Somerville, Los Angeles, Berkeley, and San Francisco. Beserra (2003: 6) mentions that almost 800,000 Brazilians live in the USA, 454,500 in Paraguay and 224,229 in Japan, according to Itamaraty.
living in the construction works related to the Kourou space centre. 30% of the Guyana population (total almost 200,000 2006) is Brazilian now (Arouck 2000; 2002) and in the other neighbouring country, Guyana, Brazilians are active in (diamond) mining too.

About the backgrounds of the Brazilian migrants in the Guyana’s little is known so far. Given their occupations in the new country, they do not come from the affluent part of Brazilian population. Most of these migrants had little schooling and come from the poorer areas of Brazil, and many already migrated in Brazil before they moved to Surinam, British Guyana or French Guyana. According to several people 95% of the women migrants are from Belem, and 95% of the men from the state of Maranhão, but these numbers are not based on systematic research.4 The vice-consul estimated that 90% of the Brazilian migrants come from northern Brazil, and 70% of these from rural Maranhão, where poverty is most severe.5 Other sources state that the Brazilians come from Amapá mainly, where they already were engaged in gold mining (Hoogbergen et al. 2001). My observations and interviews with migrants confirm that most come from the Northern states: Pará and Maranhão, and in lesser numbers also Piauí, Tocantins, Amazonas.

The emigration of such large numbers of Brazilians turned our attention to the role of religion in the migration process. In Brazil religion takes such an important place in social and cultural life that the question arises as to what happens with the religious lives of transmigrants in the host countries. In Paramaribo the presence of Brazilian religion is visible and known by all in the form of the Pentecostal churches and the Catholic priests. But how is the involvement of the Brazilian migrants, the people who live in Paramaribo working in shops, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and the prostitutes and garimpeiros who come to town from the woods periodically, in the available religious options? In this paper I will explore the interconnection between religion, migration and transnationalism. Starting from the available material on transnational migration – of Brazilians but not alone – we will attempt an overview of contemporary research into the


5 Interview March 8, 2004.
transnational socio-religious field. I will use this overview then, to formulate some first analyses of the data I gathered with respect to the religious aspects of the lives of the Brazilians in Paramaribo, Surinam.

2. Transnationalism and Transnational Religion

Scholars of transnationalism and transnational migration only recently started to pay attention to religion (although some authors have furnished interesting overviews of the field already; cf. Levitt 2001b; Vertovec 2000). Slowly it is being acknowledged that religion plays an important role in the organisation of migration, community building by migrants and all kinds of transnational links between home and host countries. In the research on transnationalism much more attention has been given to questions concerning the role of the nation-state, such as the redefinition of the boundaries, political organisation and the sending of remittances. But to understand transnational migration, the nation-state is no longer the correct entity. According to Vertovec (2000: 13) we should understand transnationalism as the actual, ongoing exchanges of information, money and resources – as well as regular travel and communication – that members of a diaspora may undertake with others in the homeland or elsewhere within the globalised ethnic community.

As Margolis also rightly puts it (following Basch et al. 1994): “immigrants become transmigrants by constructing social fields that ignore geographic, political and cultural boundaries”, thus making the home and host society a single field for action (Margolis 1995: 29). Of course migration is only one form of transnationalism, and there are many other “cross-border” activities that deserve attention, such as – with respect to religion – missionary activities.

Contemporary study of migration uses the concept of transnationalism to emphasize the fluidity of space and place, the (imagined) communities created in the process, the permeability of borders, etc., concepts that express a shift from the ‘materialist economistic’ focus to attention on the subjective experiences of migration (Lewellen 2002). Transnationalism then, is not so much a theory as a set of ideas and conceptual tools for analysis that are meant to do justice to the fluidity and movement involved. Some important aspects of analysis should be the rethinking of the ideas of space and place, and the power
processes involving identity politics connected to these notions (2002: 136-137). Olwig (2003) argues transnational migration also means that migrants not only maintain a personal connection with their home country, but also “are pushed back to the country they have left by the receiving country because they are categorized and perceived in this country in terms of their origins in another nation-state”. This origin marks them as different and in many countries (e.g. in the US, which recognizes dual citizenship), allows them to be active in two different nations-states. “The immigrants, in other words, are perceived to be transnational” (Olwig 2003: 68).

What does this mean for religion? It is safe to say that transnational religion takes place in a much larger context: economic, political, social and cultural. In a recent paper Levitt (2003) makes a useful distinction between transnational religion and the religious practices of transnational migrants. Transnational religion as it appears in scholarly texts has not so much to do with migration, but instead points to the ways in which world religions create a transnational civil society that challenges the nation (Rudolph/Piscatori 1997). In this context several authors have addressed questions of the pluralisation of religion in relation to globalizing relations between peoples (Petersen et al. 2001b). Others have pointed to the role of religion in migrant and diaspora communities (Brettell 2003; Levitt 2001a; 2003; Vertovec 2000).

The religious beliefs and practices of migrants, their local organisations and informal attachments to religious communities, the way they construct identities and notions of belonging within the religious context, are at another level of analysis and abstraction. The religious practices of transnational migrants are nevertheless often connected to transnational religion, “because transnational migration households, congregations and communities are sites where diasporic, global and transnational religions are created” (Levitt 2003: 849). The distinction is therefore mainly a question of focus; do we want to clarify the local community and the processes of identity formation, community organisation and religious meaning making? Or are we interested in the larger structures? In this paper I will concentrate on the first option.

Several authors have designed descriptions for the concepts used in this context. According to Schiller transnational religion refers to the religious practices, discursive and non-discursive, and the institu-
tional form of a religion, that are lived at different places, and in which the daily practice of both locations is part of the same social field. Religion is a social field just as kinship, friendship, business or politics, and the transnational social fields are the life world of the migrants that are part of daily life in two societies: their society of origin and their society of settlement (Levitt 2003; 2004; Menjívar 1999; 2000; Peterson et al. 2001a; 2001b; Vásquez/Marquardt 2003). Transnational religion thus makes it possible for individuals to have their religious lives across international borders.

It is not difficult to think of religion as an important element in immigrant communities. Religious institutions, international, have been important resources for migrant groups in which identities are reproduced and produced in new their environment, churches forming a basis enabling migrants to adapt to their new situation while maintaining the connection with their cultural background (Yang/Ebaugh 2001). Immigrants establish networks and relationships to survive in the new country, and regional and other identities clearly delineate groups and bring people together. Religious resources help migrants to adapt to the demands of the new society and answer to the challenges to survive in often very harsh circumstances. According to Guest (2003) religion is the principal organizer of the social networks Chinese immigrants create in New York and of utmost importance, because the religious communities – Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist or Daoist – are the main field for the mobilization of the social capital that these immigrants need to survive in the US.

Religion is particularly strong in constructing communities among adherents, offering security both connected to the world of God and gods, as to the here and now in the local group. In the case of migrant populations, the communities formed religiously easily include transnational links. The ties between the home community and the host community constructed through religion may be of various kinds and exist on various levels. They can be limited to individual and personal links of members of the religious groups, be they ordinary church-goers or priests, pastors or other religious specialists. In her ethnography of the ‘transnational villagers’ between Miraflores and Boston, Levitt (Levitt/Peggy 2001c) shows how migrants use religion to produce links of belonging transnationally, and maintain double allegiances. The ties can also be institutional ties, established between
local groups in home and host communities. Especially when people from the same hometown or village form migrant communities, it is likely that such institutional ties are created. Levitt mentions financial and material support of US Catholic parishes for particular Dominican parishes and exchange programs for seminarians between the two countries Levitt (2001c: 167). But also without clear institutional links, religious groups may be mobilized as a support network with great symbolic importance (Sandoval 2002).

Religion may be primarily a local and localizing force in either home or host society, or in both. Levitt (2001c) asserts that Dominican Catholicism was largely a lay business until recently and therefore migrants are quite prepared to do things themselves. However, the Catholicism they knew in the Dominican Republic was very much connected to the territory in which it was lived out. Stripped of this territorial stage, it lost much of its validity in the new context in the host country USA. Therefore it is also logical that a special attraction may reside in the transnational character of many religious traditions. In its orientation to global and universal truths, religion may become a potent transnational force that makes sense in the new society without a direct reference to the home country.

A case in point is Roman Catholicism, which can be considered an old transnational system, one of the most international institutions in the world. It has been part of a translocal and transcultural project from the start, and uses largely the same symbols and rituals worldwide – making it easy for migrants to participate in the host community. There is a large recognition and this creates a feeling of home in the host context. For Catholics this makes it relatively easy to participate in the services in other places, even in other languages. They need not put in much effort. This can be convenient, especially when people do not have the desire to spend much time and energy in it. People who live their lives across borders, earning money in one place to send it to another place, might not be very motivated to get involved in church life altogether.

Simultaneously, the Roman Catholic Church spreads its universals and adapts them to local cultures, developing practices and experiences rooted in particular cultural contexts. Elsewhere, Mariz and I have discussed the contemporary tension between the “localizing” and “globalizing” elements for Brazilian lay groups (Mariz/Theije 2001;
see also Theije 2006a). In Brazil, as in other parts of the world, Catholicism to some extent also adopts localized appearances when it becomes the religion of the people. The representatives of the “official”, or institutional, Church use the expression *catolicismo popular* (popular Catholicism, or *religiosidade popular*, popular religion) for the result of the translation into local culture. Several researchers have reported that the same happens in the host countries where migrants adapt to or develop specific forms of Catholicism.

But other religions can rely on transnational networks too. In a very interesting comparison between Salvadoran street gang members and Pentecostal churches, Gómez/Vásquez (2001) show that in these Pentecostal churches the cross-border activities include the monitoring of the youngsters from the gangs and helping them into another life, in the US or in Salvador. Pentecostals build on many, horizontal networks of transnational churches. Catholicism, with its history of universal and global organisation and mission, seems to be paradoxically less transnational, according to Peterson/Vasquez (2001) in their research on Charismatic Salvadorans in El Salvador and in Washington, because in its organisation it emphasizes the localisation of beliefs and practices. Of course there are transnational links, but these are the result of individual initiatives and not part of an institutional strategy.

Studies on migrants in North America show that religion is an important element in the reconfiguration of the migrants’ identity in the host society, also because US cultural policy promotes and sustains the religious expression of migrant groups (for example Hepner 2003 on migrants from Eritrea and Guest 2003 on Chinese migrants). Religion furnishes elements for the construction of a new identity, or is the main source for the maintenance of an identity linked to the home country. Religious identities and practices also enable migrants to sustain membership in multiple locations. In her study of Dominican migrants in the US, Levitt (2001a: 160) found that

membership in the religious organizational system linking Boston and the Dominican Republic allows individuals to move almost seamlessly between these two settings, thereby facilitating their continued involvement in their sending community at the same time that they are assimilating into the United States.
It goes without saying that in all these instances, religion can deeply influence the lives of migrants, and their relation to home and host community, religiously defined or not.

3. Brazilian Emigration and Religion

Just as the eye for religion within migration studies in general is relatively new, so it is in studies on Brazilian migration. Quite some research has been done, but what do these works say with respect to religion? Migration of Brazilian citizens is best documented in the case of the US (Beserra 1998; 2003; Fleischer 2002; Margolis 1994; 1995; 1998; Martes 2000; Reis/Sales 1999; Ribeiro 1999; Sales 1999a; 1999b). In one case, that of the Brazilian city Governador Valadares, probably the best known case of an “emigrant town” religion might be the origin of the flux of people to the USA. In the 1930s and 1940s several missionaries settled and founded churches in Governador Valadares, that later would offer the possibility to the Brazilian converts to travel or move to the USA (Goza 2003: 269).

Sometimes religion can be seen as the main motivation for migration, as is the case with missionaries or when religious servants of the home community go to the host community to serve the religious needs of the migrants. Research among Brazilians in Los Angeles showed that the First Adventist Church of the Portuguese language is a very important organizer of migrant lives (Beserra 2003: 79-116). Beserra describes how in the case of these Brazilians in Los Angeles, their religious group functioned also as recruiting device, the core around which the social network of the migrant is constructed. In his study of Brazilian Nikkei in Japan, Linger (2001) found a missionary family of the Assembléia de Deus living in Toyota. The presence of the pastors of Deus é Amor in Paramaribo can be interpreted this way. Although missionaries often only stay for a limited number of years, they may open a route so to say that others can take afterwards.

In Argentina religion seems to play no significant role in the sociability of the Brazilian migrants (Hasenbalg/Frigerio 1999). Other research however, showed that churches are in fact the only institutional structures in the Brazilian immigrant community in New York (Margolis 1995) and Boston (Martes 1999; 2000). Research in the USA highlights religion as an important factor in the lives of the mi-
grants, not in the least because it is a chief provider of material and emotional support. It is not uncommon for churches to offer all kinds of services to the migrants, which is very important for many, especially those who recently arrived and don’t speak the language nor know ‘the way’ to resolve practical problems, as was showed in the research of Alves/Ribeiro (2002) in Florida. Next to personal contacts, pure necessity of help and assistance attracts people to the Brazilian churches. Research in Los Angeles showed that the First Adventist Church forms the centre of a social network for migrants from Brazil (Beserra 2003). Alves/Ribeiro (2002) underscore the social security aspect of religion. They found that the churches offered many kinds of social help to the migrants, ranging from financial donations to offering housing – or at least a bed to sleep in. In the absence of civil organisations, consular services were even offered through one of the protestant churches. In fact, among Brazilians in the US religious groups appear to be the only existing institutions, as was shown in research in New York (Margolis 1994) and Boston (Martes 1999; 2000; Sales 1999a).6

Researchers repeatedly find a lack of organization among Brazilians in other countries. A lack of organization in the host country may point to the fact that these people are more oriented to their home country. Research in the USA also shows that Brazilian migrants develop less mutual help as compared to the Chinese migrant groups for example. Brazilians are more divided, to such an extent that Margolis (2003: 60) even speaks of “the discourse of Brazilians speaking ill of one another”. Arouck (2000: 76) found in French Guyana that even the carnival parties were differentiated. He explains this difference by referring to class differences between the migrants, a suggestion that is also found in the work of (Resende 2003) who compares two neighbourhoods in Miami.

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6 Faist (2000) called attention to the political aspects of transnational spaces in which migrants move. With respect to the formation of transnational communities and what they call a “transnational public sphere”, Levitt/Dehesa (2003) point to the fact that the policies that countries adopt to incorporate emigrant communities are important. In their research, they found that the Brazilian state is not very successful in constructing a space for civic engagement because it has a top-down approach in the policies it develops. This might contribute to the importance of religion in the Brazilian migrant communities.
The religious situation in societies of settlement is often quite different as compared to Brazil, but in most countries we find a religious field with as many options and as diverse as it is in Brazil. However, the circumstances of migrant life may also create other expectations and necessities as compared to the society of origin. This may make people choose adherence to other churches than to the home religious community. Research in the US showed that Brazilian migrants are more often members of evangelical churches than they are in Brazil (Martes 2000: 116). Furthermore, of this larger number of evangelicals, more are men as compared to the churches in Brazil (Alves/Ribeiro 2002: 68).

A last point of interest is language. In the process of organizing their own religious groups, language skills seem to play a major role. Thus in New York there is a Brazilian parish, with Portuguese language services that is very popular among the Brazilians (Margolis 1998: 89). However, a much-reported characteristic of the new local forms is that they are less connected to a specific local context, and in most cases also less to a specific people. In fact, it is reported that the Catholic Church in the US helps to create a meaningful social field for Hispanic migrants, regardless of the country where they come from, and including the Brazilians. The Church thus helps to “[…] shape migrants’ political relationship with the broader receiving context by encouraging […] either a pan-Latino solidarity of resistance or a Hispanic multiculturalism” (Vásquez/Marquardt 2003: 166).

Several authors suggest that the transnational character of many religions may be attractive to migrants because they than feel they are a part of a larger group. The research of Levitt among migrants from Governador Valadares underscores the importance of a religious membership that is the key to an American-Brazilian identity (2003: 864). And this not only counts for the migrants in the societies of settlement. The non-migrants in Governador Valadares also are part of the transnational religious field, when they watch televised masses from Massachusetts to see their relatives on the screen (Levitt 2004: 1).
4. **Transnational Religion in Suriname**

The Brazilian population in Suriname differs substantially from the migrant communities in the US or elsewhere. Most migrants work as *garimpeiros* and live in the forest, far away from urban Paramaribo, in small relatively isolated groups. Most men and women have no family in the *garimpo*, and the social ties in workforces are often unstable, people switch often from one work place to another and might travel at a regular base between the interior and Paramaribo or Brazil too. In Paramaribo part of the Brazilians have settled with their families, but most are singles who stay in town temporarily, between periods in the forest, or going to Brazil after a time of work, varying from several year to some months. The people who stay and work in Paramaribo prefer to go to Brazil on a regular basis also because they need to renew their visa. Others remain years in a row without legal documents, especially when they live in the *garimpo*. In some places small hamlets developed where bordellos are based, and where shops and bars sell food, drinks, clothing, and utensils for the work. These hamlets than become the centres for large areas in the forest where the independent workers extract the gold. The largest of these hamlets house several Pentecostal churches also.

The composition of the Brazilian population in Suriname, in the forest and in town, influences the religious activities they develop. First, there is a general lack of organization, of which possible representatives such as the priests, or the president of the association of *garimpeiros* complained. Several people suggested that this lack of organization is a consequence of the undocumented status of most migrants the country. Organizing would mean becoming more visible. Another explanation put forward is the supposed temperament of the *garimpeiros*; “they are like nomads” said the vice-consul, explaining they have other problems to deal with than to worry about their legal rights and documents for example (Theije 2006b). Under these circumstances, religion appears to be the only field where at least some kind of organisation is reached. This is not a surprise, as religion is an important factor in cultural, social and political life in Brazil, and the experience of Brazilian migrants in other countries shows that this pattern is followed elsewhere too. So, religion is a means of organisation in Suriname too, albeit of limited scope. Many migrants told me
they were not participating in religious affairs in Suriname, although they used to be practicing in Brazil. In this section I will discuss some characteristics of the religious practices of the Brazilians in Suriname: the available religious structure in the country, the problem of language, and the transnational religious elements.

Just like Brazil, Suriname is a religiously plural society. The population of less than half a million people is more or less equally divided between Hinduism, Catholicism, Protestant Christianity (the Evangelische Broedergemeente, the Herrnhutter community, is the largest group, but Pentecostal groups are growing) and Islam (Algemeen Bureau Voor De Statistiek 2006: 33). Apart from these ‘world religions’ many Surinamese are involved in Winti, an Afro-Surinamese cult that is especially popular among urban creoles. The religious institutions, structures and networks that the Brazilian immigrants encounter in Suriname are largely built from these ingredients. All of these religions with the exception of Winti have institutionalized practices but also know many informal elements. The catholic and protestant beliefs are similar to those in Brazil. Contrary to what maybe is expected Winti is quite different from Afro-Brazilian religions (due to the syncretism with a different Christian church). However, similar to the Brazilian situation there always seems to be place for new churches also. I will come to that in a moment. Let me first say something brief on each of the religions.

The Herrnhutter religion is the largest protestant church in the country. Although it is different from protestant and Pentecostal churches in Brazil, it attracted many Brazilian migrants that arrived in the 1980s and 1990s. However, several Brazilians who have lived for ten or fifteen years in Paramaribo said that after many years of being a member of the Evangelische Broedergemeente, lately they are participating in the Brazilian Pentecostal churches that were founded in Paramaribo since the end of the 1990s. The many Pentecostal churches that are available now, indeed attract most part of the Brazilians who develop religious activities, not only in town (where more options are available), but also in the larger garimpos in the forest, where they are the only churches present. Surinamese Catholicism has no parishes in the gold fields, but in town Catholicism is well organized. The Surinamese Catholic Church followed the policy for many years to minister to every ethnic group with clergy from the same
group. So for example they would have a Javanese priest for the Javanese Catholics, a Chinese priest for the Chinese Catholics, etc. As part of what is called the nationalistic policy this was changed some time ago (Vernooij 1998). From that time on, parishioners and priests would preferably no longer come from the same ethnic group. In a land of many languages and ethnic groups a recent result of this policy is that there are now Portuguese-speaking Brazilian priests in the Creole, Dutch and Sranantongo-speaking, neighbourhood Latour and Dutch-speaking Belgian priests in the Portuguese-speaking Brazilian neighbourhood Tourtonne.

For the Brazilians the fact that they do not speak the local language is an obstacle for their religious participation in Surinamese congregations. Catholics would attend in one of the parishes in Paramaribo where a weekly mass in Spanish was offered, which was the nearest to their mother tongue. Recently a Portuguese speaking nun and the Brazilian priests of Latour have started to organise a special Mass in Portuguese once or twice a month in Tourtonne. However, this is not a very structural solution, which can be seen as a sign that offering services to national communities is not a priority of the Surinamese Catholic church. The prevailing policy is directed to integration. Before they started in the parish, the Catholic priests spent several months in the Netherlands to learn Dutch, the official language in Surinam.

The policy of Pentecostalism with respect to language is the opposite. All Brazilian Pentecostal services are administered in Portuguese and the Pentecostal pastors do not speak Dutch or Sranantongo. Several Brazilians that had been living in Suriname for many years already and had become members of Surinamese churches are now attracted to the Portuguese language used in the churches and some have become members of the Deus è Amor community recently. Just like in Brazil the members of the Pentecostal churches are referred to as brothers and sisters, and in town as well as in the garimpo they were respected inhabitants. Even Brazilians that identified as Catholics would “visit” a Pentecostal church now and then. They did not convert, and did not consider themselves members of this church, but they liked the “praising God, pray, and hear the Word”. To find this
“I enter in any church”, said garimpeiro Raílson. And for this, the language is very important, more important than the religious tradition of the prayer or preaching. The mixture of different religious traditions that is so characteristic for Brazilian popular religiosity, finds an extra motivation in this situation of a migrant population that does not speak the language of the country it lives in. Interestingly, the Portuguese language services of the Deus é Amor church started to attract Surinamese people too, so that now there is simultaneous translation whenever there is someone available who has a command of Portuguese and Dutch or Sranantongo.

Both the Catholic priests and the Pentecostal pastors declare that the Brazilian population of Suriname comes to the churches because they have many problems and are looking for a spiritual consolation. Many health problems, poverty because the profits form the garimpo are declining, or because for some reason the person lost all he or she had, and for the rest all the same problems as they would have in Brazil, such as discordance in the family and worries in relation to relationships and love. Apart from religions’ feature of offering security both connected to the world of God and gods, as to the here and now in the local group, the transnational character of many religions may be attractive to Brazilian migrants in Surinam. The local Catholic structure is of course part of the transnational and global network of Roman Catholicism, and of the Redemptorist religious order. As a global institution the Catholic Church aims at centralizing and controlling the practices and beliefs of its followers. At the same time, however, it has to give room for adaptation to the local context (Mariz/Theije 2001). In Surinam, with respect to Catholicism it appears to be a sign of the times that the Redemptorist congregation that almost founded and surely structured Catholicism in the country for almost a century substituted its Dutch missionaries for Brazilian friars recently. And this is not the only link between Brazilian and Surinamese Catholicism. The Sisters of Paramaribo also have connections in Brazil, and one of the Surinamese nuns who lived for many years in Brazil, is now a mediator and contact person for many Brazilians in trouble. In collaboration with the Brazilian friars she organizes a Por-

7 Garimpeiro, 38 years old, working at concession Antino, interview February 2006.
Portuguese language mass in Klein Belém every two weeks that is very successful. And she maintains an extensive network of help to Brazilians in trouble.

Transnational religious practices are one of the manners in which migrants maintain a connection to their homeland. The Brazilian Pentecostal churches in Suriname establish a very direct link, institutionalized in the person of pastors that come to work with the Brazilian community and conduct services in Portuguese. It is possible to reason the other way around also: because the Pentecostal churches ‘follow’ the migrants to new locations, in other countries, they become transnational religious organizations themselves.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, our main objective was to clarify the idea of transnational religion and its role in migration and transnationalism, based on literature and preliminary data on the case of Brazilian migrants in Suriname. Religion has an important impact on the way people experience their situation, create notions of belonging and identity, and the meaning people give to their everyday lives. It also offers many concrete tools for adaptation and social integration. Many religious organisations are global institutions, and this may facilitate the participation of the migrants – the religious rituals, symbols and organisation are known and familiar. This makes them a suitable field for migrants to seek forms of belonging and security in the often dangerous and insecure situation of the migrant existence. As transnational organisations, religious groups may also play the role of representing a group of believers, and become a player in the political field too.

The religious consequences of the recent migration of Brazilians to Suriname are not yet known; we still have to see whether these Brazilians establish a “Brazilian life” in Suriname or “creolize” into the Surinamese society. Transnational religion may play a role in either of these processes. By constructing social fields that are not limited by cultural, political and geographical boundaries, the Brazilians in Suriname might be engaged in the construction of a transmigrant identity, instead of referring to a Brazilian or creating a Surinamese identity. For the individual seeking religion the resources in Suriname the available resources are different from those in Brazil.
The Catholic Church does not make itself very present in Belenzinho, and still less in the interior where most of the migrants live. The Pentecostal church is much more visible, near to the Brazilian population both on various localities in Paramaribo town, but also the forest, which makes this church an important factor because of the availability of religiosity every day of the week. The migrants use both resources in many cases in an occasional way, without getting involved in a structured way in church life, bases on individual choices that are isolated in time and place. The composition of the Brazilian population in Suriname makes the clients of the churches an extremely unstable group. Some live in the interior, spend some weeks in the city now and then during which they might seek religion; they go to a catholic Mass or visit the Pentecostal churches some times, but then they return to their work in the forest, where they may stay for months in a row before returning to Paramaribo. In such cases, the religious activities of the individual will not result in a close connection to a community of believers.

I did not find any specific links that Surinamese congregations could have with localized Brazilian parishes, which would justify the identification of transnational religions. The church Deus é Amor could be constructing connections between Pentecostal communities in the places of origin of the migrants, and Suriname; however, it is probably not so easy to happen because the Brazilian population in Paramaribo is so unstable. Furthermore, the migrants originate from many different places in Brazil. Not even the three Brazilian Catholic priests should be seen as representatives of Brazilian Catholicism, solely at the service of the Brazilian migrants. “That they are Brazilian is pure coincidence” he said Father Vernooij historian of religion and Redemptorist priest himself (personal communication, February 2004). And this makes sense, because they are not in the Brazilian neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the Catholic missionary practice can only confirm the transnational character of religion.
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Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda

A short Sketch on some Signs of Transformation in Brazilian Urban Imaginary

This brief sketch has to do with a phenomenon that may come to have important developments in a country like Brazil with large gaps between social classes and a perverse persistence of economic inequality. I am referring to the new cultural developments that come from the periphery and are beginning to enter into dialog and to intervene with mainstream culture. The examples are countless. Funk rhythms take over FM radio stations and middle-class parties. Cobertores (Blankets), a sold-out show about the reality of homeless children directed by choreographer Carmen Luz, with a cast of youngsters from the Andaraí slum, plays to unexpected success. The world of fashion bows to the style of slum artists. A novel such as Cidade de Deus (City of God) makes the bestseller list and its film adaptation is nominated for an Oscar.

In this scenario, at least one thing is making itself clear: a new element is reformatting our cultural paradigms and spreading throughout the urban landscape of Brazilian cities. Examining my increasingly heavy folder of newspaper clippings, I began to work with this new phenomenon from a critical point of view.

At this point, I noticed the first issue that this material raises, one that signals the importance of the new cultural expressions currently emerging from the peripheries of the large cities. After dedicating my entire life as a researcher to identifying the possibilities of resistance and political challenge of the cultural production that followed the 1960s rebellions and their repercussions, I feel uncomfortable and insecure when faced with the challenge of defining a position from which to study such manifestations. For the first time in my middle-class scholarly experience, I found myself in trouble. Therefore, I decided to employ the utmost prudence in positioning myself in this new arena.
In a broader sense, we still do not have a sound critical body of studies on the cultural production of the urban peripheries. The few existing works analyze such cultural production either from the perspective of social and cultural inclusion or they deal with the impact of its strong presence on the media. However, I do not intend to move along in any of these directions. What interests me here is a very specific and limited matter: the connections, appropriations and debates generated between the cultural mainstream and the cultural manifestations of the urban peripheries. It is worthwhile to point out the specificity of the composition of social forces in Brazilian culture, where social inequalities and wealth distribution continue to be unsolved problems, creating a real gap between elite and popular cultures. What I intend to do here is just focus on a few ongoing cultural crossovers.

Regarding my methodology, I decided to revisit two of my older and most persistent objects of study: the first one being the articulations between culture and politics and the second the creation of alternative means for cultural production.

I’ll begin with the first one. It is a known fact that black militancy in Brazil never succeeded in becoming well organized due to several complicating factors such as the movement’s internal divisions, the obstacles to prioritizing racial issues when faced with demands related to class inequalities, or the challenges of facing national beliefs that always tend to overlook the existence of a strong racism pervasive in our daily lives.

It is true that after 1988, the centennial of the Abolition of Slavery in Brazil, there was an increase in political awareness concerning specific racial issues. Nevertheless, it can be said that black movements in Brazil, in spite of some unquestionable progresses, never succeeded in creating a critical and political body that could in fact represent the large percentage of blacks and mestizos in Brazilian society.

But today, new black generations are not merely engaged in the preservation of their history or in the affirmation of racial pride. Going much further, they are also strongly addressing issues of social exclusion suffered by low-income populations, consisting mostly of blacks, mestizos and migrants.

The frontline selected by these young movements is activism within the arts, with a strong commitment to social transformation. The activity (or attitude as it is called), is now experienced simultane-
ously as art and as a way of intervening in their poor communities. The most significant media used by this youth is hip-hop, an artistic genre that includes five forms of expression: MC, Rap, Break dance (the bboys), Graffiti and Knowledge.

I will briefly explain the latter, since it is a significant and relatively new element in Brazilian hip-hop. A key element of hip-hop aesthetics is to raise awareness and to value local history and racial roots, which brings up the need for information and knowledge. Organic knowledge – whether academic or not – is now being experienced as an element of the hip-hop culture, validating some of its agents as voices of the periphery. New organic intellectuals are increasingly present in public spaces giving interviews, taking part in both national and international seminars and congresses, and producing academic papers and university theses. In the public arena, the outstanding activists include DJ Marlboro, Mano Brown, MVBill, Ferrez and José Junior among many others. The academic pioneers of Brazilian hip-hop are Écio Salles (from the Afro Reggae group), Ericson Pires (from the Hapax group) and Alexandre Vogler (from the Rradial group).

Coming back to hip-hop, the most frequent criticism heard in Brazil is that it is “Americanized”, that it has nothing has to do with the “root” culture.

I cannot resist making an aside here about the clear similarity of this critique with the one that used to be made against black movements in the 1960s and 1970s, equally accused of being a North American import.

Having pointed this out, I shall continue with two observations on the supposedly “foreign” character of local hip-hop. One is about the questioning raised by these movements of the very notion of a national culture. The political activism and the anger expressed by the hip-hop idiom seem to sprout not merely from a supposedly foreign cultural trend but above all from the awareness that hip-hop is able to articulate a supranational forum of poor and black youths who wish to raise the banner of global resistance. Seen from this viewpoint, hip-hop echoes somewhat the more sophisticated tone and logic of recent World Social Forums.

The second point comes from the eclectic character of rap in Brazil. From a rhythmic viewpoint, Brazilian RAP is a merging of the
genre born in Jamaica and raised in New York ghettos with the sound of pagode, samba, frevo, maracatu, axé and even bossa nova, without specifically privileging any of these beats or tunes, in the best hybrid style of Néstor Garcia Canclini.

From the viewpoint of political emphasis, a few adaptations were also made. For instance, there is a quite eloquent local reading for the RAP acronym. In English, RAP is the abbreviation for Rhythm and Poetry. In its Portuguese translation, RAP became the abbreviation for Rhythm, Attitude and Politics.

Among its practitioners, the hip-hop attitude is called the gangsta revolution, whose goal is to build community awareness within the panorama of violence and poverty found in urban peripheries. One of the axes of the hip-hop political project is pedagogic action instead of aggressive confrontation. Most of the time this means intensive release of information and provision of access to culture, both now seen as basic rights of all citizens and identified as a strategic factor for any project of social transformation.

The new black consciousness acts in groups, sells a lifestyle and generates financial inputs, so as not to depend entirely on the State. There are some successful examples, such as Afro Reggae (in this sense an exemplary group) or the siblings MV Bill and Nega Gizza, activists of CUFA (Slums Central Union, which gathers 326 Rio de Janeiro slum communities), where Rap is practiced as a means of showing the precarious living conditions of slum-residing blacks. Nega Gizza leads two quite aggressive radio shows, being the first woman to have a talk show of this kind on an FM radio station. MV Bill, in the video clip Soldados do Morro (Slum Soldiers), denounces in national broadcast by means of shocking images the drama of teenagers with heavy loaded machine guns working for drug dealers. An important fact shown coast to coast, since 90% of this kind of work is done by children and teenagers, starting from nine years old.

Today, there are thousands of hip-hop groups all over the country, setting the tone for this new political profile which is creating conditions for the concrete visibility of racial claims in Brazil.

I would not like to close the hip-hop subject without mentioning a “phenomenon inside the phenomenon”, that is, the very strong role that women play in this area. There are many well-known hip-hop women, such as Tati Quebra Barraço, Nega Gizza, Ana Cristina,
Monica, Kelly, Danielle and others. They include rappers, who use a very politically minded idiom, and funkers, who have a rebellious attitude. Among the latter, Tati, the pioneer, stands out. Tati is the first woman to break the barrier of male-only funkers.

Tati Quebra-Barraco’s performance – whose artistic name literally translates a slang euphemism for “the act of sexual intercourse” – both seduces and shocks. She comes onstage, shoots out sentences filled with strong sexual meaning, breaks down prejudices, demands equality between men and women, and stirs the public into frenzy.

In private life, Tati never gives interviews. She is married, the mother of three children and, in her own words, a dedicated wife and housekeeper. On stage, she turns into a hurricane woman who, similar to a machine gun, shouts war screams. Tati, a role model for other funkers, is a “funk girl with attitude”, who screams and mimics forbidden porno situations and boasts about her freedom and power.

It is easy to foresee the controversies generated among the feminists by funkers’ performances. A women’s movement from São Paulo, the Geledes, has carried out some work with female funkers about the reproduction of male chauvinism and the reactionary contents of their lyrics. This initiative has certainly given them an increased awareness of what they are singing about, but has not succeeded in changing their ways. Tati and her followers continue with what they see as an appropriation of the sexual brutality surrounding their lives.

In opposition to the funkers, one finds the rappers. Led by Nega Gizza, who has the same empathy and success with the public, but whose lyrics avoid explicit sexual appeal to attract the audience, they reject both the funk which Gizza considers macho oriented, as well as American rap, which she calls “dribble music”. Gizza defines herself as a politically committed rapper and a hip-hop activist, as well as a feminist who fights in favour of revolutionary black woman.

Whether it is Tati, manipulating the system, or the warrior Giza, raising the flag of social change, it is clear that something is already in the air, promoting debates and political openings for low-income women.

Literature has also not remained immune to change. It is part of the Brazilian literary tradition that a great deal of attention is given to the themes of poverty, hunger, social inequalities and, lately, urban
violence. It is also part of our cultural tradition that intellectuals – in this case, writers – lean towards political engagement and social commitment. In Brazilian literature, the writer has always been the only voice to speak on and in favour of the poor and the excluded (in this sense there is an excellent work by Roberto Schwartz called *The Poor in Brazilian Literature*).

In 1997, however, our literary world was surprised by the publication of a novel that, in a short time, became one of the top Brazilian best sellers of recent times. I’m referring to *City of God*, by Paulo Lins, currently translated into numerous languages.

Paulo Lins brought a completely unexpected variable to our literary circles: poor people have a voice and can even write. Even more, they can write books that turn out to be a huge success with the public and critics. However, let us begin at the beginning.

Paulo Lins, a resident of the City of God slum, graduated from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and began to write his first poems while working as a high school teacher.

At a certain moment, he started working as a research assistant, writing ethnographies about City of God’s community for Professor Alba Zaluar, who was doing research on urban violence. Since Paulo showed great difficulty in organizing his reports, Alba Zaluar suggested that instead he could make a literary narrative with the results of his findings. And so it was done. Eventually, Alba showed Paulo Lins’s texts to Professor Roberto Schwarz who immediately detected the literary potential of Paulo’s reports. He then suggested that Paulo write a novel using this material, and introduced Paulo to a leading publishing house (*Cia das Letras*). Paulo was enthusiastic with Schwarz’s reaction but immediately realized the pioneering importance of the task ahead. He went into a panic. It was only through great effort and with the help of his main literary model, Dostojevsky’s *Crime and Punishment*, that he managed to finish the novel.

Starting of from his close relationship with periphery communities that included lowlifes, outlaws and drug dealers, for the first time in Brazilian literature, we had a detailed anatomy of the daily life of poverty and crime in our country, now with the added flavour of genuine personal testimony. For the first time, the slums were no longer treated as idealized places separated from the paved streets, but as
places that contain the open violence and the nonconformity found in slums.

As a result of the unquestionable success of *City of God*, new roads were opened for creative writing. Maybe even a new canon has been as being generated.

In 2000, a new book of equal importance came out, although with a different impact from that of *City of God*. The book is *Capão pecado*, by Ferréz (pen name of Reginaldo Ferreira de Silva). *Capão pecado* – (pecado means sin in Portuguese) – paints a sophisticated portrait of Capão Redondo, a São Paulo neighborhood with one of the highest rates of poverty, violence, drug dealing and criminality, and where Ferréz grew up and still lives today. Its more than 200,000 residents do not have access to sewage systems, hospitals, or any type of medical assistance. Capão has the bloody rate of 86.39 murders for each 100,000 inhabitants, much above the national average, which is already stratospheric by international standards.

This book shows a higher level of integration with the hip-hop universe than its predecessor, *City of God*. Ferréz employed rap lyrics as a reference, with their mix of ghetto chronicle and summons of the brothers to action. A starting point quite different from the literary canon which had informed the making of *City of God*. In the book, we have the participation of Mano Brown (a rap celebrity, also a resident of Capão Redondo), who provides the epigraphs of each chapter of the book. The two of them, together, from then on became outstanding community leaders.

The second book by Ferréz, *Manual Prático do Ódio* (s. Practical Handbook of Hate) more aggressive than the first one, describes the dilemma of a generation marked by the sequels left by the lack of attention from the State as well as by the intensity of media impact in the poor communities.

The thing that surprises us most when reading Ferréz’ books is a very unique displacement of the locus of violence. Instead of being the theme of the narrative, violence is now simply the daily reality of the characters themselves, who are no longer perceived as criminals but as commonplace people like any of us, with their individual emotions, their respect for family, feelings of love and jealousy, and dreams of a better future. This comes as a shock to readers who do not live in the scenery of crime, and provides an uncommon form of identification.
or, at least, an understanding of the aggressor’s character, non-existent in our literature until then.

After his success, Ferréz was granted a scholarship to study literature at an American university. He decided not to go. His refusal included the offer of a North American producer who attempted to buy the rights of *Capão pecado* for the cinema. Ferréz explained in a newspaper interview: “I write to be read by my community. My place is here. My war is here.”

Committed to this war, Ferréz has created, in partnership with Mano Brown, the movement 1 DASUL, a cultural enterprise that, among other activities, has its own CD production company and a fashion brand called Irmandade (Fraternity).

Today, his fashion brand occupies a 65 square foot warehouse and has two other manufacturers, producing an average of 300 pieces a day. The griffe Irmandade, characterized by illustrations denouncing the system, has a store in downtown São Paulo and its production is distributed to seven Brazilian states, in addition to holding the distribution rights for fashion brands belonging to six other rap groups. The griffe Irmandade also prints monthly booklets for an anti-drug program and plans to open up a clinic for treatment of drug addicts. Ferréz has also organized two special numbers of the magazine *Caros Amigos* called “Marginal Literature”, that gathers and publishes periphery writers, providing space for local talents.

In his own words him, Ferréz is engaged in the project of “breaking down the door” of literary history for those who come from the margins of society. He explains: Marginal literature is the one produced by those sections of society whose writings find no place within the canon. However, he warns: When we obtain something through art, it does not mean that we will calm down. What we have to do is to organize our hatred, directing it towards those who harm us. All the things that the system has denied us we must take. This statement uttered by Ferréz brings up the main subtext of new cultural projects being produced in the margins. For the first time in history, out loud and clearly, the poor state their desire and their right to consume the very same material and symbolic goods historically enjoyed only by the middle and upper classes. They want the latest model of Nike sneakers, as well as access to specialized information and high culture. This leads us to conclude that the greatest revolutionary novelty oc-
Another segment that has surprised most people is represented by the art collectives (roughly defined as gatherings of visual artists who meet around a specific cause or project and who use art forms other than those of graffiti, the official visual expression of hip-hop culture).

The collectives began to appear at the end of the 1990s and perform interventions in the urban space.

Quickly, such interventions, also in the spirit of “the urgent thing is to act”, began to take a political stance of social denunciation, now in the streets and public plazas. Simultaneously, such works discuss the very structure of production within the framework of art circuits and art markets. In the self-definition of collectives, one notices a symptomatic proximity to Antonio Negri’s notions of “crowd”, “work-affection” and “life-art”.

These collectives, which are spreading in exponentially throughout Brazil, bring something new with them. Collectives are not coops, they are also not groups, they do not have a fixed number of participants, nor could they be characterized simply as artistic movements.

Very much on the contrary, the organization of collectives is rhizomatic and nomadic, which marks their difference within the art segment. Collectives are formed merely to meet the challenges of one or more projects. They are created for a specific end, and soon afterwards are recomposed with new participants, in another project. This means that the composition of a group is not fixed, but mobile. An artist can take part in a group due to a given project, and in the next project he may join another group for the accomplishment of another project.

Communication among collectives happens quite intensely through blogs and discussion lists on the Internet. Some sites gather information in a more nodal way, better exemplifying the network logic that rules this production. There is, for instance, the site <www.redecoro.zip.net> (a blog with information about sites) and the network of art theoreticians on the site www.artesquema.com. Collectives are financially independent and informal units, self-managed, decentralized and flexible. For each project, the collectives search for sponsorship, offer courses, sell products or perform services such as illustration, design, video etc. In this lies their uniqueness.
According to participants in some of these collectives, they were the result of necessity, not desire. Their banner is: “That which is urgent is real.”

A good example is the action “Occupation within Occupation”. For three weeks in December 2003, 120 artists performed an intervention at the Prestes Maia Building, located in downtown São Paulo, which had been occupied by 470 families from the Downtown Homeless Movement (MSTC). In that action, the artists performed works in cooperation with the homeless, promoting interaction between artists and MSTC members, thus giving the intervention a sense of redress or amendment.

This form of art is known as “artvisms”, a hybrid of art and activism. Or, as they themselves ironically call it, “arrivismo”, which, according to the Portuguese dictionary means “the behaviour of those who aim to improve their social status at any cost”.

The priority given to political actions reminds us of the aesthetics of rap, graffiti and marginal literature, previously addressed herein, whose form of political engagement is to stress immediate action and the aggressive release of information.

We should also call attention to the fact that the production of a group does not value individual artistic production. The author of the artwork is always the collective entity, not the artist x, y, or z. A brief manifesto has been signed by Túlio Tavares, participant of the group A Nova Pasta (The New Folder), which included one single artist.

The creation of this group with only one participant is not simply an act of nonsense. The implicit idea in the creation of this group is the denial of that which the artist calls “umbiguismo” (Umbigo in Portuguese means navel) meaning self-centeredness, or better saying, is related to a criticism of the ideas of individualism and the need for authorship and authenticity that structures the modern art market.

At this point, we have touched a sensitive point concerning the effect of the collectives. The broadest questioning of the notions of authorship and intellectual property.

At a time when free software and digital inclusion are being discussed in industrial and social forums under the motto “good knowledge is shared knowledge”, a similar claim appears in avant-garde art: the copyleft movement. This movement deals with what is called “creative plagiarism”, “cut up aesthetics” or “sampling”.

Led by artists and writers, the copyleft want to allow the reproduction of works, as long as they remain “open”. Debates promoted by the copyleft movement have generated some advancement as well as the regulation of creative collectives – a flexible legislation for literary and artistic works. There are licenses such as “some rights reserved”, “recombination”, “public domain”, and many others. Copyleft and creative collectives are juridical innovations meant to not only overcome piracy but also to emphasize a sense of a cultural “factory” in order to create and promote social and artistic cooperation.

There is also the strategic use of media, which proposes new means of using television, radio, video, web sites, publications and other types of electronic media in order to give voice to minorities, alternative communities, political dissidents and street artists.

Well, the results that will be achieved by all these claims and questionings, in terms of a change in the structure of social forces in Brazil, are not easy to foresee. However, this production has already had an important side effect.

Historically seen as a “Divided City”, Rio de Janeiro, the city from where I observe this phenomenon, has begun to open channels between territories that were formerly impenetrable.

The Brazilian middle class is starting to demonstrate an unexpected interest in hip-hop aesthetics and attitudes. In the wake of such interest, a new form of political participation for artists and intellectuals is emerging, related to urban periphery communities and centred in the logic of solidarity action – also called ‘brodagem’ in hip-hop dialect (which means, acting as a brother).

Characterizing the emergence of a new form of intellectual engagement, artists abandon the rhetoric of protest and the role of spokespersons for the excluded, beginning to interact directly with the communities, bringing informal professional education to places where formal knowledge does not penetrate. Consequently, an important network to exchange cultural skills and values is emerging. The political motto of this moment is, “To act is the important thing to do”.

Some examples of brodagem are well known. Waly Salomão and Caetano Veloso, after a terrible slaughter in the slum of Vigário Geral, climbed the hill and helped to create the Afro Reggae Cultural Centre. The Centre offers art, music, poetry, and philosophy workshops.
Rosane Swartman and Vinicius Reis, film directors, created a centre of cinema studies in the Nós do Morro, at the Vidigal slum Gringo Cardia, a well-known artist and set-designer, has been heading the Show Factory School since June 2000, a school that intends to capacitate low-income teenagers who wish to become actors, ballet dancers, fashion designers, carpenters, sound operators and set designers.

Rosana Palazyan, a visual artist, works with the inmates of João Luiz Alves, a house of correction for youngsters that trains teenagers arrested for armed assault, homicide and drug dealing. The results of her work are exhibited in important galleries and museums.

Tetê Leal, a sociologist, created Copa Rocca in the Rocinha slum to train dressmakers, fashion designers and entrepreneurs. Today Copa Rocca employs over 100 people, sells its products to leading local fashion brands, takes part in international fashion shows, exports to Selfridge’s and Galerie Lafayette, and works in cooperation with well-known artists such as Antônio Dias, Ernesto Neto and Carlos Vergara.

I would like to stress the point that these actions are not in any way charity-oriented endeavours. They are business oriented, and indicate cultural exchanges and joint authorships that result in products displaying a plural composition of skills, styles and aesthetics.

On the other hand, and equally important, is the fact that cultural and social exclusion as an issue, and hip-hop as a style have strongly permeated the city’s artistic production and cultural events.

As an issue, it is easy to observe the redirecting of the current national film production and the prestige of films such as News of a Private War (Notícias De Uma Guerra Particular), by João Moreira Salles, City of God (Cidade de Deus), by Fernando Meirelles, Carrandiru, by Hector Babenko, The Bus 174 by José Padilha, The Rap of the Little Prince Against the Greasy Souls (O Rap do Pequeno Príncipe Contra as Almas Sebosas) by Paulo Caldas e Marcelo Luna or Yellow Mango by Claudio Assis.

As a style, a recent example is the huge success of Fashion Week 2004 in Rio de Janeiro, at the Museum of Modern Art, where the usual ethereal and Caucasian look of the top models was replaced by the black beauty of carioca gangs that entered the catwalk to applause, wearing designer clothes of prestigious fashion brands such as Andréia Saleto and Blue Man.
This type of exchange, so hard to measure critically, is not exempt from the possibility of reinstating the old appropriation trick, where mainstream culture appropriates new marginal cultural forms. However, and being optimistic, it is difficult that in a rigidly structured class society such as the Brazilian one, the ongoing cultural inoculation between classes, ethnicities and antagonistic interests does not generate political benefits in the medium and long term.

Intellectual activity itself is now seeking (and maybe finding) its place in this new cultural landscape.

Maybe our old reactive trenches are being transformed into active movements in favour of an ethic- and solidarity-oriented globalization.

Maybe those trenches and their policies of ambiguous tolerance are already being replaced by new forms of action and articulation among the academy, artists, NGOs, unions and associations, thus dissolving old corporate equations into new, and even urgent, ways of making politics.

**Bibliography**


The appearance of the first *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro’s urban landscape at the end of the 19th century was accompanied by reports in the pages of the national capital’s newspapers. Three years after the Ministry of War dispatched soldiers returning from the Canudos War to be posted at the top of the hill in the center of the city – shortly dubbed the “Morro da Favela” (Favela hill) – the first public outcries began appearing in the press. In November 1900, the *Jornal do Brasil* newspaper published warnings by public authorities that the precarious and unsanitary shacks located on the hillsides could become a haven for criminals (Alvito/Zaluar 1998). Motivated by fear, an array of initiatives sought to alter the dangerous conditions endured by migrants, ex-slaves and other poor people unable to follow the rules of appropriate behavior established by public health officials and other agents of the civilizing marvels of the turn of the century (Valladares 2006). From then on, poverty, origin, color and the social class of favela residents would be inevitably associated to a way of living in, occupying and interpreting the city.

In the 20th century, ambitious plans for urbanization and remodeling were used by public health institutions as a justification for the destruction of boarding houses, shacks, and small settlements in semi-rural areas that failed to meet the criteria for introducing modernity into the tropics. Together with public health officials, legislators and city administrators focused on standardizing the new construction codes in the name of hygiene and the eradication of epidemics that scourged tropical cities. Urban plans and moral panic, followed by violent incursions, intensified in the communities that resisted these new measures. By mid-century, the favelas were no longer limited to a few “concentrations of unhealthy settlements” and had transformed the profile of the city, proliferating in form, size, population density, styles, and physiognomy. The favela became the symbol of a disor-

However, the expansion, penetration, and rooting of favelas in the disorganized fabric of the city from the late 19th and early 20th centuries were not exclusively the result of the resistance of its residents. Favela residents were regularly forced to negotiate the terms by which their presence would be tolerated, so as to avoid invasion and removal. Daily violence and other forms of “social suffering” (Das 1997) did not exclude forms of communication between the favela and the ‘others’ – dialogues and deals involving questionable authorities, corrupt public employees, sympathetic politicians, police ‘from the area’, and other personalities who from the early 20th century began to populate the chronicle of the city, which grew despite differences naturalized and turned ‘cultural’. From the beginning of the century, these arrangements steered the growth of the city. The political ploys that mediated forms of communication between the favela and its intermediaries would transform its codes of visibility (Perlman 1976; Pandolfi 2002; Silva 2002; 2004; Alvito 2004).

The favela of the poor but decent worker featured in the sambas that chronicled Rio de Janeiro’s social life in the 1940’s, for example, combined with older images of moral panic that by the 20th century, were used to represent favelas in various genres of Brazilian music. The favela became a visible index of estrangement, an image of the city and its codes of conduct. As such, it transcended its reference points and occupied other territories, influencing other discourses. Favelas were already present in radio and print journalism, and by the end of the 1950’s began to appear in film. It is at this moment that Brazilian film director Nelson Pereira dos Santos translated post-war Italian realism, reinterpreting its scenes, figures and text based on the popular imagination of the favela: the lyricism of the malandro and his musicality.¹

Following the movies Rio Zona Norte (The Northern Zone of Rio) and Rio 40 Graus (Rio 40 Degrees), the favela became the backdrop of a more radical representation of the differences that socially struc-

¹ See, for instance, Nelson Pereira dos Santos’ Rio Zona Norte (1957) and Rio 40º (1955), and the 1960 Academy Award Winner and winner of the Palme d’Or at the 1959 Cannes Film Festival, Marcel Camus’ Black Orpheu.
ture and culturally express Brazilian society. As in Casa Grande e Senzala (The Masters and the Slaves) – the model which Gilberto Freyre conceived in the 1930’s to portray Brazil through a kind of structuralizing dualism – the favela was transformed into a symbolic reference of dualities and antagonisms, as well as of passages and dialogues between different concepts of Nation (Freyre [1933] 1997). The favela becomes the Nation of the “other”, averse to order, transformed into an emblem, the utopia of new generations.

If on one hand the nascent Cinema Novo and, later, the tropicalist parangoles of Hélio Oiticica during the 1960s were to transform disorder, misfortune, fear, and barbarity into an inventory of cultural diversity in Brazil under the military regime, on the other, the favelas would be irreversibly transformed through daily urban violence into city-states, festering territories, and virtual democratized territories. In the beginning of the 21st century, in the movie based on Paulo Lins’ book City of God (1997), film directors Fernando Meirelles and Katia Lund present a romanticized portrait of a middle class seduced by the magical possibilities of an encounter that transgresses social and geographical limits of the “legal city” and the favelas (Fischer 2007). Impossible love, community-based heroes and native Robin-Hoods hyper-realistically invaded the screen. The urban utopia that describes the city as a metaphor of the country is thus revealed (Cunha/Gomes 1996; 2002; Bentes 2002; 2003; Freire Medeiros/Santanna 2006).2

The representations manufactured by the media, in literature, and those that populated the imagination of politicians, administrators, urban planners, policy makers, and social reformers, however, did not always reproduce the experiences lived by members of these communities and their neighbors. As with any form of representation, a large part of the mediated images of the favela reflect the unease of those who observed them. They composed a body of knowledge that saw the favela as averse to order, a place of absence of citizenship. These are stubborn and difficult images to overcome at the dawn of the 21st century. The simplified way in which I have tried to contextualize

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2 For a different vision of the association of favelas and violence in Fernando Meirelles’ and Katia Lund’s movie, City of God, see, for instance, the debate between two intellectuals, ex-resident of Cidade de Deus, rapper, and composer, MV Bill, and Paulo Lins, author of the book The City of God, on which the movie was based. See <http://www.vivafavela.com.br> (26.04.2006).
historically the daily array of speeches, or, better put, “discursive interventions” of the favela and its settlers, which are permeated with all kinds of symbolic violence, has a justification. It is to situate the discursive field which shapes both public policies and the subjectivity of the residents of the favela who populate the imaginary of Cariocas [Rio de Janeiro residents in general] – through which other forms of representation are insinuated.

My purpose in this text is not to conduct an analyses of different forms of virtual organization of social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). My desire is only to note the emergence of new and renewed discourses on favelas and their residents in a new territory – the Internet. To do so, I focus on one of many concepts and objects given priority by NGOs and social movements that represent or collaborate in partnership with favela communities: the uses and meanings of the notion of history as a focus and strategy for political legitimation. They are discursive and visual structures that are built in the programs of non-governmental organizations, the government and social movements. Even though the Internet is not an unoccupied, rocky or flooded terrain without an owner, or under legal litigation, it is here that the favela is virtualized and given sensitivity. This chapter will explore different forms of occupation of virtual territories by tracing the questions and practices that situate the production of new, and the reinterpretation of old local histories.

1. Who speaks about the Favelas?

The use of mediating resources such as the Internet by social movements in different arenas of political debate became more visible in the 1990’s. In order to reflect upon and analyze the construction, forms of circulation, and uses of categories that spatially and temporally situate the contexts in which images and texts are aimed at a variety of readers and surfers, various studies have noted the use of cyberspace as a field for diverse forms of social activism. Arturo Escobar and other authors have mapped the epistemological implications for anthropological research, as well as the political dilemmas that involve activism in virtual spaces (Escobar 1994; Ribeiro 1998; Wilson/Peterson 2002; Aranha 1996; Kolk et al. 2000). The virtual dimension of these new fields and spaces have required social move-
In favelas and “favela communities” – as some prefer to call them – such as the Complexo da Maré (a group of communities), Rocinha, Cantagalo, Borel, Prazeres, Complexo do Alemão, Cidade de Deus, and Serrinha, local groups arose that began to work with churches and schools in meetings organized by older community members, as in the case of Centers for Memory, Historical Centers and local “networks” (Pandolfi 2004). In addition to these initiatives and, at times in conjunction with them, the construction of websites as spaces for dissemination and networking stimulated new forms of creation, language, and mobilization (Briggs/McBride 2002). In this context, interpretations of the history of conflict involving the State, social movements, NGO’s and private institutions that act in favela communities involve a series of images and ideas that concern the meaning of favelas and principally how they should be represented (Leite 2004; Novaes 2004; Pandolfi 2004). The question of representation – but mainly, the legitimacy of the ‘voice’ and ‘image’ which comes from favelas – have a central importance in the texts that circulate in these sites.

It is not by chance that the website of an NGO born out of social movements in the form of a network – networking with groups and institutions in and outside of the favela – the Observatório das Favelas (OF) – refers directly to representation as a field of activism and political transformation. Defining its objectives, OF identifies communication as political practice, in that

it produces and gives visibility to new representations of favelas, breaking away from the paternalistic and criminalizing language traditionally used in this context. For this purpose, OF supports the creation of a communication network that involves the media, especially community-based media; produces books, films and images that promote a new per-

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3 Among others, are projects directed to the production of local memory and history in communities such as Rocinha (“Varal de Lembranças”), Mangueira (“Museu do Samba”), Complexo da Maré (“Maré de Histórias”), and Borel/Casa Branca (“Condutores de Memória”).

4 The presence of computers network in ‘community centers’ inside favelas is a reality since 1994 when an NGO called Centro de Democratização da Informação (CDI) – Committee for the Democratization of Information – opened its first branch in in the Santa Marta favela <http://www.cdi.org.br> (26.04.2006).
spective of favelas, and organizes and disseminates publications produced by young students in the favelas.\(^5\)

For this purpose the OF disseminates and commercializes images on its website. With these “images of the people”, in which the favelas and their residents are represented, the website seeks to produce a vision from the point of view of the community, those who live the daily experience of belonging to the favela. In addition to the OF, two other non-governmental organizations have sought to create a political and social practice of intervention in representation, the websites Viva Favela (VF) and Favela News Agency (ANF). ANF, created in 2000, disseminates images called the “eyes of the favela” and defines itself as:

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\ldots\text{an agency that simultaneously links the favelas, and serves as a bridge to the pavement [as neighborhoods with urban infrastructure and services are known]. It is a humble site which is created and maintained by the volunteer labor of our small team – just like a community work project. We gather our content through casual meetings and contacts, and put together Favela News Agency little by little, just as the favelado builds and improves upon his house. In modest terms, this reflects a great ambition: to offer true information on the sensitive territory of the favelas. To give voice to community members on the Internet, including youth and community leaders, always so absent from the media. Everyone is invited to participate, make their voice heard, their diversities, projects, and struggles. The Favela News Agency is a virtual structure that is never completely finished, always interactive, and ready to grow and deepen its roots in the real city.}^6
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Viva Favela, created in 2000 by journalists and community leaders under the sponsorship of the non-governmental organization Viva Rio, is one of the best known initiatives and inspires an intense reflection on ways of “talking about”, “representing” and “giving voice” to those in the favela. It represents a kind of network created among journalists, social scientists, NGO’s activists, and favela residents (Valladares 1977; Grynszpan/Pandolfi 2003). As a member of this network, the group *Centra Unica das Favelas* (CUFA), for example, coordinates cultural, Hip-Hop and black movements through a network that considers the favela as an emblematic territory:

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Youth from the Hip-Hop movement, presidents of residents’ associations, community leaders, sambistas, artists and workers in general from diverse communities in Rio de Janeiro organized themselves around an idea: to transform the favelas, or better, the unrecognized talents and potential, due to social, racial prejudice. […] CUFA (Central Única de Favelas) emerged as a direct result of this idea, acting in different areas, embracing diverse communities that come together around a primary ‘body’ – that is CUFA itself, bringing together these communities for the joint development of a great diversity of projects in an attempt to value not only the communities, but each individual found within.7

Rather than exclusively disseminating local interventions, their website coordinates the field of cultural production of youth who produce and consume Hip Hop in the city. CUFA insists on its legitimacy for expressing the voice of marginalized groups without mediation. Explaining the choice of Hip Hop, its organizers have affirmed that:

[...] the periphery is a figure that should speak for itself, have its own voice, and participate in cultural, political and social dialogue one-on-one with other social groups. The periphery is a majority treated by a minority. To dominate the discourse is part of our project of situating things in their true place.8

2. Putting Favela in its Place

In some of the initiatives mentioned the construction of representation of favelas implies diverse forms of negotiation concerning what favelas were in the past. In other words, in the elaboration of narratives of their histories, they discuss different projects that aim at construct, “research”, “recuperate” and produce local history in order to transform the stigmatization of favela residents and their place of residence.

An idea common to the many different projects initiated in Rio de Janeiro in the past five years is that all favelas have a history in which residents are both subjects of their formation and participants in their


reproduction. The semantic uses and feelings that support these practices suggest that this is a complex terrain that involves forms of production and transformation of subjectivities. A significant number of initiatives for the production and recuperation of the memory and history of favelas began in 2000, based on networks of local organizations – community associations, community centers, and schools – and external partners, local mediators, municipal, state and federal government institutions, international agencies, and academic “volunteers” (primarily anthropologists, and to a lesser extent, historians). This foundation, reflected in the diversity of partners, raises a series of questions: under what circumstances did history become a focus of relevant and transformative actions that would be able to bring together such a diverse group of partners and participants? It is difficult to specify an exact chronology that would allow us to trace the formation of a network, and more or less systematic forms of connection, given the diversification and multiplication of partnerships over the past years. However, it is worth trying to understand how “producing histories” and examining forms of representation are linked as an inflection in the same discourse and political practice carried out on the Internet. Histories retold and recorded – from different kind of sources – can be interpreted as unstable instruments in the production of urban and local subjectivities.

The sophistication of the resources used in the production of favela histories cannot prevent a questioning of whether these instruments – favela websites – are ‘representative’ of the voices of their residents. There are many disagreements and criticisms about the authenticity of these representations and the legitimacy of their producers in “speaking” in name of the residents of favela communities. Several should be noted here. Created within the website Viva Favela, the homepage Favela Tem Memória [Favela has a Memory] is an attempt to create a virtual and real community of producers of histories of favelas (Ramalho 2004; ISER 2004). Combining the work of university students who live in the communities, they use techniques of journalism, photo-journalism, history, oral history and ethnography to

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9 See, for instance a project called “Condutores de Memória” which aimed at reconstruct the local histories of favelas’ communities of Tijuca (Condutores de Memória 2006).
document the memory of community members. Despite the fact that
the site is an initiative actually created outside of the favela, its con-
tent represents ‘homemade’ historiographical and journalistic materi-
als about favelas. The website is divided into various sections; the
“Gramaphone”, the “Favelario”, “Speaking in Favela”, “Cloud Soup”,
“Photo Gallery”, and “Time Line”. It seeks to make history “from a
narrative perspective”, while using stylistic and technical support that
intervenes not only in the text but also in the training of those who act
as collectors and producers, the “community correspondents”.

The project has been recognized as a unique experience that
sought, above all, to overcome symbolic, special and political barriers
that implicitly or explicitly differentiated the various actors involved
in the project – individuals and institutions “from the pavement” and
the favelas. This project began when participants launched a series
of experiments aimed at confronting images of stigmatization while
giving voice to favela residents. Cited as a singular experience that
sought, above all, to overcome symbolic and political barriers that
implicitly or explicitly differentiated the various actors involved in its
activities, the project was the initiative of producers who trained resi-
dents in the production of news, images, and local histories. One of
the roles of these ‘correspondents’ was seeking news in a medium
little known on the part of mass media and state institutions. For resi-
dents and those familiar with the social and symbolic space of the
favela communities, these ‘correspondents’ would be able to repro-
duce the voice of its residents on their own terms (Sant’Ana 2004). At
the same time, in taking the term ‘correspondents’ from the language
of journalism, the project was based on the idea that residents were
mediators authorized to enter as members rather than strangers in a
feared territory. Even while edited by a team of professionals and
specialists responsible for the training of ‘correspondents’, other local
histories of the favela were constructed from the perspective of its
residents.

The texts, interviews and data collected by the ‘correspondents’
were combined with other materials – information about favelas found
principally in the newspapers of the 1950s and 1960s. This kind of
source also has an enormous importance in other projects and provides
a visual memory of the historical construction of the marginalization
of residents of the favelas. An example includes the Centro de Estudos

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e Ações Solidárias da Maré (CEASM), in the Maré favela complex, in sponsoring the collection of local histories and production of newspapers. A relevant part of the archives of images is the result of a process of collection by university students resident in these communities, with supervision of professors in the social sciences. In the photos, perceptions on the part of the press and the elites, shocked at the growth and proximity of the favelas, lead to the gradual stigmatization of the favela as something that should be removed from the city. In contrast to this perspective, students were trained to photograph the contemporary day-to-day of the favelas.\textsuperscript{10} The photographs of houses built on sticks (\textit{palafitas}), materials used in construction, as well as the use of metal, the remains of \textit{tapume} (pieces of wood used in the construction of public buildings reutilized in the building of houses), and other left-overs from city construction sites are intermingled with personal stories about the daily experience of transformation of the physical space beyond its migrant origins (CEASM 2004). The resident of the favela radically and continuously transforms the physical space where they live. Still, ‘residence in the favela’ is a continuation of other forms of organization and policies of deterritorialization carried out through removal – a form of violence that is constantly present. Thus, if the history of struggle allows for the recognition over time of the legitimacy of living in the favela, even if under precarious conditions, the history of removal gives authority to versions recreated around local ownership, based on spatial references. Thus, in trying to implode the negative signals of these historically produced strategies of subjectivity, some of the actors and their projects, contradictorily, would be preserving and even giving force to their boundaries and features of difference based on a supposed common experience. In the current era of urban transformation of Rio, in which the favela and its members have become the focus and scene of publications, presentations, actions, symbolic forms of violence, and policies of all kinds, the recognition of their history makes explicit a series of questions that should be objects of reflection.

Beyond the unique character and the stylistic, aesthetic and above all rhetorical experimentation initiated by Viva Favela (VF) and the website Favela Has Memory (FTM), other forms of occupation have

\textsuperscript{10} See \texttt{<www.imagensdopovo.org.br>} (26.04.2006).
proliferated on the web. The websites Central Unica de Favelas – CUFA – and the Favela News Agency (ANF), for example, emphasize other forms of representation. Directly linked to community organizations and, in particular to black and cultural movements and other cultural expressions, such as the Hip-Hop movement – they establish ties with other networks, mediators and forms of participation in the public debate, including projects of sports (street basketball), music, and cinema.\footnote{See, for instance <http://www.cufa.org.br> and <http://www.cufaviaduto.org.br> (26.04.2006).}

But these differences are not only stylistic, nor are they limited to institutional arrangements. The ‘authority’ of their producers – residents of the favela – is highlighted to give legitimacy to the purposefully chaotic aspects of the site. Due to their specificities, these projects cannot be compared entirely on the same terms. I prefer to see them in their complementary dimension and in their possibility of suggesting a particular moment for the transformation of strategies for political mobilization in favela-based communities of Rio de Janeiro. By virtue of their importance in the realm of actions involving social movements, nongovernmental organizations, and the State, these communities have attained significant visibility, which implies a measurable expansion in the networks of interaction which exist under, between and in between the lines of the discourses that promote a polarized view of, literally, the favela versus the asphalt – that is, the paved areas of the city. These networks promote different ways of semanticizing the categories “favelado” and “favela resident”. By defending common memories, histories and pasts, these agents call for their rights to power and authority of the word, even if mediated, and at times “handled” by able writers. One of the objectives observed is specifically to produce dialogue, and the coming together through symbolic leveling of citizenship in which a certain notion of history – that of the citizen who is aware, engaged and active, is a part.

Among other initiatives, these projects capitalize on one of the possibilities created by NGOs and social movements – the idea that histories lived in favelas need to be told. However we need to differentiate the forms of collection, production, and reproduction of knowledge conceived of as history, and the way in which they circulate
within and outside of the community. The initiatives briefly described here reveal a tension, also present in the tales, testimonies, and conversations about forms of engagement of members with these projects and their various “communities”. Who speaks, for what, and for whom are these stories on the favelas and their members told? By invading the virtual sphere of the internet, favela communities and their mediators produce a kind of exhumation of ghosts present in the popular and violent imaginary of the city, or reinterpret and recycle its leftovers, fragments, and whatever else can still be reinterpreted. In this form, banners and pop-ups implode our capacity to read the images of the internet as if it were simply words, “the sensitive territory of the favelas” – an phrase coined by the creators of CUFA (Central Única das Favelas) – populated by different actors and multiple interventions, in transforming itself into a text that invades the web as a territory of expression.

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The Sensitive Territory of the Favelas


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1. Performance, Television and Film: the Case of *Bus 174*

On July 12 year 2000, in the Jardim Botânico upper middle class neighborhood in Rio de Janeiro city, Sandro do Nascimento, a young black man, was the protagonist of what would become a spectacular event of violence. Surrounded by police, what apparently started as a “small act of robbery” inside a regular urban bus became a threatening scenario, a dangerous stage, where aside from the hijacker and his victims, a series of Rio de Janeiro policemen and state government officials performed to the media. During four hours, from afternoon to early evening, television crews present at the scene transmitted the progress of the case live to the whole country. At the end of this bad thriller two people – the hijacker and two month pregnant 23 years old teacher Geisa – died. They were shot live on national television.2

In the context of a wider project about the politics of representation and different forms of “appropriation” of television and film apparatus in contemporary Brazil,3 this paper focuses on film *Ônibus 174* (*Bus number 174*), a documentary made a couple of years later which reviews and contextualizes the brutal events of that day. The film by director José Padilha places TV reportage in perspective. An assemblage of television footage, expo facto reports by privileged participants, such as hostages, the “SWAT” officer who was in charge of the operation, former friends and family of the protagonist, social

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1 Preliminary versions of this work were presented in the Annual meeting of Socine, Brazilian Cinema Studies Association (Salvador, Brazil, November 2003) and in the São Paulo International Conference of Documentaries (March 2004), and published as “Políticas da representação: ficção e documentário em Ônibus 174” In: Mourao/Labaki (2005: 196-215).
2 Detailed description of Rio de Janeiro’s newspapers coverage of the event in Silva, Cristina Dias da (2004).
3 “Inclusion and Exclusion: the Politics of Representation in a São Paulo favela” is funded by CNPq, the Brazilian National Research Council.
workers who knew him, as well as drug dealers, policemen and specialists who did not have any direct connection with this specific case, the film constitutes privileged material for research about the relations between the media, public visibility, violence and performance in contemporary Brazil.

The term “appropriation” here designates different ways through which subjects represented in the media as this “other” – who is associated with violence, poverty and race – control the ways their image appears on the screen. The hypothesis of the project is that different ways and degrees of “appropriation” assume specific aesthetic forms, and express different relations which filmmakers establish with their subjects. Within this broader framework, *Bus number 174* presents a “perverse” form of “appropriation”. During a whole afternoon and early evening, the performance of Sandro, the protagonist here, galvanized television and the other media. As he became aware of the fact that he was at the center of the scene, his performance privileged this unique chance to speak up, in detriment of his own chances of survival. In this sense, his action can be analyzed as one – perverse – form of appropriation, first of live television, later of documentary film. Before turning to the film itself, I will start with a brief fieldwork-inspired discussion of the conceptual framework of the project in construction, followed by a brief description of the ways in which *favelas* appear in the history of the Brazilian scene which will be useful for understanding current shifts. Discussion of the case of *Bus 174* is then followed by sketches of other forms of “appropriation” of the means of representation which are present in other films. Unsolved questions about how to represent violence without reinforcing prejudice and discrimination conclude the paper.

2. Politics of Representation in Contemporary Brazil: a Broader Research Project

Urban violence, poverty and race have appeared as intrinsically connected themes in the recent boom of Brazilian film. These themes gained a sort of “hyper visibility” in the media4 that contrasts with

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4 Recent Brazilian film has been subject to different interpretations, some of them with emphasis on the shift of meaning in the representation of “favelas”. See for
their relative invisibility during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Film and television treatment of violence, poverty and race has provoked intense debate involving directors, musicians, critics and social movements. Questions in this debate revolve around the accuracy of filmic representation, the eventual excess of violence that would reinforce stereotyped images of the poor, mistaken images of violence as the only possible account of daily life in poor neighborhoods and non-legitimate appropriation of local images.

This paper participates in this debate as part of a wider project which focuses on film and television representations of violence and poverty as an intrinsic dimension of the Brazilian contemporary social problem. The hypothesis here is that certain films and television programs express different forms of contemporary “appropriation” of the mechanisms of producing audiovisual representation of urban poverty and violence. The idea here is to relate different forms of representation to the different ways in which the people who represent and/or are represented in each specific work perform. The ways in which people perform in the process of filming – including rehearsal, rewritings of the script, sound track, mise-en-scéne, etc. express different games of appropriation of the mechanisms of constructing representation.

This research is supported by continuing ethnographic experience in a favela in São Paulo since the end of the 1990s and is the result of my professional trajectory – departing from urban anthropology to the study and critique of audiovisual representations. My field experience in the late 1990s suggested that inhabitants of the favela were connected to the world through television and radio reception. They were also aware of their relative invisibility in the media. Moreover they attempted to appropriate the means of producing their own representations of themselves and the world. In the early 2000s, amidst a broader process of change, still largely unknown, this situation of relative invisibility shifted (Hamburger 2003: 104-115). Different forms of

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5 The project I refer to here is called: “The impact of television on reproductive behaviour in Brazil”, carried out by a consortium of research institutes which included researchers from CEBRAP/São Paulo, University of Texas, CIDEPLAR-UFMG, NEPO-UNICAMP, ECA-USP, was financed by Rockfeller, Mellon, Hewlett Packard, and MacArthur Foundations.
emergent representation include viewing local television sensational newscasts, performing in popular “shows de auditório”, taking part in NGO experiences of local video production, community radio projects, local home video production, as well as starting an acting and/or singing show business career. Successful hip-hop groups have done sound tracks of recent films such as “City of God” or “O Invasor”.

Early fieldwork information suggested that the main notions that feed this ongoing project, and will be tested in the interpretation of different films and programs, such as “the politics of representation” and the “appropriation of the mechanisms of producing representation”. In short, the project discusses the idea that the dispute for the control of what is broadcast, how and in what media is strategic in the contemporary metropolis. Moreover the idea is to call attention to the fact that black and poor favela inhabitants take part in this dispute through different attempts to interact with the media. Dispute over the control of what is represented, how and where, defines the relationship that people from different social classes and professional segments maintain with various audiovisual formats, such as TV programs (the news, reality programs, soap operas), documentaries and/or fictional films.

Roughly, the idea is that in different ways, which are still under investigation, people try to appropriate the mechanisms of producing representation. And different aesthetic arrangements capture and express different forms of this appropriation. By becoming a candidate to take part in “reality shows” such as “Big Brother”, by writing a book about the poor neighborhood where you live (which eventually might become a movie), by writing and interpreting rap songs (which can become TV or film soundtracks), or by participating in audiovisual workshops in poor neighborhoods or in prisons, people aim to be included in the universe of the visible – an universe which sometimes is framed as the universe of the “spectacle”.

In the theoretical horizon of the project figures the problematization of the notion of “spectacle” in itself. From the perspective of film and television makers, the question is how to represent violence without reinforcing stereotypes and prejudices. Producing representation of poverty and violence nowadays means dealing with images that play a strategic role in the interplay of social relations and representations.
If the hypothesis of different ongoing forms of appropriation of the mechanisms of producing representation is correct, the idea that contemporary social relations should be understood in terms of the “society of the spectacle” – roughly understood as this almost independent universe, which would fascinate and alienate people – would be questioned by the idea that even though unequal and distorted, interaction rather than separation would mark relations between viewers and films and/or television programs. Different kinds of continuity – some more perverse than others – would mark relations between viewers, people represented and professionals who work on the construction of representation. Different forms of “appropriation” of the mechanisms of producing representation range from aesthetically oriented political actions that aim at television exposure, such as 9/11 (Hamburger 2003: 49-60), to films that construct their verisimilitude based on the body movement and oral language of endogenous casts, scripts that are based in insider reports, local sound tracks, etc.

3. Favelas, Poverty and Violence in the Brazilian Audiovisual Scene

Favelas have been present in Brazilian films since early years. In the 1950s and 1960s, poor neighborhoods were connected with blacks, carnival, samba, afro-religion cults. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s poor urban landscapes were absent from the impoverished cinema scene, as well as from affluent television screen. The above-mentioned films disrupt this relative invisibility.

Modern Brazilian film emerged in connection with favelas. With Rio 40 graus (1954) and Rio Zona Norte (1957) both directed by Nelson Pereira dos Santos, Brazilian film acquired the streets of the city, leaving classic scripts and studio settings behind.6 Two productions, by foreign directors with local connections, inspired by these breakthrough films, deal with favelas – samba and carnival. Orfeu do Carnaval (1959) by French director Marcel Camus, based on the play by

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6 In 1935 Humberto Mauro directed Favela de meus amores, a film that unfortunately did not survive. About Brazilian modern film see Calil, Carlos Augusto (2002). About favelas in the history of Brazilian cinema see Bentes, Ivana (2003). About Nelson Pereira and the relationship between his films and Italian Neo-realismo, see Fabris, Mariarosaria (1994).
Vinicius de Moraes won the Palm d’Or in Cannes. Years later, *Fábulas* (1965), by Swiss Arne Sucksdorff with the help of some of his students at the film course provided by Itamaraty, the Foreign Affairs Department, was also shown in Cannes. Between these two “foreign” films, *Cinco Vezes Favela* (1962) by Marcos Faria, Miguel Borges, Carlos Diegues, Joaquim Pedro de Andrade and Leon Hirszman, expresses five “cinema novo” images of Rio de Janeiro *favelas*. The five short fiction films bring documentary images of the city with special attention to blacks, black kids, *favelas*, carnival and music. All these films contemplate some kind of violence. “Favela boys” who face several acts of daily violence while selling peanuts around tourist places in *Rio 40 graus*. “Favela boys” who make money by stealing cats in bourgeois houses, or simply catching street cats, and selling the animals to *tamborim* makers who use their skin in *Couro de Gato*. A youth gang which robs and kills fellow friends in the neighborhood in *Rio Zona Norte*. Local bandits who kill Eurídice in *Orfeu do carnival*. Violence was there to signalize that black *favelas* were not idyllic places of music, dance and sensuality. Violence was there as if to allegorically suggest that class conflict and discrimination intrinsically embodied and signified violence.

Although violence and poverty were represented in many fiction films of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Hector Babenco’s *Lúcio Flávio, passageiro da agonia* and *Pixote*, the focus was on prison, police, and correction institutions, rather than on daily life in *favelas*. In those years and until the late 1990s, popular neighborhoods have been condemned to a certain “invisibility”. Weakness of documentary reinforces this sense of invisibility. Even though during these years many documentaries were shot in *favelas*, this local blooming got little broadcast, because in Brazil, television – the main producer and exhibitor of documentaries worldwide – has completely ignored the genre.\(^7\)

Over the past 40 years, with rare exceptions, structural limitations to documentary production have enhanced the invisibility of popular segments living in large cities. Especially on television, this invisibility was, and still is, an expression of discrimination. At the same time,

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\(^7\) For a panorama of documentary in Brasil see Teixeira, Francisco Elinaldo (2004).
in recent years, as the illegal traffic of weapons and drugs has dominated poor neighborhoods, documenting *favelas* has become a “security” issue. Local leaders have attempted to control the production of images about their communities. In the 1990s, Cacá Diegues’ remake of *Orfeu* was shot on a specially built *favela*. Nowadays, in order to shoot in these locations one needs their permission.

During the 1970s and 1980s, when television consolidated itself as a popular and lucrative vehicle of an expanding industry with international connections, urban sceneries of poverty and violence were absent from the screen. Telenovelas (Brazilian daily soaps) are well-known for their glamorous characters and sceneries (Kehl 1986; Leal 1986; Sarques 1986). Even though they are shot on location, they rarely use *favela* locations. As regards TV news, during the military years, the tone was official, i.e. newscasts talked basically about government actions. Poor neighborhoods and their inhabitants were not considered newsworthy. Television news focused on ‘great events involving great personalities’. This rigid and formal agenda was coherently represented in an “objective” news style: fixed images, with a steady hand, edited in a clean, fast, and conventional way.

Black people rarely appeared on the television screen, in news or in fiction. The country that television portrayed was white, peaceful and affluent. The official image privileged rich scenarios, where consumption of goods abounded. Fictional plots involved cases of crime and drama, but the tonic was romance, in general a privileged path to social ascension. At the end of 1980s, television fiction started to question 1960s and 1970s “developmentist” optimism. In so doing, these popular electronic *feuilletons* anticipated public treatment of issues that would dominate the political agenda of the 1990s and early 2000s, such as political corruption.

In 1991, *Aqui, agora* (Here and now) an early evening television local news program, aired on SBT channel, disrupted previous conventions by introducing poor urban landscapes where ordinary people performed cases of domestic violence, as well as small scale conflicts – among neighbors or against companies which allegedly violated

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8 On the slight presence of blacks on Brazilian TV see Araújo, Joel Zito (2000), book and film.

9 For an analysis about the relationship between telenovelas and politics in Brazilian recent history see Hamburger, Esther (1999).
consumers rights. *Aqui, agora* legitimated popular urban landscapes as sceneries for news programs recorded on location and with reporters and cameramen on the move. Shaky images produced by professionals who were out of breath while climbing up the hills transmitted the sense of immediacy, and contributed to reinforcing the impression of “hot news”, transmitted live. *Aqui, agora* reporters went out of the studios “in search of the news where it actually happened”. In contrast with the official tone of conventional coverage, *Aqui, agora* transformed matters related to small conflicts and local crime into news. This short-lived program inspired similar newscasts in rival networks such as Record and Bandeirantes, but it also proposed aesthetic and thematic reformulation of television news with repercussions in Globo, and perhaps, in film. In the nineties, despite its good ratings, SBT took *Aqui, agora* off the air, due to the program’s low commercial value, given advertisers resistance to invest in what was considered a lowbrow program.

In the nineties representations of violence and urban poverty, specifically *favelas*, returned to film, but in a different register. American film director Spike Lee shot a Michael Jackson clip in a Rio de Janeiro *favela*. By the end of the 1990s and incorporating images from popular television newscasts, the documentary *News of a private war* started a new trend.

In the 1950s and 1960s, *favelas* appeared in films as inhabited by “malandros”, i.e. characters who aimed to take advantage of everything, who lived out of “smart” small illegalities, for whom life was to be lived with good humor. At the beginning of the nineties, *Aqui, agora* caused public opinion impact by bringing the ‘peripheries’ to televsual display. In the late 1990s, *favelas* reappeared as privileged landscapes for gang dispute, for drug dealers and, to quote the policeman in Salles’s film, who coined the expression that named the film, for this “private war”. *News of a private war*’s co-director, Brazil-

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11 For comparison between the ‘cinema novo’ of the early 1960s and the ‘revival cinema’ see Ramos, Fernão Pessoa (2003); Xavier, Ismail (1983), and Bentes, Ivana (2003).


13 Poverty and violence were not absent from cinema in the 1970s and 1980s.
ian-American Kátia Lund, also co-directed the celebrated and Oscar-nominated *City of God*. The links between the two films do not stop there. There had been attempts before, but *News of a private war* is the first film to follow the track opened by popular TV news, i.e. to enter and actually register the otherwise invisible true war that goes on in Rio de Janeiro *favelas*. The film registered the director’s surprise with this next door, then unknown, to hell. Only a couple of years later, *Bus 174* further developed the subject.

4. **Bus 174**

The structure of *Bus 174* is similar to the structure of the incisive documentary *Notícias de uma guerra particular* (*News of a private war*) by João Moreira Salles, which José Padilha edited.\(^{14}\) Both films articulate conflicting elements of a tragic situation in an attempt to express complexities which resist easy explanations. *Notícias* contrasts views by people who are with the police with reports by drug dealers (men who are with the *movimento*) and with reports by *favela* inhabitants who do not align with any side. *Ônibus 174* adds a forth perspective: the media.

*Notícias de uma guerra particular* (1999) offered the first reflexive glance at an universe that, at that time, was still only visible through the sensational lenses of popular TV news programs. The documentary, aired on cable television,\(^{15}\) resulted from the director’s initial project of filming a NGO project, a *favela* dancing company. As his crew did research among the young dancers, they came across daily violence on an unprecedented scale. Instead of a film about ballet, Salles’ film revealed to Brazilians who do not live in poor neighborhoods, and who have access to cable television and news papers, the barbarism already in place in Rio de Janeiro *favelas*. The film was possible thanks to an agreement between filmmaker and drug dealers, who not only allowed shooting, but also agreed to take part in

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14 *Notícias de uma guerra particular* was one of the first documentary films in the 1990s to deal with the universe of violence and drugs in Rio de Janeiro *favelas*.

15 Due to high costs and low availability, very few viewers have access to cable television, therefore only a few viewers saw this documentary. Nonetheless the film influenced other film makers to deal with the subject further.
the project. Later on this illegal interchange was questioned by legal authorities.

Only four years later, *Bus 174* came out amidst a “boom” of documentaries and fiction films that bring to light this world, submerged up to the early 1990s. The interplay between all these films expresses the intense ongoing dispute over the control of representation. Titles such as *Invasor, Cidade de Deus, Cidade dos Homens, Carandiru,* or *Prisioneiros da Grade de Ferro* can be interpreted as different specific cases of appropriation of the mechanisms of control over production of filmic representation about poverty and violence.

*News* and *Bus 174* present similar formal structure. Both films create a hyper-dramatic atmosphere by contrasting different points of view about life in contemporary Rio de Janeiro favelas. Drug dealers, policemen, ordinary people in the first, and the three plus the media, in the second, have their perspectives analytically confronted. Both films are punctuated by grave instrumental music – a narrative element that reinforces the tragic picture. By articulating different – sometimes opposing, even enemies’ perspectives – both films adopt a comprehensive perspective which goes beyond simple melodramatic keys such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Nonetheless, they both emphasize the difficult nature of a no-way-out situation. It is not a coincidence that both documentaries end in the cemetery. *News* with a parallel montage of enemy funerals: a policeman and a drug dealer – both killed in combat. The final sequence confirms the tragic superiority of death with a steady shot of a cemetery white wall which slowly fills up and turns black, with names and dates of thousands of victims of this “private war”. *Bus 174* finishes with the solitary funeral of Sandro, the boy who at five saw his mother’s murder, some years later survived the Candelária massacre in Rio, was kept in the ‘Padre Severino’ reformatory (the same reformatory, with very similar takes of naked and humiliated male bodies, appears in *News*). Captain Pimentel, the policeman whose statement suggests the title of *News,* is also interviewed in *Bus 174.* It is possible that some interviewees who concealed their identity, using similar masks – are also in both films.

Both films use the strategy of articulating successive fragments without the use of the classic outside voice-over of an “objective” narrator who makes sense of the images, which in their turn are care-
fully chosen as good illustrations. Careful editing alternates speeches that express different positions, sometimes even antagonistic positions. As a result a complex, panoramic but comprehensive view emerges: one which recognizes – and legitimates – existent opposing views concerning the same dramatic situation.

The four years separating the two films are the years of the so called “revival” of Brazilian film, both fictional and documentary. But they were also crucial for the passage from the invisibility, characteristic of the previous decades, to a series of diversified documentary experiences that gave visibility to the universe of the urban popular classes. Both films express representation principles adopted in this new phase of Brazilian cinema. Violence, present in the allegorical register of the films made in the ‘cinema novo’ era, emerges with force in the contemporary documentary production. Violence appears in documentary-like images, as an endemic force that polarizes disputes over the control of representation.

By taking television archive material as his prime material José Padilha’s film brings elements that stimulate us to think about audio-visual representation, television and film. Television footage of the occasion guide the film, in its chronological reconstruction of the event. Archive material was edited in a way as to foster our understanding of the situation. The idea here is that a film, done after the fact, with the benefits of distance, in time and space, both in production and reception, can contribute to putting the television event in perspective, to foster our understanding of the tragedy, to stimulate the formation of an enlightened public opinion, which should be able to escape Manichaean views of the drama, especially a possible dominant interpretation that would approve the police’s attitude of killing the aggressor.

Documentary film in this case should be able to contextualize the event, to give voice to participants, in ways that live coverage cannot

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16 In Cineastas e imagens do povo, Jean Claude Bernadet (2004) analyses Brazilian documentaries produced in the early sixties with a particular emphasis on the ways in which different films express particular relations between directors, who shoot, and the people represented in the screen. The book brings an insightful analysis of the use of the narrator in what he calls the sociological model. Contemporary films do not use voice-over narrative. Nonetheless, perhaps they keep other traces of the sociological model.
do. The analytical general view proposed in the film can be noticed right from the beginning, with the panoramic shallow flight over the city of Rio de Janeiro, pointing out the social differences registered in the urban geography, the beach and the hills (the *favelas*), until its arrival at the Botanical Gardens, approaching the scene of the crime.\textsuperscript{17} Throughout the film, sequences of television material, recorded live on the day of the hijacking, are intercut with archive material, such as the police/criminal record of Sandro, news published in the press about his mother’s death, the Candelária massacre, in addition to countless interviews with hostages of the bus, policemen, journalists, drug dealers, real relatives or relatives by affinity, professionals who took care of him as psychologists, social workers and a capoeira teacher.

Although not exactly in the same order, the film follows very closely the chronological script of the protagonist’s life, reconstituting his trajectory, not as the cruel man or violent criminal pictured on live television at the time, but as a victim of an unfair, violent and unjust society where he lived. The complex scenery composed of different and sometimes contradictory perspectives ends up, as much as in *News of a private war*, by creating a complex picture with no way out. The almost solitary burial of a boy illegally strangled inside a police car (the only moment, after hours of negotiation, when television cameras were absent) was accompanied by a lady, also solitary, who presented herself as the person who Sandro (already an adult) adopted as a mother, and to whom he promised to “be someone”. No blood family; appealing tragic soundtrack.

Instead of the audience of millions who in 2000 followed live coverage of the event, the film had a modest audience in Brazil. It succeeds in making the viewer – usually an upper middle class Brazilian – feel at least a little bit co-responsible – for omission, or for being complacent with stereotypes that associates blackness, poverty, ignorance, criminality and violence – a social context which, ultimately, would have murdered Sandro.

Beyond what perhaps could be thought of as an overdramatic structure, which duplicates, at the other extreme, the stereotype of the

\textsuperscript{17} See Bentes, Ivana (2004) for a comparison with other films which open with similar aerial shots of Rio de Janeiro.
algoz, which associates black carioca poor male kids with violence, by presenting a decent and legitimate picture of a poor black who at the age of five saw his mother being slaughter, a couple of years later survived a police massacre and who finally was killed by police abuse, the film offers excellent material to think about the relationship between citizens who belong to an almost invisible society and the mechanisms of producing representation such as photographic cameras and TVs.

_**Bus 174**_ discusses a “mediatic phenomena”. The presence of cameras transformed a robbery of small dimensions into a national event with international repercussion. And different reports on the event reveal unexpected critical perspectives, such as the one by a masked character. This drug-dealer, who protects his face for obvious reasons, does not approve of Sandro’s operation from the start, for organized crime condemns crime against bus passengers, simple people just like them. Furthermore, strategically, this masked bandit explains that the robbery was not properly planned as it would be very unlikely to escape from the place where the bus stopped. Moreover, as the drama became the center of attention in the media, the chances of escaping diminished radically. This professional belittles Sandro as an “amateur”. His opinion matches other interviewees’ opinions who knew Sandro very well either as a companion, a student, an inmate, or a hostage. They all unanimously describe him as a human being different from the monster that was pictured during the event.

The assembly of the _in loco_ recorded material in chronological order, mediated by contextualizing reports, allows us to reconsider the parallel development of the police and the kidnapper conduct. The film reveals that the presence of the media introduces a variable that paralyzed the police, leaving technical routine procedures to the wills of political leaders. Later on, after the arrest, it is only in the absence of cameras that the shameful act of revenge takes place.

The presence of the media also changes Sandro’s performance and in this specific case the film allows us to infer a transformation. The inside of the bus becomes like a back stage – where not everything can be seen or heard – creating a true drama performance. Reports by some of the victims confirm that Sandro not only acted, he also directed their performance. Throughout the event, step by step, he gradually embodied the stereotype of the bad character, for which he
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had a perfect “physique du role”. This character gradually takes his real mask out, only to vest an invisible mask of a well known stereotype character. He started by wearing a hat, a mask, and sun glasses, and by speaking through the voice of his hostages. He ended up by exposing his opened face through the opened window of the bus. Through this privileged post he told Brazilians, and the world, about the most dramatic episodes of his impressive biography. Things he emphasized are relevant here.

As the chances of escaping become less likely, Sandro gives up hiding his face. He removes his mask, puts his face literally out of the bus window and yells. He addresses, not the hundreds of people that are watching the drama on the site, right behind the police cordon, but the millions of TV viewers who followed the developments of his dangerous operation live, on radio or TV.

The lines Sandro shouted are expressive. He refers to things he imagines he shares with the people he imagines as his viewers. He says that unlike fictional events in the American film he saw on TV the day before, his actions were for real. At the same time, a hostages’ testimony, who escaped, tell us the story of the negotiations going on back stage between these antagonistic characters. Sandro told the hostages – all women, since he had released the men – at his signal, to pretend they were being hit. In other words, he directed a play. He pretended to the outside public that he would shoot, while arranging with hostages to scream as if they were actually being hit. Inside the bus, hostages at that moment were lying on the floor, so that from the outside, their voices would be heard, but their bodies would not be seen.

As I suggested before, the police, in its turn, played the role of the paralyzed. The operation was marked by comings and goings. At the time there was even suspicion that the bullet that killed one of the hostages was shot not by Sandro, but by a policeman who would have killed the innocent pregnant woman instead of the hijacker. This was not true. The suspicion itself nonetheless reveals general lack of confidence in the police.

The presence of the media immobilized the police and mobilized the hijacker. At the same time, the media became, itself, a prisoner of the event. TV channels and radio stations felt compelled to broadcast the story, with the kind of frenzy that is typical of mediatic events.
Sandro in his turn was in a sense “prisoner of the lights”, or, in other words, prisoner of the attention given to him by the cameras. Gradually, as I say, he switched his moves from the emergency gathering of a little money, to the urgent performance of the role of the bad guy, which everybody who knew him and was interviewed in the film – including some of the hostages – agreed he was not.

Although, according to the reports by his street companions, he hardly mentioned anything about his past or his family, when facing public visibility through television cameras, Sandro denounced his tragic early years. He seemed to be aware that his story would capture attention. He denounced that he had been consistently beaten during his life. This boy as a victim had appropriated the situation, aiming to revert it. And in his hours of fame, he uttered a threatening speech. Again, his bad man’s discourse, vicious victim, according to him was inspired by American movies, contrasts with the perceptions that the hostages had of him – with a double game revealed by them – from the outside he pretended to shoot while inside there was a guarantee that he would not hurt anyone. The windows of the bus framed the stage.

As usual, live coverage explored the event without much contextual information. In order to go beyond this sensational approach, the film recovers the wicked victim’s trajectory. It intends to recover the identity of someone who miraculously survived several violent tragedies. It pictures someone whose life embodied the Brazilian social drama with incredibly sharp colors. The film sharply denounces a succession of extremely unjust circumstances – we see simulations of his witnessing of his mother’s murder; of the horrendous police massacre of street kids, during the night, in front of the Candelária church in downtown Rio de Janeiro. We are presented with images that show humiliation and abusive treatment of kids in the correction institution where Sandro was sent, and from where, not surprisingly, he escaped.

The film takes Sandro’s speech as a guide to tell his history. The characters he mentions, or that appear in the documents, are all interviewed. The hijacking event – beginning during the day and, as a bad omen, finishing in the dark – serves as a guideline to the film that cuts scenes in order to put things in context several times. With a dramatic music in the background, the film develops towards the tragic end as if there was no other way out. Sandro’s relationship with the camera
– the performance of a desperate man facing the spotlights, which is quite obvious in the film – is the knot that remains to be undone.

Bus 174 sharply denounces enduring Brazilian social inequality as the root of an incredibly tragic life. It powerfully assembled TV images in a way that allows viewers to rethink a relevant event which would otherwise be rapidly forgotten. It does, with more sensitivity and fairness, the same role as the TV coverage did – it lets the boy direct the show – despite the police, government, and the media – and against his own chances of surviving.

The atmosphere of a tragic end is enhanced by setting up a narrative in melodramatic tone. Bus 174 does not play with goodies or baddies. Sandro appears as the victim of perverse social conditions. Viewers are presented with this terrible otherness for which they should feel co-responsible, at least for their complacence with discrimination.

In the case of Bus 174, the documentary material seems stronger than fiction. Sandro was five when he saw his mother being stabbed. He never knew who his father was. As a rebel, he adopted the streets. He was the witness of another cruelty, this time carried out by policemen – the Candelária massacre. As a survivor the boy for a while, during what was perhaps the healthier period of his life, could count on a capoeira teacher from PUC, Rio de Janeiro Catholic University. Addicted, he went back on the streets. In the absence of a mother, he adopted one. He promised that she would be proud of him one day. The tone of the music highlights the path as an inevitable tragedy.

Bus 174 is powerfully disturbing. The question it raises, though, is how to disarticulate this complex conundrum that associates poverty, race, gender and violence with fear? Would it be possible to think about aesthetical ways of disarticulating these common sense connections?

5. The Politics of Representation

The idea here is to try an analytical approach that could be used for the analysis of other contemporary Brazilian productions that, either dealing with fiction and/or documentary, express different ways of appropriating mechanisms of producing film and television representation. As I suggested in the introduction, the idea is that different
contemporary works reveal different forms and degrees of appropriation of the media. Dispute over the control of who represents what and how seems to play an increasingly crucial importance in contemporary Brazil. In this dispute, representations about poverty, race, gender and violence play a strategic role. The most successful films in the so-called revival phase can be understood from this point of view. The city is, in this sort of universe, privileged scenery, sometimes even with protagonist roles. Popular neighborhoods or, more specifically, *favelas* are at the center of these elaborations.

*Favelas* have, as discussed earlier in this paper, been pictured in the Brazilian movies from a very early period. Films by Nelson Pereira dos Santos – considered a hallmark in the history of the Brazilian cinema, precisely because of his search for urban landscapes – expanded the use of *favelas*, already present in other forms of artistic expression, such as painting, to cinema. From Grande Otelo’s character in *Rio Zona Norte* (1957), a pioneering modern film, to local actors representing local characters in *City of God* (2002), there is a whole itinerary of representations to be discussed. During this development, the way of representing *favelas* has changed, as did the relationship among those who make films and those who are represented in films. My hypothesis, to be further investigated, is that the allegorical representation of violence that marked “new cinema” movies gave way to documentary forms.

In an allegorical register, cinema novo used violence to introduce a different element compared to the national commonsensical representation – in which Brazil was seen, essentially, as a peaceful, “cordial” country. In documentary contemporary register, violence comes to the forefront of national representation.

Studies of reception conducted in contexts of social discrimination and intense media coverage, suggest different heterodox ways of interacting with printed and electronic means of communication in an intense move to dispute the control over the means of producing representation. Acknowledging this “politics of representation” leads one to think of aesthetic manifestations as expressions of specific relations that viewers and producers establish around special articulations be-

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18 Classic sociological interpretations stress the interpenetration of public and private relations as a founding basis of “cordial men”, and a tolerant nation.
tween sounds and images. In this sense, performance embodies – captures and expresses – conflicts. Different cases express different arrangements.

In the long run, when inquiring about formal concrete arrangements in terms of expression of articulations between certain characters that seek, one way or the other, to control the mechanisms of constructing their representation, we open a path to rethinking the idea of the society of spectacle as proposed by Guy Debord and that, in a diluted manner and lacking ulterior re-elaborations, has served as a reference to different sorts of work, in distinct theoretical perspectives, which seek somehow to place the imaginary in the context of contemporary phenomenon.

Contemporary films deal with different strategies to represent, to talk about violence and poverty. Some experiences, as the Kinoforum workshops or the ones that led to the film “Prisoners of the Iron Bars” (Prisioneiros da grade de ferro) try to transfer, to the inhabitants of the poor neighborhoods and to the inmates of the demolished prison Carandiru respectively, technical “know how” in order to stimulate this poor, black “other” to make their own films. Experiences of the same sort have been conducted among native Americans, Australians, and Brazilians (Ginsburg 1993). In Brazil the project “Video nas aldeias” pioneered this kind of experience. Prisioneiro, the Kinoforum workshops, among many others, bring this experience to urban contexts of conflict and social discrimination – such as prisons and poor neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo metropolis.

Feature fiction films pose a different order of questions, nonetheless, they can also be thought of in terms of a different appropriation of the mechanisms of making representations. Like Bus 174, City of God (2002) can be thought of as following the paths to favelas opened by News of a private war. Both films have the same co-director, Kátia Lund, who coordinated relations with local people. City of God is based on a fictional auto-ethnographic book by Paulo Lins, a former resident of the neighbourhood. Lins worked as a research assistant with anthropologist Alba Zaluar who did research in the Cidade de Deus neighborhood. His book departs from documentary material to

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19 See the catalogue of the recent Video nas Aldeias exhibit at CCBB in Rio de Janeiro.
fragmented novel form where he tells a series of segmented cases. The story lacks a clear beginning, middle or end. It reveals, from an insider’s point of view, the universe of barbarism that has been taking place in everyday life in this favela. A situation that is common to contemporary large Brazilian cities. Curiously, at least in São Paulo, in technical terms, Cidade de Deus would be classified as a conjunto habitacional, a project, or, in British terms, a council estate, as it is not a self-constructed illegal assemblage of shacks, but a government-built housing project on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro city. Book and film use of the word favela may be seen as marking a shift in an insider’s tendency to despise the word due to its pejorative symbolic meaning.

The script, written by Bráulio Pedroso, selects and condenses characters. It articulates a history with a classic narrative, which systematizes the trajectory of the local criminals – starting from past times of inconsequent roguery to contemporary times of pulp fiction violence style. However, beyond this systematic narrative, the film is the result of a year of laboratory sessions with the actors, who were local residents of Rio de Janeiro favelas, organized in the NGO Nós do cinema. For these boys, who are candidates to become ‘Sandros’, representing a ‘Sandro’ in the film is a way of playing out the role of Sandro. During the laboratory, this amateur-professional cast improvised speeches which were incorporated by the director and the screenwriter, added to twelve successive versions of the script. Throughout this long and intense building process, the actors, in some ways characters of themselves, transferred to the film the texture of their everyday life – especially through body language and oral expression. In this way, it is possible to say that there was some sort of symbiosis among actors, director and screenwriter – an unequal one, as the hierarchy is quite clear. Director and screenwriter, plus editor (in the post-production phase) retained the authorial prerogative of deciding what to keep and what to leave out. But City of God inaugurated a “method” that was afterwards followed in the television series City of men. According to the method the script is based on ethnographic on-site research. Scripts describe situations. Lines are improvised by young actors on the set. Actual shooting follows two or three rehearsals of each scene.
Fast pace editing of this well-constructed story played by local unknown actors who speak their own slang and act according to their own codes, shot on location, results in a powerful film. A sharp picture of a deeply rooted myth, which associates violence and poverty, turns out as verisimilar reality. The result is a work that uses fast paced language, using an aesthetic that many despised as pure advertising, perhaps because it is clean and efficient, and giving a sense of authenticity and a documentary appeal. Mostly, City of God resembles the story based on the insertion of these “authentic” elements.

The case of Carandiru is different, even though there are similarities with City of God. The most recent film by Héctor Babenco, as much as Fernando Meirelles, is equally based on an ethnographic report of someone who, in some ways, shares the prison experience as an insider. Drauzio Varella, the doctor who with this book revealed the writers’ side of his professional activity, sought with his book to explain the catastrophic massacre that in one day interrupted dramatically the routine of the prison where he worked, killing 111 of his prisoner patients. Drauzio’s story cannot be seen as a report of someone “from within”, as he was doing voluntary work, visiting everyday. However, he has a sort of specific knowledge that makes him more a voice “from within” that our own. There is an inside/outside ambiguity in the book, implying some appropriation of the production mechanisms of the news. The “authentic” experience of the doctor inside the prison gives credibility to his report from inmates and readers. The doctor’s initiative, sharing his apprehension, and the act of barbarism from the State that ordered the invasion of the prison by military police during São Paulo state-governor Antonio Fleury’s administration, was an editorial success. As the doctor of the prison, the author talks from an ambivalent point of view – he is an insider that leaves every day. He has a position of authority as a doctor. But he knows the inmates by their names, he knows how to find his way in the entanglement of cells, hallways and pavilions.

The film is therefore based on a report that involves some appropriation, even if it is a “half-one”. Carandiru is based on Drauzio Varella’s personal experience as a doctor in the prison – a mix of being an insider and an outsider that gave him a privileged perspective of the events that took place in the traumatic massacre of 1992, an extreme case of state violence. The doctor becomes a chronicler after
elaborating the experience he saw in the destruction of the atmosphere he once knew. Although the cinema version has weakened the role of the writer/doctor as an insider/outsider, Carandiru, as City of God, is the result of a professional-personal elaboration of an insider/outsider. Born and raised in the ‘City of God’, Paulo Lins talks about his community first as an anthropologist researcher and then as a novelist. His story contains documentary and fiction, ethnography and literary characteristics. The film maintains the ambiguity. There is, as mentioned before, the amateur actors cast, who elaborated the dialogues in consecutive versions of the script that were re-elaborated after laboratory sessions. The soundtrack is marked by rap music. The filming in the favelas transformed the locations as another element of reality in the film’s narrative.

Eduardo Coutinho’s film Santo Forte (Strong Saint, 1999) and Babilônia 2000 (Babylon 2000) is also part of this cinematographic experience rediscovering the favelas. Here the issue is not violence. The first film is based on Patricia Monforte’s anthropological research that reveals the religious universe of the favelas. The second one goes to the favelas to document the resident’s oral reflections concerning the turn of the millennium. In both cases, the initiative, the agenda and the characters’ selection were concentrated in the hands of the producers and the director who retain the initiative of the filming process. But the objective here is to document something that could be denominated as “cinematographic encounter”. To make the film is seen as a relation. The film documents an interaction among the team, including the director-interviewer, and the characters. It takes what was said as an expression of that moment. They also express the experience on location. The discovery of the favela after the trafficking. Eduardo Coutinho’s Santo Forte is also from the same year – and also shot in a favela with characters from there – but the theme here is religion and the priority is the chat and not much action. Babilônia was filmed in 1999.

The different ways in which the people in these films appropriate the production mechanisms of their representation configure different strategies, crystallizing in different aesthetic proposals. It departs from the texture of the films in itself to analyze in what ways it expresses forms of appropriating the representation mechanisms. It is not the case here to replace the analysis of the aesthetic articulation of these
works with an ideological discussion about the relations involved in the production process of each work. Quite the contrary, the aim is to understand the dispute for control of constructing mechanisms of representation as an intrinsic dimension of making documentaries, which in many cases justifies the use of fictional conventions.

It is not the case here to judge the presence of cameras. Conversely, it is the case of inquiring about the elements surrounding them. The idea here is to propose an analytical criterion for the current productions, different forms of appropriating the production mechanisms of representation in recent documentary and fictional works. This paper dealt specifically with the film *Bus 174*. The specific case reveals the contradictory ways in which the TV cameras end up stimulating certain behavior – not so much for what is going to be shown, but for the fact of going on air itself. Therefore, the sense of breaking with the invisibility that had characterized the character’s life, with recurring victim positions, witnesses of bizarre tragedies, stimulates the addicted boy to develop a performance for the cameras. For this documental performance, negotiated in the realm of live news, embodying a persistent role in the Brazilian culture, especially in the time we live. Sandro embodies a stereotype and takes benefit as much as he can of the capacity to cause fear. During his ‘15 minutes’ or so of fame, the rebellious boy immobilized the police, divided by divergent orientations, paralyzed by the impossibility of killing a transgressor live on TV to the whole country, as one interviewee reveals – the technically advisable shot would be to hit the head causing a fast and certain death without facilitating any action of the kidnapper against the hostages. However, a shot of that kind could have undesirable effects in the video, such as a cranial explosion. The police and the state government became hostages of what they could imagine as a negative repercussion of an aggressive act in the eyes of the public. The boy became a hostage of the character that he embodied, infuriating the police, humiliated by the inability to act when live TV is present. On the other hand, the presence of the cameras guaranteed a certain survival. It is possible to conceive that if the police car had a camera, the murder would not have taken place. Conversely, the same cameras that guaranteed Sandro’s celebrity, forced him into a performance that could not envision another way out but the tragic end that happened.
Bus 174 allows these kind of speculations, but perhaps it could have gone a little bit further concerning the disarticulation of preconceived notions that surely connects the violent social order and its representations. Would it be possible to deal with the case without falling into the space that flirts with the melodramatic tradition, opposing victim and criminal, in some ways justifying violent acts by the lack of social dignity? Again, in concrete terms, the question is how to escape these traps? How to dismantle the convention that makes the media easy to manipulate, especially when representing violent acts? How to create other mechanisms, different from the attainment of violent acts, in order to set television and cinema guidelines?

Bibliography


My paper will focus on the Brazilian artistic movement called Tropicalia, and especially on the music of Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil. Here I will directly explore their treatment of transnational and multicultural history and themes as examples of political agency within popular culture. As a kind of conceptual video-jockey, I will counterpoint historical commentary and analysis with a series of musical video-clips. (The handouts will provide an itinerary, along with English translations of the lyrics of the songs.)

The Tropicalists have been much in the news of late, due to Gil’s appointment as Brazil’s Minister of Culture, the publication in English of Caetano’s Tropical Truth, and the various Grammies, awards and film roles awarded to the two artists, such as Caetano’s appearance in Almodovar’s Habla con Ella. Journalistic critics of the English translation of Caetano’s memoirs were astonished to encounter a pop-star who could write like Proust and speak knowingly not only about French, American, and Brazilian culture but also about postmodernism and globalization, in a text where names like Ray Charles and James Brown would brush up easily against names like Stockhausen, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze. Both Caetano and Gil, it seems to me, are Orphic intellectuals, or to play on Gramsci’s “organic intellectual”, “Orphoganic” intellectuals: they write books in one moment and lead dancing crowds in another. Reconciling the Dionysian and the Apollonian, they are not only the performers of popular culture, they are also its theoreticians.

As a multi-art movement, Tropicalia melded the popular and the erudite, the Brazilian and the international, the anachronistic and the contemporary, exposing Brazil’s contradictions to what Roberto Schwarz called “the white light of ultra-modernity”. Caetano responded to Roberto Schwartz’ analysis of this “absurdity” in his song
“Love, Love, Love”. Brazil may be “absurdo”, Caetano wrote, “mas Brasil nao e surdo, ja que tem ouvido musical”.

Only a tiny proportion of the Tropicalia songs are “love songs”; the composers simply grant themselves the right to speak about anything and everything. In “Pela Internet”, for example, Gil addresses the possibilities opened up by the Internet, but he multi-culturalizes the discussion by linking the new media to Afro-Brazilian culture, reminding us that West-African religions too were concerned with mediums and communication. More recently, Gil has become embroiled in the debates about “intellectual property rights”. In the spirit of indigenous notions of communal property, Gil is releasing some of his songs under the Creative Commons License so that others may freely “cannibalize” them. In a generous gesture of recombinant transtextuality, Gil, who has himself devoured so many influences, now offers the body of his own work to be devoured by others.

My use of the metaphor of cannibalism is not, of course, accidental. It is well-known that the Tropicalia movement drew on the favored modernist trope of “anthropophagy”. Instead of the “bon sauvage” of the Romantics, the Modernistas preferred the “Bad Indian”, the cannibal, the devourer of the white European colonizer. Radicalizing the Enlightenment valorization of indigenous Amerindian freedom and equality, the modernists highlighted aboriginal matriarchy and communalism as a utopian model for a society free of coercion and hierarchy. The philo-indigenism of the modernists, like that of the French philosophes, enabled a deep anthropological critique of the political and moral bases of Eurocentric civilization.

Tropicalia too was strongly influenced by “anthropophagy” which can be seen as the global South’s version of “intertextuality”, now viewed from the standpoint of neo-colonial power relations. Like the Modernists, the Tropicalists were eager to cannibalize artistic movements from around the world. While the modernists devoured dada and surrealism, as Caetano himself put it, the Tropicalists devoured Jimi Hendrix and the Beatles, all part of a campy pastiche aesthetic which has sometimes been seen as a form of postmodernism avant la lettre.

More than any other, it was Glauber Rocha’s 1967 film “Terra em Transe” that helped crystallize the Tropicalia movement. Caetano delineated the film’s impact on the movement. “That whole Tropicalist
thing”, as Caetano famously put it, “became clear to me the day I saw “Terra em Transe”. My heart exploded during the opening sequence, when, to the sound of a *candomblé chant*, an aerial shot of the sea brings us to the coast of Brazil” (Veloso 1997: 99). Without that “traumatic moment”, Caetano writes, “nothing of what came to be called tropicalism would have ever existed” (Veloso 1997: 105).

A baroque allegory about Brazilian politics, “Terra em Transe” is set in an imaginary country called Eldorado, but which looks very much like Brazil. The “Primeira Missa” fantasy sequence stages a tense encounter between African, indigenous, and European cultures: In this sequence, the character Porfirio Diaz, named after the Mexican ruler, arrives from the sea, in a scene suggesting a primal fable of national origins. Virtually any Brazilian spectator will recognize the reference to Cabral’s “First Mass”, celebrated with the Indians in April of the year 1500. But Rocha’s treatment of this primal theme departs dramatically from earlier artistic representations such as Victor Meirelles’ famous 1861 painting or Humberto Mauro’s 1937 *Descobrimento do Brasil*. By conflating Cabral with the *coup d’etat* engineered by Diaz, Rocha symbolically links the 16th century Conquest with 20th-century neo-colonialism and fascist *coup d’etats*. Diaz is implied to be a latter-day reincarnation of the *conquistadores*. In so doing, Glauber answers the modernists’ call for the “Decabralization” of Brazil.

It is noteworthy that what first impressed Caetano in “Terra em Transe” was the conjunction of aerial shots of the Brazilian coast with the music of *candomblé*, a synthesis of image and music which powerfully evokes the cultural crucible of the Black Atlantic. The very aesthetic of the Rocha sequence draws heavily on the Africanized forms of Rio’s yearly samba pageant, with its zany historicism, and its carnivalesque delight in anachronistic allegories; indeed, the actor who plays the conquistador is Clovis Bornay, a historian specialized in carnival pageantry and well-researched “fantasias”. Secondly, the mass is accompanied not by Christian religious music, but by Yoruba religious chants, evoking the “transe” of the Portuguese title. Rocha’s suggestive referencing of African music implies that Africans too formed part of this primal encounter which gave birth to modernity and, ultimately, to globalization.
Since we are here in Berlin, just a short distance from the site of the Berliner Ensemble, it seems appropriate to open a parenthesis concerning the relation between Brecht, Rocha, and Tropicalia. The period of “Terra em Transe” and Tropicalia coincided with the height of Brechtian influence in Brazil. The Marxist Brecht, ironically, was the most popular playwright in Brazil during the military dictatorship, with ten different Brecht productions in 1968 alone. Brechtian theories exerted a strong influence on theatre groups like Arena and Oficina, and on filmmakers like Rui Guerra, Leon Hirszman, and Arnaldo Jabor. Rocha, for his part, was deeply impacted by a 1960 Salvador performance of Brecht’s “Dreigroschenoper” and he famously proclaimed that his three artistic gurus were Shakespeare, Eisenstein, and Brecht. Apart from his own hopes of making an adaptation of the “Dreigroschenoper” and his efforts to involve Orson Welles in an adaptation of “Galileo”, Rocha endorsed many aspects of Brechtian aesthetics, such as anti-illusionism, direct-address, epic interpretation, and contradiction between sound and image.

“Terra em Transe” exemplifies what I would call, playing on both meanings of the word “transe”, a “Transe-Brechtian Aesthetic”. Rocha carnivalizes and Africanizes Brecht, filtering his ideas through the “transe” of West African possession religions. While Brecht deploys contradiction and disjunction between image and sound, Rocha goes further by staging the historical contradictions between vast cultural complexes – European, African, indigenous – existing in relations of subordination and domination. The Catholic mass is superimposed on music which incarnates precisely the religion suppressed by Christianity, so here the music comes to represent not only an aesthetic disjunction but also the return of the historically repressed. The scene’s fractured and discontinuous aesthetic stages the drama of life in the colonial “contact zone”, defined by what Mary Louise Pratt calls “conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict”. Rocha’s neo-baroque Afro-avantgardist aesthetic here figures the discontinuous, dissonant, fractured history of the multi-nation through equally dissonant images and sounds. Here style itself becomes national (and transnational) allegory.

The brief sequence from “Terra em Transe” offers a glimpse of what Tropicalia might share with Glauber Rocha. First, we find a common critique of the conservative cultural politics of the traditional
Tropicalia, Transe-Brechtianismo and the Multicultural Theme

left, with its preference for the folklorized rural over the mass-mediated urban, its resistance to technical innovations like the electric guitar, and its protectionist defense of what Caetano calls an “indigenous reserve of samba”. Like “Terra em Transe”, Tropicalia generated centrifugal, dispersive texts that fracture the left-populist cultural consensus; they performed a kind of electroshock on dominant paradigms, excoriating both the reactionary Right and the populist Left. Second, Tropicalia absorbed Glauber’s emphasis on the unharmonizable contradictions of Brazil, no longer smoothed over in the name of homogenizing ideologies like “racial democracy” or “Luso-Tropicalism” (Indeed, Caetano preferred the term “Tropicalia” to “Tropicalismo” precisely because it avoided the association with Gilberto Freyre). Third, Tropicalia absorbed Glauber’s Janus-faced openness not only to the popular but also to the avant-garde, whether Brecht and Godard in the case of Rocha, or Concretism and Oiticicca in the case of Tropicalia. Fourth, Tropicalia shared with Glauber the parodic return to foundational myths and national icons, whether Cabral’s “First Mass” in the case of Rocha, or Carmen Miranda in the case of Caetano, all epitomized in the triple pun of “Carmen Miranda-dada”, alluding simultaneously to Carmen Miranda, to the Dada movement, and to the cangaceiro couple Corrisco and Dada. Fifth, Caetano took from Glauber the idea of an anti-illusionist, transtemporal, and multichronotopic aesthetic, one with the audacity to take on vast historical questions. Finally, Caetano too was “Brechtian” in his way. Apart from admiring the work of Brecht-influenced artists like Glauber and Boal, Caetano refers in Tropical Truth (Veloso 2002) to his “Brechtian” use of popular icons like Carmen Miranda. But like Glauber, Caetano and Gil were also “transe-Brechtianos”. Their work goes beyond Brechtian rationalism and scientism, with its emphasis on class, to open up wider social contradictions revolving around race and gender and sexuality and culture.

“Tropicalia” favors a carnivalesque “aesthetic of mistakes”, in which artistic language is liberated from the stifling norms of correctness. Carnivalesque art is thus “anti-canonical”; it deconstructs not only the canon, but also the generating matrix that makes canons and grammaticality. In Verdade Tropical, Caetano evokes something like this aesthetic revolution when he speaks of a “transformation of the very criteria of taste” (Veloso 1997: 147). Tropicalism, for Caetano,
strives for an “equilibrio desequilibrado, feito samba” an awkward equilibrium comparable to the off-balance grace of samba or frevo. (We find this off-balance quality in the CD “Livros”, where the Olodum-style drumming sometimes does not “synthesize” completely with the neo-bossa style of the melody). What impressed Caetano in Glauber’s films, similarly, was not “the attempt to do things correctly […] but rather the making of mistakes and succeeding on a completely different level, according to a new set of criteria for judging what was correct and what was not” (Veloso 1997: 101).

The music of Caetano and Gil is deeply imbued with Afro-diasporic cultural values. “Beleza Pura” exalts the Africanization of Bahia and the cultural take-over by the Afro-blocos. Consistently, Caetano’s music associates black women with beauty, as in the song “Neide Candolina”, a tribute to two black women from Salvador. The city, Caetano suggests, should have more respect for “Liberdade”, a play on the word for freedom but also the name of Salvador’s largest black neighborhood. And Caetano has constantly dialogued with African-American singers, whether through “covers” of songs by Nat King Cole or Michael Jackson, or through shrewd commentaries about the music, as in his wonderfully evocative homage to James Brown’s screams, which (quote) “tear in a clean rip over the lean swing of his band”.

Another striking feature of Tropicalia, shared with Glauber Rocha’s work, is its diasporic, transnational allusiveness; Caetano and Gil take the entire world as their province. One of the most beautiful songs ever written about New York City, for example, is Caetano Veloso’s “Manyata”. Although not all listeners are aware of the fact, “Manyata” paints a scene set along the lower bay of the Hudson river, in an indeterminate time anachronistically mingling centuries of history. The word “Manyata” constitutes a Brazilianized pronunciation of Manhattan, an example of transcultural filtration, where an indigenous American name is heard “through” an equally indigenized Portuguese. Within Caetano’s allegory, the river is obviously the Hudson; the woman in the canoe is obviously native American, the Goddess of Legend is the Statue of Liberty, and the “whirlpool of money” is Wall Street. The young woman in Caetano’s canoe, in this sense, is palimpsestically symbolic: she is at the same time Eve in a prelapsarian Eden, and a native American woman in a pre-Columbian world, but
she is also a native Brazilian woman, more particularly a Tupi woman, since Caetano calls her a “cunha”, Tupi for “young woman”. By linking the native American woman to the torch symbolism of the Statue of Liberty, Caetano hints at the central role of the “Indian” in the “American”, French, and Brazilian versions of the Enlightenment.

In his music too, Gilberto Gil forges links between widely separated cultural worlds. His song “From Bob Dylan to Bob Marley: Samba-Provocation”, for example, forges a creative counterpoint between the Jewish-American Bob Dylan, the African-American Michael Jackson, and the Jamaican Rastafarian Bob Marley, all filtered through a Brazilian sensibility open to Africa, Europe, and all of the Americas. The refrain goes as follows: “Bob Marley died/ Because besides being black/ he was also Jewish/ Michael Jackson/ meanwhile/ is still around/ Because besides becoming white/ He’s become very sad.” Speaking more generally, Gil has served as a kind of musical “bard” of the Black Atlantic. Not only has he performed with musicians like Jimmy Cliff, Stevie Wonder, and Youssou N’Dour, he has also referred both lyrically and stylistically to the variegated musical forms of the Black Atlantic. “Sugar Cane Fields Forever”, for example, traces popular music to its origins in the cane fields of slavery. For decades, Gil has been composing musical odes to Afro-Brazilian religious culture, whether to candomblé, as in “Iemanja” or to macumba, as in “Batmakumba”. Aware of the legacy of racialized repression around the diaspora, Gil composed the anti-apartheid song “A Prayer for Freedom in South Africa” (1985) and created the theme song “Touche pas a mon Pote” for the French anti-racist movement “SOS Racisme”. His song “Quilombo” memorialized Palmares, the 17th century maroon republic founded by fugitive slaves. The lyrics go, in part:

It existed
That black Eldorado of Brazil
It existed
Like a burst of light that freedom created
It reflected
The light of divinity the holy fire of Olorum
[roughly, the Yoruba concept of God]
It revived
A Utopia of One for All and All for One

The next video clips deal with the latter-day legacies of conquest and slavery, both in the negative form of dispossession and brutality, and
the positive form of artistic expression as a sublimation of historical pain. The first musical clip deals with a phenomenon common to most of the Black Atlantic countries – police brutality against black people. What differentiates the Brazilian case from the US case is the fact that police violence in Brazil is in a sense “integrated”, that is, the police who brutalize people of color are often themselves black or of mixed race. This difference derives, many would argue, from two historically distinct modalities of domination, the Anglo-segregationist model more typical of the US, and the Latin assimilationist model more typical of Brazil. Historically, the major confrontations of Brazilian history – Palmares, the Bandeiras, Canudos – have not simply pitted black against white; people of color have fought on both sides, even if an overarching white domination still structures the whole. As a result of these historical differences, the situation in Brazil lacks the stark clarity of a Rodney King-style white/black police confrontation. Indeed, the recent cases where private camcorders registered police abuses illustrate these differences. In 1997, both in the Rio slum “Cidade de Deus”, and in the Sao Paulo slum “Diadema”, police were recorded systematically beating, robbing, and even killing favela residents.

A song which artfully analyzes such phenomena is the Caetano/Gil song “Haiti é Aqui”. To my mind, this single song says as much about the lived modalities of racial and class oppression in the Black Atlantic as a whole series of dissertations. The lyrics describe a scene in which Caetano himself played a role. Just as he was being awarded a “Citizenship Award” on a stage overlooking Salvador’s historic Pelourinho Square, Caetano saw mostly black police beating up a mostly black, or mestizo, or poor white crowd.

The song’s refrain – “Haiti is here, Haiti is not here” – alludes to a famous quotation from the Brazilian philosopher Silvio Romero. Almost a century after the Haitian revolution, Romero warns that “Brazil is not, and should not be, Haiti”. The lyrics link Brazil to Haiti as a double site, both of a black revolutionary past and of a neo-colonial present, an association even more resonant in the light of recent events in Haiti. But here style is inseparable from substance. Brazilian popular music often encodes cultural tensions and syncretisms, not only through lyrics but also through melody, harmony, and percussion. Popular music, through its mise-en-scène and performance, allegorizes
the nation. This particular song stages the power relations between Europe and Africa, between cello and the surdo, between melody and percussion, between the Casa Grande and the Senzala. But here the cello itself is percussive, and yelps with pain at the blows of the police. The song is declaimed, furthermore, in rap style, a style associated with black Americans, but also linked to Brazilian traditions such as “repente” and “talking sambas”. The rap style introduces a note of anger and aggressiveness, an implicit break with the sweeter harmonies of bossa nova and the suave discourses of “racial democracy”. The aggressiveness contrasts even with the sweetness of Caetano’s own “Menino do Rio”, whose refrain – “Havai, seja aqui” – the song both echoes and transforms. Here relations are no longer cordial and the music is no longer sweet, instead we find the politicization of avant-gardist dissonance. The lyrics also recall the legacy of slavery and the pillory as the site of disciplinary punishments – “Pelourinho” after all means pillory. But now the whipping post has given way to mass incarceration and police murder. A pause in the music allows for a dramatic announcement of the murder by police of more than a hundred inmates at Carandiru prison, a kind of Brazilian Attica prison massacre. Yet these events do not shock because of the doxa disseminated throughout society, the realm of “what everybody knows”, in this case the pseudo-knowledge of how blacks are supposed to be treated. At the same time, the lyrics and the percussion evoke the sounds of resistance in the drumming of the Afro-blocos. Their epic grandeur dazzles us, but this kind of culturalist strength is ultimately insufficient when citizenship is so fragile and compromised. And it doesn’t matter that Lente Fantastico visits Salvador, or that Paul Simon collaborates with Olodum to make “Spirit of the Saints”. The song alludes, then, to the differentiated commonalities of the Black Atlantic, where Brazil both is like, and is not like Haiti: Haiti is here. Haiti isn’t here.

A good deal of the multicultural work in both Brazil and the US has focused on racial representation in the media. In his book *The Negation of Brazil (A negação do Brasil)*, Joel Zito Araújo (2000) points out that Brazilian blacks are very much under-represented on Brazilian television, and when they do appear it is usually as subalterns or background figures. Araújo discusses the historical incident in which a Brazilian TV series, based on Uncle Tom’s Cabin, offended the black
community by using a white actor in blackface for the title role. The
Gilberto Gil song “Mao de Limpeza”, here performed with Chico
Buarque de Hollanda, also uses blackface, but this time in a comic and
carnivalesque register. The song’s lyrics satirically upend a Brazilian
proverb that suggests that “blacks, if they don’t make a mess at the
entrance, will make it at the exit”. Calling that view “a damned lie”,
the singers proceed to disentangle the association between blackness
and dirtiness. The lyrics go as follows:

The Hand of Cleanliness
They say that when blacks don't make a mess at the entrance
They make it at the exit.
Imagine!
But the slave mother spent her life
Cleaning up the mess that whites made
Imagine!
What a damned lie!
Even after slavery was abolished
Blacks continued cleaning clothes
And scrubbing floors
How the blacks worked and suffered!
Imagine!
Black is the hand of cleanliness
Of life consumed at the side of the stove.
Black is the hand that puts food on the table
And cleans with soap and water.
Black is the hand of immaculate purity.
They say when blacks don't make a mess at the entrance
They make it at the exit
Imagine!
What a damned lie!
Look at the dirty white guy.

In this song Gil provokes a Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt; he makes
the doxa of racist common sense strange. Imagine! How could anyone
ever have associated blackness with dirtiness! Even the style is
Brechtian in that it recuperates an “incorrect” stereotype within an
anti-illusionist aesthetic. The phenotypic white singer Chico appears
in blackface, while Gil, the black, appears in whiteface, but we are not
supposed to believe that Chico is really black or Gil white. In cultural
terms, the references are at least double, to the “boneca de pixe” (tar
baby) tradition in Brazil and to the racist North American tradition of
minstrels, but “Hand of Cleanliness” is written and performed in a
completely different spirit. Here, the idea of blackface comes not from
white media entrepreneurs but from the black artist himself. And with minstrels, blackface usually functioned alone; there was no whiteface. Blackface was unilateral, premised on whiteness as normative and blackness as intrinsically comic and grotesque. But here, in a sly Brazilian version of the costumed inversions of Genet’s play The Blacks. A Clown Show (Genet 1960), the song overturns the racist binarism which equates blackness with dirtiness; here blackness connotes immaculate purity. At the same time, the parodic and stylized performance itself implies the transcendence of the black/white binarism: the two singers are obviously friends, obviously playing at carnival, and obviously having a very good time. The racism of the proverb does not mean that whites and blacks cannot be friends or fight together against racism.

At this point, I would like to bring the discussion back to anthrophagy and the native Brazilian. The modernists, as we suggested earlier, linked the Indian to a counter-modernity of indigenous egalitarianism. The only problem with the modernist discourse was its failure to link these ideas to the actually existing Indians of Brazil. In this sense, modernism continued the Romantic stream of Indianismo which exalted a safely remote and symbolic Indian, without actually engaging with the flesh-and-blood Indians being dispossessed around Brazil. But with the advent, in the 1980s, of “indigenous media”, we find the present-day avatars of another modernist concept, Oswald’s idea of the “indio tecnizado”. The “high-tech Indians” of indigenous media use audiovisual media such as camcorders and VCRs to preserve and reinvigorate their traditions, and strategize against dispossession; the media become a recombinant means of cultural invention, a form of technological anthrophagy.

The final clip, a Caetano song called “The Indian”, brings us full-circle. The sentiments expressed in the song are not so distant from a recent “Solemn Declaration of Indigenous Peoples”, which proclaimed that “We the indigenous peoples declare to all nations. We are from a millennial lineage, and we are millions. And even if our entire universe is destroyed, we will live, longer than the empire of death”. And indeed, Brazil in recent years has witnessed an Indian resurgence and rediscovery of Indian identity, as Sergio Costa has described in a

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Peoples thought to be on the verge of extinction have experienced upsurges in population and renewed pride.

The song’s references, once again, are transnational, ranging from traditional indigenous culture (the reading of the night’s starry face for signs and omens) to 19th century Indianismo (Peri from O Guarani), to Modernismo (the echoes of Oswald’s technicized Indian), to Bahian culture (the “Sons of Gandhi”), all alongside a postmodern multiracial gallery of pop culture heroes.

Caetano and Gil, in sum, show how music and cinema can transfigure historical relationalities in ways at once cosmopolitan, international and very Brazilian. Their art stages multicultural conflicts and connections in ways that complement and sometimes even transcend the methods of written history and the social sciences. Artists like Caetano and Gil display a chameleonic ability to move easily between various cultural repertoires, to negotiate multiple worlds in a ludic dance of identities reminiscent of carnival and candomblé. They “perform” the cultural debates in visual, sensuous, and percussive form. Whenever I present the music of Caetano and Gil, someone usually complains that the music is not really revolutionary since it is still a commodity sold through transnational corporations. That is true enough on one level, and I am not presenting Caetano and Gil as political models, or even claiming that they are revolutionary. These questions are ultimately much more complicated. Popular music cannot create a revolution, but it can provide a revolution’s soundtrack. Brazil, Caetano once said, has created the world’s most charming protest music, and in Brazil songs like Gil’s “Aquele Abraco”, and Chico’s “A pesar de Voce”, or “Vai Passar” became veritable political anthems. Popular music may not create a revolution, but it does matter, in the end, if masses of people listen to Gil rather than Xuxa, or to Public Enemy rather than Britney Spears. When popular musicians are dismissed as not revolutionary, one wonders to whom they are being compared. Is it to Lenin and Trotsky and Che Guevara – in which case they will definitely be found insufficiently revolutionary. Perhaps they should better be compared to other musicians, to politicized rappers for example, or to poets like Haroldo dos Campos, or intellectuals like Roberto Schwarz or Stuart Hall.

Music is not a mere mirror of identity; rather, it shapes, critiques, and fashions new forms of identity and identification. “Haiti e aqui”,...
for example, makes the middle-class white listener, who might not have personally suffered discrimination or police brutality in the flesh, think about those issues, much as Bertold Brecht’s poem about “Marie Farrar, infanticide” made its readers think about the abuse of maids in Weimar Germany. Music and art create new registers of feeling, channeling empathy to help us see and feel the world differently. The songs we have heard, I would argue, demonstrate music’s capacity to give pleasurable, kinetic shape to social desire, to mobilize feeling in a popular and mass-mediated form. Tropicalia inhabits, to borrow Caetano’s own words about Jorge Bem, “the transhistorical utopian country which we have a duty to construct and which lives inside all of us.”

**Video clips and lyrics**

*Terra em Transe:* The Film that Catalyzed Tropicalia
Video 1: Glauber Rocha’s “Terra em Transe” (1967).

New York, Sao Paulo and the Africanization of World Culture:
Video 2: Gil’s “Funk-se Quem Puder”

Funk-Yourself if you can/ It’s imperative to dance/ Feel the impulse/
Throw your butt around/ Tasting the Rhythm
Funk-yourself if you can/ It’s imperative to play/ Fire in the vertebrae/
Fire in the muscles/ Music in all the atoms
Our Atlantic, Athletic, romantic, poetic Republic of Music…
Funk Yourself if you can/ It’s time to throw everything upside down/
without panic/ a quick form of playing/ time to swim back to mother Africa…

The History of Black Revolt:
Gilberto Gil’s music for Carlos Diegues’ “Quilombo” (1984)

“Quilombo: the Black Eldorado of Brazil”

It existed/the black Eldorado of Brazil/ It existed/ like a burst of light that freedom produced/ It reflected/the divine light, the holy fire of Olorum/
and it came back to life/ the Utopia of one for all and all for one…
It existed/ the black Eldorado of Brazil/ It existed/ It lived, struggled, fell,
died, and came back to life
A peacock of many colors, the carnival of my dreams… Quilombo, Quilombo

The Reality of Police Brutality:
DVD 1: Gilberto Gil and Caetano Veloso: “Haiti e Aqui” (performed by Caetano)
The Subversive Uses of Blackface:

**Video 3: Gilberto Gil: “Mao de Limpeza” (performed with Chico Buarque de Hollanda)**

They say that when blacks don’t make a mess at the entrance
They make it at the exit
Just Imagine!
The slave mother spent her life
Cleaning up the mess that whites made
Just Imagine!
What a damned lie!
Even after slavery was abolished
Black continued cleaning clothes
And scrubbing floors
How the blacks worked and suffered!
Just Imagine!
Black is the hand of cleanliness
Of life consumed at the side of the stove
Black is the hand that puts food on the table
And cleans with soap and water
Black is the hand of Immaculate Purity
They say when blacks don’t make a mess at the entrance
They make it at the exit
What a damned lie!
Look at the dirty white guy!

The Post-modern Indian: Kayapos with Camcorders:

**Video 4: Caetano Veloso: “The Indian”**

After the last indigenous nation will have been exterminated,
And the spirit of the birds from the springs of clear water
More advanced than the most advanced of the most advanced of technologies.
He will come/ Fearless like Muhammad Ali
(He’ll come since I saw him)
Passionately loving like Peri (He’ll come since I saw him)
Cool and infallible like Bruce Lee (He’ll come since I saw him)
The axe (energy) of the afoxe of Gandhi
Will come...

Addendum: The Politics of Syncretism:

**Lyrics to Gilberto Gil’s “From Bob Dylan to Bob Marley: A Provocation Samba”**

Soon after Bob Dylan converted to Christianity, he made a reggae album
as a form of compensation/ He abandoned the Jewish people, but returned to them while heading in the wrong direction ... When the peoples of Africa arrived in Brazil, there was no freedom of religion. As a result,
Africans in Brazil adopted Our Lord of Bomfim, an act both of resistance and surrender.

Refrain:

Bob Marley died/ Because besides being black/ He was Jewish/ Michael Jackson/ meanwhile/ is still around, but besides becoming white/ he’s become very sad.

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